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Abstract 
The case of severe anorexia presents profoundly difficult ethical challenges. Respecting a person’s 
autonomy to refuse treatment may mean ‘giving into’ their illness, but forcing treatment seems 
cruel. These matters put strain on the concept of ‘capacity’, the test by which the law decides who 
can make their own decisions. Critical reaction to relevant legal decisions indicates that there is a 
lack of consensus over how the law should decide capacity in the case of anorexia.  
The aim of this thesis is to examine what process of reasoning courts should use to decide whether 
or not someone has the capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. It will consider the specific issues 
pertaining to anorexia. However, while anorexia presents particular difficulties for the law of 
capacity, it is not unique; there are other mental illnesses with overlapping features. This means that 
the primary question of this thesis cannot be answered without considering the wider role of 
capacity in the legal system. Therefore, a necessary first step in this thesis was to examine the 
broader question: how should the courts determine whether or not a person has the capacity to make 
medical treatment decisions in general?  
In order to examine the broader question, a critical analysis of the law of capacity in Australia, 
England and Wales was performed. This was done by reviewing case law and legislation in those 
jurisdictions, and by conducting a case analysis of legal capacity decisions in different contexts in a 
single jurisdiction (Queensland, Australia). This analysis led to two central conclusions. Firstly, as 
well as autonomy, there is a necessary and legitimate role for beneficence in the determination of 
capacity; a role that is sometimes not acknowledged in the context of a strong focus on autonomy. 
This role for beneficence allows for limited consideration of the ‘outcome’ of a decision, and the 
nature of a mental illness experienced by the decision maker, when determining someone’s capacity 
to make a decision. However, the second conclusion is that even this limited role for beneficence 
carries the danger that people with mental illnesses who refuse what is seen to be necessary medical 
treatment will inevitably be found to lack capacity to make that decision, thus these people’s 
decision making freedom is inappropriately restrained.  
It is important that this shortcoming in the legal process should be addressed. In order to do this, 
courts should ensure that determinations of capacity are not made on medical evidence alone. It is 
argued that a proper capacity assessment should include close and careful engagement with the 
person, in order to discover his or her subjective perspectives, values and desires. Information 
gathered from this engagement should play a central role in the determination of capacity. This 
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would ensure both that the capacity assessment is in keeping with what the law prescribes, and that 
the autonomy of people with mental disabilities is not inappropriately curtailed by medical 
beneficence.  
This thesis then considers the specific issue of capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. Analysis of 
relevant published legal decisions reveals that a problematic form of reasoning is currently being 
used, such that a person diagnosed with anorexia will never be found to have capacity to refuse its 
treatment. Methods by which this form of reasoning can be avoided are explained. Primarily, this 
involves reaffirming the ‘functional’ approach to capacity assessment, and applying the conclusions 
developed regarding capacity generally, in which close attention is given to the subjective views of 
the decision maker. 
In applying the conclusions of this thesis, it may be the case that many people with anorexia will be 
found to lack capacity to refuse its treatment, as currently occurs. However, implementing the 
conclusions of this thesis ought to have the effect of giving the decision makers a voice in the 
determination of their capacity, one that is not currently being given. Further, its effect should be 
that it becomes possible for someone to be found to have capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia, 
thereby disrupting the automatic association between diagnosis and incapacity that the current 
approach creates.  
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Introduction 
 
 A DIFFICULT CASE 
The case Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia)1 involved a 32 year old woman with Anorexia 
Nervosa (anorexia), who had been receiving treatment for the illness since she was 15 years old. E 
had decided that she no longer wanted treatment for the illness, and instead wanted palliative care.2 
E’s health care team, with the support of her parents, agreed to cooperate with E’s request. The 
seriousness of E’s condition meant the withdrawal of treatment for anorexia would most likely 
result in her death. However, after the palliative care regime had commenced, the government 
authority overseeing the health care team made an application to the Court of Protection (England 
and Wales) to determine the legality of this course of action. In his ruling, Jackson J found that, 
firstly, E did not have legal capacity to make decisions about food at the time of hearing, nor when 
she made an advance directive requesting no further treatment for the illness. This meant that E’s 
treatment refusal was not legally effective, and therefore a substituted decision needed to be made 
on her behalf on the basis of her ‘best interests’.3 Secondly, His Honour found that it was in E’s 
best interests to be transferred to a specialist unit for the treatment of anorexia (an option that had 
not previously been available), where she would be treated, whether or not she consented.  
This was a difficult case, which received significant critical response.4 Some of this criticism 
echoed that of E’s parents, who stated: 
It seems strange to us that the only people who don't seem to have the right to die when there is no 
further appropriate treatment available are those with an eating disorder. This is based on the 
assumption that they can never have capacity around any issues connected to food. There is a logic 
to this, but not from the perspective of the sufferer who is not extended the same rights as any other 
person.5  
                                                          
1 Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2012] EWCOP 1639. 
2 Although it was not diagnosed as such, it seems clear that E would meet the criteria for the type of anorexia recently 
delineated as ‘severe and enduring anorexia’. See Chapter 1, Part II B 1.  
3 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) ss 2-4. 
4 See Joanna Whiteman, ‘Limiting Autonomy? Mental Capacity to Refuse Treatment in the UK’ (2012) 9 The Equal 
Rights Review 149; Peter Saul, ‘Force-Feeding Anorexic Patient Curbs Freedom of Choice’ The Conversation July 3 
2012; Barbara Hewson ‘Bleak Prognosis Makes Force-feeding Ruling Questionable’ 156(26) Solicitor’s Journal 9; 
John Coggon, ‘Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests, and the Patient’s Human Right to ‘a Wholesale Overwhelming of her 
Autonomy’ A Local Authority v. E [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP)[2012] HRLR 29’ (2013) 22(1) Medical Law Review 
119; Robin Mackenzie, ‘Ms X: A Promising New View of Anorexia Nervosa, Futility, and End-of-Life Decisions in a 
Very Recent English Case’ (2015) 15(7) The American Journal of Bioethics 57; Charlie Welman, ‘Capacity and Patient 
Autonomy in Refusal of Treatment Cases: Paving the Way for a New Test’ (2017) 7 Southampton Student Law 
Review 42. 
5 Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 at [52]. 
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Criticism of the case included understandable sympathy for E, who after 17 years of failed 
treatment, had to yet again be put through what the judge described as ‘a wholesale overwhelming 
of her autonomy’.6  
Critical attention to a legal decision involving this subject matter is not surprising. Whether or not 
to provide compulsory treatment for severe anorexia is a vexed issue within the field of medical 
ethics.7 In cases like E’s, where a refusal to eat has led to the point of possible death by starvation, 
the ethical situation is particularly difficult. Unlike many other potentially fatal illnesses, doctors 
treating severe anorexia are able to prevent death at any time through the use of nasogastric 
feeding8 to restore weight. However, a nasogastric tube may be removed by an unwilling patient, so 
for it to be effective the patient may have to be chemically or physically restrained during feeding; 
that is, they must be force fed.9 Force feeding is a controversial medical procedure to perform; it 
has been described by the World Medical Association as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’.10 
Moreover, it may damage the relationship between a patient with anorexia and doctors, threatening 
the success of future treatment.11  
On the other hand, there is a view that giving in to an anorexic patient’s request to stop treatment is 
effectively ‘colluding’ with the illness.12 Many would find it particularly upsetting not to stop what 
can be seen as a preventable death.13  
Not infrequently, it is left to the law to decide whether to provide treatment to a person diagnosed 
with anorexia who does not want it. This thesis will examine how this decision is and should be 
reached.  
                                                          
6 Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2012] EWCOP 1639 [117]. 
7 Terry Carney et al, Managing Anorexia Nervosa: Clinical, Legal and Social Perspectives on Involuntary Treatment 
(Nova Science, 2006). 
8 Feeding through a tube inserted through the nose, directly into the stomach. See Marc Neiderman et al, ‘Enteric 
Feeding in Severe Adolescent Anorexia Nervosa: A Report of Four Cases’ (2000) 28(4) International Journal of Eating 
Disorders 470, 470. 
9 Ibid, 471. 
10 World Medical Association, WMA Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers (2017) <https://www.wma.net/policies-
post/wma-declaration-of-malta-on-hunger-strikers/>. 
11 Gunther Rathner, ‘A Plea against Compulsory Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa Patients’ in Walter Vandereycken and 
Pierre JV Beumont (eds) Treating Eating Disorders : Ethical, Legal and Personal Issues (The Athlone Press, 1998) 
193-4. 
12 Rosalyn Griffiths and Janice Russell, ‘Compulsory Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa Patients’ in Walter Vandereycken 
and Pierre JV Beumont (eds) Treating Eating Disorders: Ethical, Legal and Personal Issues (The Athlone Press, 1998), 
132-3. 
13 Simona Giordano, ‘Anorexia and Refusal of Life-saving Treatment: The Moral Place of Competence, Suffering, and 
the Family’ (2010) 17(2) Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 143. 
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 ANOREXIA, COMPULSORY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND THE LAW 
Unless otherwise authorised by law, a doctor must not give a person medical treatment if that 
person has refused the treatment.14 Therefore, doctors who perform involuntary treatment require 
some type of legal permission to do so. In England, Wales and Australia, there are four legal 
avenues in which this permission can be granted by a law court/tribunal: capacity law, mental health 
law, under the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction, and the law of guardianship (Australia) or 
deputies (England and Wales).  
There can be some overlap between those four legal contexts, and the same person, at different 
times, could be subject to each. However, they are distinct legal regimes, and require separate 
consideration. 
A Capacity Law 
Courts have historically had a general power under their protective jurisdiction to make decisions 
on behalf of people determined to lack legal capacity.15 Having first developed in case law, 
jurisdictions in England, Wales and Australia now have a definition of capacity in statute. The 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England and Wales) defines incapacity as when ‘because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’,16 the person is unable: 
a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
b) to retain that information, 
c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).17 
Australian jurisdictions use comparable capacity definitions.18  
The terminology regarding capacity requires clarification. The subject of this thesis is ‘legal 
capacity’, that is, legally effective determinations of a person’s ability to make particular decisions, 
as decided under capacity legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW). This is 
sometimes described as ‘competence’, but in this thesis, in keeping with the cases and legislation in 
England and Wales and Australia, the term ‘capacity’ will be used. A related concept is ‘mental 
capacity’ or ‘medical capacity’, which refers to mental abilities of a person, like understanding, 
remembering, and reasoning. Legal capacity is informed by mental capacity,19 but mental capacity 
                                                          
14 R v Hallstrom: Ex Parte W [1986] 2 WLR 883 at 893. 
15 Re P (Statutory Will) [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch) [22]; Terry Carney, ‘Civil and Social Guardianship for Intellectually 
Handicapped People’ (1982) 4 Monash University Law Review 199, 205-7. 
16 s 2(1). 
17 s 3(1). 
18 For details, see Chapter 2, Part III B. 
19 Kelly Purser, Capacity Assessment and the Law: Problems and Solutions (Springer Verlag, 2017) 5. 
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and legal capacity have different characteristics.20 Conflation of the two concepts sometimes 
occurs, and it is notable that in England and Wales legal capacity is decided under legislation 
labelled the ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005’; however, legal capacity and mental capacity are different 
in important respects. For example, legal capacity is a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision, whereas mental 
capacity occurs on a spectrum.21 Both legal capacity and mental capacity are sometimes described 
simply as ‘capacity’. In this thesis, I will use ‘capacity’ to refer to legal capacity, as opposed to 
‘mental capacity’. 
Under capacity law, once it has been determined that someone lacks capacity to make medical 
treatment decisions, the courts are then required to make a substitute decision for the person. The 
most widely used standard for making this substitute decision is what is considered to be the 
person’s ‘best interests’.22 This order can include involuntary treatment.23  
Before 2012, there were no reported cases in England and Wales which determined the capacity of 
a person to refuse treatment for anorexia under capacity law.24 Since then, there have been five 
cases decided in the Court of Protection (England and Wales) in which this determination was 
made.25 These cases have a number of similarities. Each case involved someone who had 
experienced anorexia for more than ten years, and had been in treatment for much of that time, yet 
the illness persisted. Each adult involved did not wish to have any further treatment. In all five cases 
it was found that the adult lacked capacity to make this decision, owing to the effects of the 
anorexia itself.  
Therefore, the court needed to determine whether to order involuntary treatment in the adult’s best 
interests. As noted above, in Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia), involuntary treatment was 
                                                          
20 Kristy Keywood, ‘Rethinking the Anorexic Body: How English Law and Psychiatry ‘Think’’ (2003) 26(6) 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 599.  
21 Thomas Grisso and Paul S. Appelbaum, ‘Values and Limits of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study’ (1996) 
2(1) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 167, 169; Harold I Kaplan and Benjamin J Saddock, Synopsis of Psychiatry 
(2003, 9th ed, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins) 242. 
22 See Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) s 16(1)(2). 
23 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093; Re P (Statutory Will) [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch) [37]. 
24 According to McSherry, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Riverside Mental Health NHS Trust v Fox 1 
FLR 614 appeared to assume the woman, who was diagnosed with anorexia, had capacity to refuse medical treatment: 
see Bernadette McSherry, ‘Force-feeding and Anorexia’ (1997) 5 Journal of Law and Medicine 8, 9. However, this was 
decided under mental health law, so the question of capacity was not relevant. The appeal was granted on an unrelated 
jurisdictional ground. In B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] 2 WLR 294 a woman was diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. She restricted food intake in a manner comparable to that seen in 
anorexia, and this was seen as a self-harming behaviour. The trial judge believed she had capacity to refuse treatment at 
common law, however, again this was not relevant to the decision, as it was made under mental health law. Moreover, 
that finding on capacity was strongly doubted by Hoffman LJ on appeal: 141. 
25 Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) [2012] EWCOP 1639, The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWCOP 2741, A 
NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35; Re W (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13, Cheshire 
& Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust v Z [2016] EWCOP 56. Cases in which a person consents to treatment 
have not been brought to court. See discussion of this in Chapter 2, Part V C.  
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ordered. In the other four cases, the Court found, supported by unanimous medical evidence, that 
further involuntary treatment was not in the patient’s best interests.   
There have been no reported cases in Australia in which capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia 
has been decided under capacity law.  
 
B Mental Health Law 
People who have a mental disorder and are considered to be a danger to themselves or others, may 
be involuntarily detained for assessment and treatment under mental health legislation.26 England 
and Wales and New South Wales and Victorian mental health legislation have the following three 
criteria for involuntary treatment:  
• the presence of a mental disorder/mental illness; 27   
• the mental disorder/illness requires treatment that cannot be provided other than through 
involuntary treatment;  
• the person is a danger to themselves or others.28  
In Queensland,29 South Australia,30 Western Australia31 and Tasmania,32 an additional criterion of 
incapacity has recently been added. Once these criteria are met, an order for involuntary treatment 
can be made. In England and Wales, and Victoria and New South Wales, this is the case whether or 
not the adult has capacity to consent to the treatment, and whether or not the adult does in fact 
consent to the treatment. However, if an adult is voluntarily submitting to treatment, an order need 
not be made. In Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, if the additional 
criterion of a lack of capacity is not met, then involuntary treatment cannot be ordered.  
In the handful of reported cases in England and Wales decided under mental health law, people with 
anorexia have been found to meet the criteria for involuntary treatment. 33 In SW Hertfordshire 
Health Authority v KB34 a detained mental health patient with anorexia argued that naso-gastric 
                                                          
26 See e.g. Mental Health Act 1983 (UK) s 63. 
27 The definition of mental disorder under the current Mental Health Act 1983 (UK)27 is ‘any disorder or disability of 
the mind’. Victoria: is a medical condition that is characterised by a significant disturbance of thought, mood, 
perception or memory: Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 4(1). Queensland: Mental illness is a condition characterised by 
a clinically significant disturbance of thought, mood, perception or memory. Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) s 10(1). 
28 See Mental Health Act 1983 (UK) s 3, Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) ss 12-14. Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 5.  
29 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) s 12. 
30 Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) s 10. 
31 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA) s 25. 
32 Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) s 40. 
33 Riverside Mental Health Trust v Fox [1994] 1 FLR 614, SW Hertfordshire Health Authority v KB (1994) 2 FCR 
1051. 
34 (1994) 2 FCR 1051. 
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feeding was not treatment for anorexia, but for its physical symptoms. This is important because the 
mental health legislation does not permit involuntary treatment for physical illnesses suffered by the 
detained patient.35 However, Ewbank J accepted the argument from the health authority that 
authority the force feeding was part of the treatment for anorexia.36  
Most determinations under mental health law in Australia are made by boards or tribunals, and only 
the Victorian body publishes its decisions. Several decisions under the previous mental health 
legislation have published on anorexia in that state. In each, the treatment criteria were met and an 
order for involuntary treatment was made,37 except for cases where the Board was convinced that 
an involuntary treatment order was not necessary, as the subject was voluntarily submitting 
themselves to treatment.38 This pattern has continued in decisions under the new Victorian Mental 
Health Tribunal.39  
There have been no published court decisions in Australia involving involuntary treatment for 
anorexia under mental health law.  
 
C Parens Patriae Jurisdiction for Minors 
As the peak onset age for anorexia is 15-19,40 medical authorities may consider involuntary 
treatment for people under 18. Courts have a power to make a vulnerable child a ‘ward of the 
court’, and thereby make decisions on their behalf, which may include medical treatment 
decisions.41 A child with sufficient intelligence—a so-called ‘Gillick competent’ child42—may be 
found competent to consent to medical treatment despite their age. In Re W (A Minor)(Medical 
Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction),43 the Court of Appeal held that it retains inherent jurisdiction to 
override a child’s refusal of treatment, even if that child is ‘Gillick competent’. The Court of 
Appeal ordered that W, a 16 year old girl with anorexia, be moved to a specialist clinic and treated 
                                                          
35 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
36 Soon after, a Court of Appeal (England and Wales) case gave potentially broader interpretation of what constituted 
treatment for a mental illness. In B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] 2 WLR 294 a woman diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder and PTSD was refusing food as a means of self-harm. The court found that as this behaviour was a 
symptom of her borderline personality disorder; Hoffmann LJ agreed with Ewbank J’s statement in SW Hertfordshire 
Health Authority v KB that: ‘relieving symptoms is just as much a part of treatment as relieving the underlying cause’: 
139. 
37 E.g. SF [1989] VMHRB 3, 02-097 [2002] VMHRB 4, 04-002 [2004] VMHRB 1. 
38 E.g. RC [1993] VMHRB 1, EF [1996] VMHRB 10. 
39 E.g. LOJ [2015] VMHT 198, UFC [2015] VMHT 52. 
40 N Micali et al, ‘The Incidence of Eating Disorders in the UK in 2000–2009: Findings from the General Practice 
Research Database’ (2013) 3(5) British Medical Journal Open 2646. 
41 Another option for coercive treatment for children in Australia, child protection legislation, has not been considered 
here, as unlike decisions made under the parens patriae jurisdiction, there is no overlap between that law and capacity 
law, the ultimate topic of this thesis.  
42 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 (‘Gillick’) per Lord Scarman, 186. 
43 [1992] 3 WLR 758. 
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there despite her objection. Lord Donaldson MR stated that the wishes of a Gillick competent child 
were ‘of the greatest importance both legally and clinically’,44 but: 
[i]t is a feature of anorexia nervosa that it is capable of destroying the ability to make an informed 
choice. It creates a compulsion to refuse treatment or only to accept treatment which is likely to be 
ineffective. This attitude is part and parcel of the disease and the more advanced the illness, the more 
compelling it may become. Where the wishes of the minor are themselves something which the 
doctors reasonably consider need to be treated in the minor's own best interests, those wishes clearly 
have a much reduced significance.45 
His Lordship did not believe W to be Gillick competent, owing to the effects of the anorexia. 
Therefore, her wishes did not have the significance that the wishes of Gillick competent child would 
have; in fact, W’s wishes themselves needed to be treated.46  
Equivalent decisions have been made in Australia in DoCS v Y47 and Fletcher (an infant by her 
litigation guardian Rylands) v Northern Territory of Australia,48 where minors with anorexia who 
rejected treatment were found to not be ‘Gillick competent’ owing to the effects of anorexia. 
Therefore, their wishes were of lesser importance, and accordingly the courts ordered that treatment 
be provided.  
 
D Guardianship/Deputyship 
A final option for legal authorisation of compulsory medical treatment in England and Wales and 
Australia is for a third party substitute decision maker to be appointed by a court or tribunal. These 
appointments are known as guardians in Australia and deputies in England and Wales.49 A guardian 
or deputy may make medical treatment decisions on behalf of the adult.50 However, in England and 
Wales, that does not include refusing consent to ‘the carrying out or continuation of life-sustaining 
treatment’ of the adult.51  
There is variation in the test on when a guardian or deputy can be appointed between the England, 
Wales and Australian jurisdictions. England, Wales and Queensland use the same test of capacity as 
used in capacity law in those jurisdictions.52 Most other Australian jurisdictions do not use a test of 
                                                          
44 Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758, 769. 
45 Ibid.  
46 A similar decision was made by the High Court (England and Wales) in Re C [1997] 2 FLR 180. 
47 [1999] NSWSC 644. 
48 [2017] NTSC 62. 
49 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) ss 16-20. 
50 See e.g. Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) s 17(1)(d).  
51 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) s 20(5).  
52 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) s 15, Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 12. 
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capacity in their guardianship legislation.53 For example, in New South Wales, guardianship orders 
can be made if a person is one who is ‘in need of a guardian’, defined as ‘a person who, because of 
a disability, is totally or partially incapable of managing his or her person’.54  
This option has not been used in any reported guardianship/deputy cases within England and Wales 
and Australia jurisdictions,55 with the exception of New South Wales. This exception is because 
mental health law was originally unavailable in the case of anorexia in that jurisdiction, owing to a 
1986 Supreme Court decision.56 Carney et al state that there are approximately six applications each 
year for guardianship in anorexia cases,57 however there are only three reported cases58 in either the 
former Guardianship Tribunal of New South Wales, or the Guardianship Division of the New South 
Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.59 Each of those reported cases finds that due to the 
anorexia, the person is in need of a guardian, and therefore a guardian is appointed.  
 
  DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION OF THE AIM OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis seeks to resolve the controversy created by the case of Re E (Medical Treatment: 
Anorexia). It examines what process of reasoning courts should use to decide whether someone has 
capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. 
There are a number of reasons why, of the four regimes described above, this particular legal focus 
was chosen. It was decided to focus on a single legal regime because while there is some overlap in 
the four avenues to involuntary treatment, the legal question being answered differs depending on 
which regime applies.60 Focussing on one allows for greater specificity in analysis. Of the four, 
capacity law was found to be of particular interest and importance.  
                                                          
53 With the exception of the Australian Capital Territory: Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) s 
5.  
54 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 3. See discussion about this in Chapter 2. 
55 The Victorian Tribunal determining guardianship matters has stated a policy that it does not authorise coercive 
treatment. See Terry Carney, ‘Regulation of Treatment of Severe Anorexia Nervosa: Assessing the Options’ (2002) 
11(3) Australian Health Law Bulletin 25. 
56 JAH v Medical Superintendent of Rozelle Hospital (1986) S14 of 1986. See Rosalyn Griffiths et al, ‘The Use of 
Guardianship Legislation for Anorexia Nervosa: A Report of 15 cases’ (1997) 31(4) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Psychiatry 525, Terry Carney et al, ‘Institutional Options in Management of Coercion in Anorexia 
Treatment: The Antipodean Experiment? (2003) 26(6) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 647, fn 34. 
57 Carney et al, above n 56, 654. 
58 OTR [2012] NSWGT 26; KSC [2013] NSWGT 20; CFL [2007] NSWGT 21 
59 This commenced in 2014.  
60 Under the now replaced Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic), one of the criteria for involuntary treatment was ‘the person 
has refused or is unable to consent to the necessary treatment for the mental illness’: s 8(1)(d) In AB [1988] VMHRB 1 
the Victorian Mental Health Review Board stated that the second part of that criterion would be determined by whether 
the person ‘has the capacity to consent to treatment, when he or she understands the broad nature and effect of the 
treatment for which consent is sought’. A number of cases involving anorexia were decided using this construction, e.g. 
SF [1989] VMHRB 3, 02-097 [2002] VMHRB 4, and 04-002 [2004] VMHRB 1. At first glance, this appears to be an 
equivalent definition of capacity to that found in mental capacity legislation. However, there is an important difference, 
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Firstly, the critical reaction to Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) indicates that there is 
disagreement and controversy over how these types of cases should be decided. Criticism of the 
more recent Court of Protection cases on capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia indicates that the 
controversy has not been resolved.61 In England and Wales, since 2012 there have been five 
reported cases decided under capacity law, compared with none under mental health law. Although 
it is not clear why this has occurred, it coheres with a noted growing unwillingness of healthcare 
providers to treat people with capacity against their will,62 whether or not that option is available 
under mental health law. There is no Australian authority on treatment refusal for anorexia decided 
under capacity law. However, as four states have added the criterion that a person lack capacity to 
the requirements for involuntary treatment under mental health law,63 it is now more likely that at 
some stage a court will have to determine capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia.64  Therefore, 
capacity law is a likely site of future legal dispute in England and Wales and Australia, and so 
resolving this controversy is an important task. This thesis aims to provide guidance to a future 
court tasked with making this decision.65   
The issue of capacity for treatment refusal has additional significance because capacity more 
broadly has been the topic of recent critical academic attention, looking at the uncertainties of the 
                                                          
because capacity to make medical treatment decisions under medical capacity law explicitly includes the possibility of 
that capacity being exercised to refuse treatment. On the other hand, the phrase ‘capacity to consent’ indicates the 
inquiry is to whether there is sufficient understanding in order for the adult to agree to the treatment. This view is 
demonstrated in the anorexia cases determined under this legislation. In 04-002, [2004] VMHRB 1 the board found that 
‘P’ did not meet this criterion, because although the Board accepted evidence that P ‘now understood how serious her 
mental illness is and the necessity of treatment in the hospital program’, this ‘insight’ had only occurred within the last 
10 days. In EF [1996] VMHRB 10 the Board found that EF did meet the criterion, because: 
EF appears to the Board to demonstrate a sufficient, if qualified, degree of insight to persuade the Board that 
she is able to consent to and will consent to the treatment required for the continuing management of her 
illness (emphasis added). 
 
See further examples of this in Pierre Beumont and Terry Carney, ‘Can Psychiatric Terminology be Translated into 
Legal Regulation? The Anorexia Nervosa Example’ (2004) 38(10) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 
819. Therefore, while this criterion resembles capacity under capacity law, in practice there is a significant difference.  
61 Daniel Wei L Wang, ‘Mental Capacity Act, Anorexia Nervosa and the Choice Between Life-Prolonging Treatment 
and Palliative Care: A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X’ (2015) 78(5) Modern Law Review 871; Emma Cave and Jacinta 
Tan, ‘Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa in the Court of Protection in England and Wales’ (2017) 23 International 
Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 1. 
62 Joel Yager, Terry Carney, and Stephen Touyz, ‘Is Involuntary (Compulsory) Treatment Ever Justified in Patients 
with Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa? An International Perspective’, in Stephen Touyz et al (eds) Managing 
Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa: A Clinician's Guide (Routledge, 2016). 
63 Above Part II B. This change has been mooted in England and Wales, see John Dawson and George Szmukler, ‘The 
Fusion of Mental Health and Incapacity Legislation’ (2006) 188 British Journal of Psychiatry 504.  
64 Chris Ryan, et al argue that capacity under that mental health legislation should be equivalent to the concept as it 
exists under capacity law: Chris Ryan, Sascha Callaghan, and Carmelle Peisah, ‘The Capacity to Refuse Psychiatric 
Treatment: A Guide to the Law for Clinicians and Tribunal Members’ (2015) 49(4) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Psychiatry 324. 
65 For those jurisdictions using a test of capacity equivalent to that in capacity law in its guardianship/deputyship 
jurisdiction, the conclusions here will be directly relevant to decisions made relating to patients with anorexia in that 
legal context also. 
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nature of its role within the legal system.66 It is also the centre of a significant dispute under 
international law. The Committee of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has 
issued a comment to say that all regimes that authorise the removal of a person’s legal capacity—
like those described above in Part II A—are in violation of the Convention.67 Australia has issued 
an interpretative declaration stating that in its understanding of the Convention, substitute decision 
making is allowed ‘as a last resort and subject to safeguards’.68 Although member States, including 
the United Kingdom and Australia, face pressure in the face of the Committee’s views, it appears 
that most will continue to operate a regime of substitute decision making regulated by a test of 
capacity for the foreseeable future.69 Yet literature is sharply divided over this issue, with profound 
disagreements over whether the Committee’s interpretation is appropriate, and whether current 
capacity law infringes the rights of people with disabilities.70   
Capacity is also particularly interesting because as well as a legal mechanism, it is a medical 
concept. Capacity is therefore an important topic in the area of bioethics, and as will be seen, one of 
the debates in the legal sphere surrounds the application of two concepts central to the field of 
bioethics: autonomy and beneficence.71 
Capacity was specifically chosen over the parens patriae jurisdiction for minors because one of the 
specific focusses of this study is how the law decides in situations like E’s (and that of the subjects 
of the other Court of Protection cases) in which treatment has been given for years without success, 
to the point where the medical utility of continued treatment is questioned. It is unlikely that this 
point would be reached with a person under 18.72 
 
                                                          
66 See e.g. Gareth S Owen et al, ‘Mental Capacity and Decisional Autonomy: An Interdisciplinary Challenge’ (2009) 
52(1) Inquiry 79; Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge, 2010); Charles Foster, ‘Autonomy in the Medico-legal Courtroom: a Principle Fit for 
Purpose?’ (2013) 22(1) Medical Law Review 48.  
67 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment no 1: Article 12: Equal 
Recognition before the Law, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 May 2014) [1.4]. 
68 < https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec> 
69 John Dawson, ‘A Realistic Approach to Assessing Mental Health Laws' Compliance with the UNCRPD’ (2015) 40 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 70. 
70 On the critical side, see Peter Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Mental Health Law’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 752, Eilionóir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Legislating 
Personhood: Realising the Right to Support in Exercising Legal Capacity’ (2014) 10(1) International Journal of Law in 
Context 81. On the other side see Dawson, above n 69, and Matthe Scholten, and Jakov Gather, ‘Adverse Consequences 
of Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for Persons with Mental Disabilities and 
an Alternative Way Forward’ (2018) 44(4) Journal of Medical Ethics 226. 
71 See Chapter 2. 
72 In Ontario, Canada, children aged 16 and over are also dealt with by the same law as adults, merging ‘Gillick 
competency’ and capacity: Health Care Consent Act 1996 (Ontario) s 4. The definition of capacity used is functional; 
equivalent to that in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW). Case law from this jurisdiction, including cases relating to 
minors, is therefore directly relevant to the issue of capacity in that jurisdiction.  
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  CONTRIBUTION OF THESIS TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
The case of the patient with anorexia refusing treatment is considered to be a paradigmatic ‘hard 
case’ for the law of capacity.73 An analysis of the criticism of Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) 
shows that there is a lack of consistency on the question of why this decision is thought to be 
problematic. At face value, much of the criticism is directed at the fact that it denied E’s autonomy, 
or her human right to refuse treatment. For example, Hewson argued that E had been treated ‘like a 
child’.74 Whiteman believes it is a ‘breach of a [E’s] right to legal capacity on an equal basis’.75 
This concern for E’s autonomy and rights is understandable; Jackson J himself admitted that his 
decision would mean ‘a wholesale overwhelming of her autonomy’.76 Moreover, in the spheres of 
disability rights and medical ethics, there has been a growth in concern generally for the protection 
of autonomy.77 Given the historical treatment of people with mental disabilities, this focus is 
important. However, if autonomy is the underlying goal supporting criticism of Re E (Medical 
Treatment: Anorexia), why was there not equivalent criticism of the other four Court of Protection 
cases, which also found the adults to lack capacity, thereby assuming the role of substitute decision 
maker? An obvious reason is that the ‘best interests’ decision reached on those other cases were not 
for the continuation of unwanted treatment. This distinction is understandable, but it shows that 
despite appearances, it is not solely autonomy that motivates the criticism of Re E (Medical 
Treatment: Anorexia). This is visible in Hewson’s critique, who argues that for E ‘the deliberate 
infliction of prolonged suffering, with such a bleak prognosis, must be disproportionate. Put simply: 
it really isn’t worth it.’78 
This then raises the question of whether the futility of treatment should have been considered when 
deciding whether or not E had capacity to refuse it. There is nothing in the definition of capacity in 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW)79 that appears to allow for that consideration to be included in 
the determination of capacity. Under capacity law, the test of capacity is directed at a person’s 
ability to understand and use information related to the decision, not the nature of the decision 
made.80 But it seems that consideration of futility was implicitly accepted by at least some of those 
criticising Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia). Moreover, a number of writers, looking at 
                                                          
73 Christopher Ryan and Sascha Callaghan, ‘Treatment Refusal in Anorexia Nervosa: The Hardest of Cases’ (2014) 
11(1) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 43. 
74 Hewson, above n 4, 9. 
75 Whiteman, above n 4, 152. 
76 Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 [117]. 
77 Genevre Richardson, ‘Mental Capacity in the Shadow of Suicide: What Can the Law Do?’ (2013) 9(1) International 
Journal of Law in Context 87, 89. See discussion in Chapter 2, Part II. 
78 B Hewson, ‘Bleak Prognosis Makes Force-Feeding Ruling Questionable’ (2012) 156 Solicitor’s Journal 9, 9. 
79 Nor under definitions of capacity in Australian jurisdictions. 
80 See discussion of this in Chapter 2, Part III B. 
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situations like E’s, where treatment for anorexia has been provided for years, and is not working, 
have argued that the futility should be relevant to capacity to refuse treatment.81  
This issue of capacity and futility is therefore important to resolving the controversy around Re E 
(Medical Treatment: Anorexia). But this then raises a broader issue that must be addressed in this 
thesis. If it is the case that futility of treatment is something that should be considered when 
deciding someone’s capacity to refuse that treatment, should that be the case just for people 
suffering anorexia, or for any mental illness? or for anyone in any particular situation? This issue 
was the subject of an important exchange between leading scholars in the area of anorexia and 
capacity respectively. In 2003, Tan and colleagues wrote: 
Despite the voluminous literature in which commentators, including clinicians, feminists, 
philosophers, and lawyers, have argued about whether patients diagnosed with anorexia nervosa 
should be allowed to refuse treatment or be forced to have treatment, there has been little attempt to 
study the nature of competence to make treatment decisions in general and of the problems in 
treatment decision making, which may occur in anorexia nervosa in particular.82 
In an attempt to address this lacuna, Tan, Hope and Stewart published a widely cited series of 
articles based on interviews with anorexia patients and their relatives. In this series, they developed 
the argument that the existing test of capacity did not sufficiently capture the autonomy-
undermining effects of anorexia. They argued that many of the people they interviewed would 
‘pass’ a capacity test, but because of the values of thinness associated with anorexia, their decision 
making about food did not represent their ‘true or authentic views’.83 These values, therefore, were 
‘pathological values’, a concept that they suggest ought to be relevant to the decision of whether to 
override patient refusal of treatment, and should be considered for inclusion in the test of capacity.84 
The test of capacity Tan et al primarily relied on in their study was the MacCAT-T, which is the 
most widely used test in the assessment of capacity to consent to treatment. Grisso and Appelbaum 
developed the MacCAT-T, and their writings on the topic of capacity have been very influential.85 
In response to Tan and Hope’s call for the incorporation of the concept of ‘pathological values’ into 
the test of capacity, Grisso and Appelbaum made two important points. Firstly, they doubted 
                                                          
81 Heather Draper, ‘Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy: A Limited Justification’ 
(2000) 14(2) Bioethics 120; Margery Gans and William B Gunn Jr, ‘End Stage Anorexia: Criteria for Competence to 
Refuse Treatment’ (2003) 26(6) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 677; Simona Giordano, ‘Anorexia 
Nervosa and Refusal of Naso‐Gastric Treatment: A Response to Heather Draper’ (2003) 17(3) Bioethics 261. See 
discussion of these arguments in Chapter 6, Part IV D.  
82 Jacinta Tan et al, ‘Control and Compulsory Treatment in Anorexia Nervosa: The Views of Patients and Parents’ 
(2003) 26(6) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 627, 629. 
83 Jacinta Tan et al, ‘Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking Processes and Values’ 
(2006) 13(4) Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 267. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Their initial paper, Paul S Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso, ‘Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment’ 
(1988) 319(25) New England Journal of Medicine 1635, has been cited over 1200 times on Google Scholar.  
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whether the current test of capacity did in fact fail to detect the effects of anorexia.86 But secondly, 
and importantly for the structure of this thesis, they argued that capacity should not be altered based 
on the nature of one illness. They point out that: 
there is an inherent danger in altering a concept like competence to consent to treatment on the basis 
of the study of any one mental disorder. It is not at all clear how the modification might influence 
findings of competence when applied to other disorders. Using a study of patients with anorexia 
nervosa as the impetus for changing the competence concept runs this risk.87 
This appears to be a sound proposition. Although anorexia does provide a difficult case for 
capacity, it is not unique.88 There are many other recognised mental illnesses that would be 
associated with similar difficulties for the law of capacity.89 And importantly, Tan et al, in response 
to Grisso and Appelbaum, agreed with this particular point. They argued that although anorexia was 
a difficult case, their investigation into capacity and anorexia was ‘studying penguins to understand 
birds’,90 that is, investigating an unusual member of the group in order to better understand the 
definitional boundaries of that group.   
There are a number of issues that the situation of Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) presents. 
One question identified above is: to what extent should the futility of the treatment offered be 
relevant to determining whether a person with anorexia can refuse treatment? Another question that 
remains unresolved is how the law of capacity should deal with cases like anorexia, in which the 
decision-maker’s values appear to have been affected by the illness. The existing critical analysis of 
Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) has been confined to the specific issues of anorexia and 
treatment refusal, rather than the broader issues of capacity to refuse medical treatment.91 What the 
exchange between Tan et al and Grisso and Appelbaum shows is that these issues cannot be 
addressed with reference to anorexia alone. Therefore, before the purpose of this thesis is achieved, 
the initial question must be addressed: by what process of reasoning should capacity to make 
medical treatment decisions in general be decided?  
                                                          
86 Grisso and Appelbaum’s views on this are supported in this thesis, in Chapter 6, Part IV A 1. 
87 Thomas Grisso and Paul S Appelbaum, ‘Appreciating Anorexia: Decisional Capacity and the Role of Values’ (2006 
13(4) Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 293, 294. 
88 Terry Carney, ‘Anorexia: A Role for Law in Therapy?’ (2009) 16(1) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 41, 42. 
89 Grisso and Appelbaum, above n 87:  
For example, anorexia is one of a class of mental disorders that is characterized by a failure to abstain from 
behavior (here, limiting food intake and other behaviors designed to reduce weight) that has negative 
consequences for the person. Other conditions in this category might include substance abuse disorders and 
impulse control disorders (e.g., pathological gambling), 294. 
90 Jacinta Tan et al, ‘Studying Penguins to Understand Birds’ (2006) 13(4) Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 299. 
91 E.g. citations above n 4, Emma Cave and Jacinta Tan, ‘Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa in the Court of 
Protection in England and Wales’ (2017) 23 International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 1; Daniel Wei L 
Wang, ‘Mental Capacity Act, Anorexia Nervosa and the Choice Between Life-Prolonging Treatment and Palliative 
Care: A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X’ (2015) 78(5) Modern Law Review 871; David Gibson, ‘Conceptual and Ethical 
Problems in the Mental Capacity Act 2005: An Interrogation of the Assessment Process’ (2015) 4(2) Laws 229. 
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The importance of first addressing the wider question can be seen in Coggon’s critical response to 
Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia). Having considered the way Jackson J treated E’s values, and 
briefly comparing it to other cases not involving anorexia, Coggon92 makes the following remark: 
Existing law tells us that a logical decision based on a deeply held religious belief against receiving 
blood transfusions will be upheld. A similar decision based on an individual belief that blood is evil 
will be ignored. A refusal of food based on a patient’s suffering anorexia nervosa, or some other 
psychiatric condition, can be ignored, though if such a refusal is founded on other values it may be 
respected. And going through decided cases, this sort of list would go on. In undertaking such an 
exercise, it is not obvious that a sound, guiding rationale could describe, or help predict, where the line 
between capacity and incapacity will be drawn93 (citations removed, emphasis added).  
Coggon’s statement demonstrates the importance of Grisso and Appelbaum’s response to Tan et al. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the process by which cases like E’s should be decided in 
the future; it is directed at the issue of anorexia. However, if addressing the anorexia question is 
done without consideration of the wider operation of the law of capacity, the conclusions may have 
the impact of decreasing the clarity in this law. Therefore, this thesis must first answer the broader 
issue of what reasoning process should be used to decide medical treatment questions in general, 
before moving onto anorexia specifically. This is an ambitious task; there has been much written on 
the topic, and serious disagreement remains. Nevertheless, unless a defensible ‘sound, guiding 
rationale’ can be developed, the conclusions of this thesis will be limited.  
 
 SCOPE OF THESIS 
The jurisdictional coverage of this thesis is England and Wales and Australia. It will be seen in 
Chapter 2 that these jurisdictions have essentially equivalent legal regimes for capacity to make 
medical treatment decisions. The conclusions reached in this thesis will have equal relevance in 
each jurisdiction. The law of England and Wales will be given more prominence by virtue of the 
fact that it has had the largest role in the development of the law of capacity, and has had the most 
judicial consideration of the specific question of capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia.94 It will 
be shown in Chapter 2 that Australian legislation has largely replicated the position developed in 
England and Wales case law and enacted in legislation.95 Australian courts have also looked to 
                                                          
92 John Coggon, ‘Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests, and the Patient’s Human Right to “A Wholesale Overwhelming 
of her Autonomy”’ (2014) 22 Medical Law Review 119. 
93 Ibid, 129-30. 
94 See above Part II A. 
95 See Chapter 2, Part III B.  
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England and Wales case law to assist in its interpretation of capacity under local statutes.96 In 
Australian decisions not made under capacity statute, judges have relied on major England and 
Wales decisions to establish the applicable law.97 
Where it is useful, case law from the comparable jurisdictions—Canada, the USA, and New 
Zealand—will be considered, and the conclusions reached here will have relevance to decisions 
made under those regimes to the extent that the law of capacity is equivalent.  
This thesis is directed at answering a legal question, and is directed at legal decision makers. The 
central method of this study is doctrinal; Chapter 3 is an empirical analysis of case law data.98 The 
development of a ‘sound guiding rationale’ to determine how the line of capacity and incapacity 
will be drawn must rest on the law as it currently exists. Some important policy arguments will be 
considered, but the primary aim in this regard is develop an understanding of the law of capacity 
that is coherent and consistent. The subject matter of this thesis is the current law of capacity, but 
based on the understanding developed in this investigation, the conclusion might require the law to 
be changed, interpreted differently, or given more detail.  
The capacity being considered here is capacity to make medical treatment decisions. However, 
capacity has a much broader application in the law than simply relating to those decisions. The law 
may determine a person’s capacity to contract, to marry, to instruct lawyers, or to write a will, 
amongst many other tasks. There is significant overlap in the applicable capacity law that applies to 
those different tasks, in fact, in some cases the law is precisely the same.99 This overlap means that 
useful comparisons between capacity decisions in different specific contexts can be made.100 
However, the ultimate focus of this thesis is medical treatment decisions.  
 
  OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 explains the current medical understanding of anorexia, and discusses what is known 
about its causes, effects, and treatment. Chapter 2 critically assesses the law of capacity in England 
and Wales and Australia. It considers the extent to which the common understanding of capacity as 
a ‘gatekeeper’ for autonomy is accurate. In order to gain a better understanding of how capacity 
works in the legal system, a case survey on three types of capacity decisions in one jurisdiction was 
                                                          
96 E.g. Re Bridges [2001] 1 Qd R 574, Re GMH [2003] QMHC 8 (decided under the Mental Health Act 2000, under 
which ‘capacity to consent to be treated’ was an alternate criterion), UMG [2015] NSWCATGD 54. 
97 E.g. Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. 
98 See Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987). 
99 For example, in Queensland, the same capacity statute is used to cover medical decisions, financial decisions, and 
legal decisions. See Chapter 3, Part II. 
100 Such a comparison is performed in Chapter 3. 
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conducted. Chapter 3 presents the results of this survey, and Chapter 4 analyses those results. Based 
on the analysis in Chapters 2 and 4, Chapter 5 develops an argument for how capacity should be 
determined under the law. It seeks to provide Coggon’s ‘sound, guiding rationale’ for how the line 
between capacity and incapacity should be drawn. Chapter 6 applies this understanding to anorexia, 
and explains how the conclusion of Chapter 5 can help to resolve the difficulty the law currently 
faces regarding capacity and anorexia, as evidenced by Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia).  
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Chapter 1: Overview of Medical Understanding of 
Anorexia 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
The research question this thesis answers is what process of reasoning courts should use to 
decide whether someone has capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. The purpose of this 
Chapter is to set the scene for this critical investigation. It will describe the current medical 
knowledge about anorexia. It will discuss its nature, causes, effects and treatment. It will be 
seen that the dangerousness of anorexia means that the question of capacity to refuse its 
treatment is of vital importance.  
 
 MEDICAL UNDERSTANDING OF ANOREXIA 
A What is Anorexia? 
The term ‘anorexia nervosa’ was coined in 1873 by Sir William Gull, and the features he 
described then are essentially consistent with how it is understood today. There are currently 
two main sources of diagnostic information on mental illness, the Diagnostic and Statistics 
Manual1 (DSM5) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)2. The diagnostic 
criteria for anorexia in the DSM5 are:  
1) Restriction of energy intake relative to requirements, leading to a significantly low body 
weight in the context of age, sex, and developmental trajectory, and physical health …; 
2) Intense fear or gaining weight or of becoming fat, or persistent behaviour that interferes 
with weight gain, even though at a significantly low weight; 
3) Disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight or shape is experienced, undue 
influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or persistent lack of recognition of 
the seriousness of the current low body weight.3 
The ICD definition also comprises those three features: low body weight brought on by 
avoidance of eating, excessive fear of becoming overweight and/or overvaluing of thinness, 
                                                          
1 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 5th ed, 2013). 
2 World Health Organisation, International Classification of Diseases, (World Health Organisation, 10th ed, 
2016). 
3 American Psychiatric Association, above n 1, 338-9. 
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and a lack of recognition of low body weight.4 Anorexia falls in the category of eating 
disorders, which also includes bulimia, and others.5 
For the person experiencing the illness, anorexia is often seen as an essential part of one’s 
personality.6 This characteristic of mental illness is known as ‘ego-syntonicity’. In their 
influential study on anorexia, Hope and Tan give examples of how ego-syntonicity manifests, 
but they also show that for other anorexic patients, at least some of the time the illness can be 
described as ‘ego-dystonic’, in that the anorexia is seen by the person experiencing it as 
something outside, or separate from, their personality.7 
The prevalence of anorexia is widely thought to be higher in Western countries than 
elsewhere, although there are no comparative data to conclusively demonstrate this.8 The 
majority of sufferers of anorexia are female,9 with a range of female to male ratio placed 
from 8:1 to 10:1 in the DSM5.10 The incidence rates of the illness have been placed from 4.2 
to 12.6 per 100,000 person years.11 There is debate over whether the incidence has been 
increasing in recent years,12 but most opinion is that the rate has been stable in Western 
countries.13 The peak age range of onset is between 15-19 years of age.14  
There is a high level of comorbidity associated with anorexia,15 with one study by Hudson et 
al showing 56.2 per cent of sufferers also experiencing another recognised mental disorder.16 
These comorbidities may reduce the effectiveness of treatment, so for some people can be a 
                                                          
4 WHO, above n 2, 177. 
5 American Psychiatric Association, above, n 1. 
6 Maria Roncero et al, ‘Ego-syntonicity and Ego-dystonicity of Eating-Related Intrusive Thoughts in Patients 
with Eating Disorders (2013) 208(1) Psychiatry Research 67. 
7 Tony Hope et al ‘Anorexia Nervosa and the Language of Authenticity’ (2011) 41(6) Hastings Center Report 
19. See also Walter Vandereycken, ‘Denial of Illness in Anorexia Nervosa: A Conceptual Review: Part 1 
Diagnostic Significance and Assessment (2006) 14(5) European Eating Disorders Review 341. 
8 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, Eating Disorders: Recognition and Treatment: Full 
Guideline (Draft for Consultation) (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2016). 
9 Hans-Christoph Steinhausen and Christina Mohr Jensen, ‘Time Trends in Lifetime Incidence Rates of First‐
Time Diagnosed Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa across 16 Years in a Danish Nationwide Psychiatric 
Registry Study’ (2015) 48(7) International Journal of Eating Disorders 845. 
10 American Psychiatric Association, above, n 1, 341. 
11 Laura Currin et al, ‘Time Trends in Eating Disorder Incidence’ (2005) 186 British Journal of Psychiatry 132; 
Nadia Micali et al, ‘The Incidence of Eating Disorders in the UK in 2000–2009: Findings from the General 
Practice Research Database’ (2013) 3(5) British Medical Journal Open 2646. 
12 Frederique RE Smink, Daphne van Hoeken, and Hans W Hoek, ‘Epidemiology of Eating Disorders: 
Incidence, Prevalence and Mortality Rates’ (2012) 14(4) Current Psychiatry Reports 406. 
13 Micali et al, above n 11. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Girolamo Preti et al, (2009) ‘The Epidemiology of Eating Disorders in Six European Countries: Results of the 
ESEMeD-WMH Project (2009) 43 Journal of Psychiatric Research 1125. 
16 James I Hudson et al, ‘The Prevalence and Correlates of Eating Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication’ (2007) 61(3) Biological Psychiatry 348. 
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sustaining factor in the illness.17 A very wide range of comorbid disorders have been 
identified, with no one class of disorder standing out as having consistently higher levels of 
comorbidity. The disorders with the highest level of comorbidity found in the Hudson et al 
study were major depressive disorder (39.1 per cent), phobia (26.5 per cent) and alcohol 
abuse or dependence (24.5 per cent).18   
Anorexia is considered to be a particularly dangerous mental illness. It has the highest 
associated mortality rate of all mental illnesses, at approximately 5.1 deaths per 1000 person 
years.19  
B Effects of Anorexia 
An aversion to food and an unhealthily low body weight are often described as ‘effects’ of 
anorexia, including in major legal decisions;20 however, as these features are diagnostic 
symptoms of the illness, as seen in the DSM5 and ICD definitions above, it is not strictly 
correct to describe them as effects.  
There are somatic consequences to the lack of nutrition and weight loss that flow from 
anorexic behaviours, varying by the level of actual starvation, rather than the severity of the 
psychiatric symptoms. Insufficient food is broadly detrimental to the body, and negatively 
affects the cardiovascular system, bone density, haematology, muscular and metabolism, 
amongst other bodily systems and functions, all of which can have serious, even fatal, health 
consequences.21 Growth may be affected in adolescent sufferers, as may be the reproductive 
system.22 In cases of severe weight loss, there may be a reduction in brain size, which can 
lead to cognitive defects.23 However, although associated with disturbances in decision 
making regarding food and weight, in general sufferers are reasonably intellectually 
unimpaired.24  
                                                          
17 Tureka L Watson, Wayne A Bowers and Arnold E Andersen, ‘Involuntary Treatment of Eating Disorders’ 
(2000) American Journal of Psychiatry 1806. 
18 Hudson et al, above n 16.  
19 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, above n 8, 19. 
20 See Chapter 6. 
21 Jon Arcelus, Alex J Mitchell, Jackie Wales, and Søren Nielsen ‘Mortality Rates in Patients with Anorexia 
Nervosa and Other Eating Disorders: A Meta-analysis of 36 Studies’ (2011) 68(7) Archives of General 
Psychiatry 724.  
22 American Psychiatric Association, above n 1. 
23 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, above n 8. 
24 I Carina Gillberg et al, ‘Cognitive and Executive Functions in Anorexia Nervosa Ten Years after Onset of 
Eating Disorder’ (2007) 29(2) Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 170. 
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1 Severe and Enduring Anorexia 
Like most other illnesses, anorexia exists on a spectrum of severity and longevity.25 While 
the majority of those with the illness recover,26 some sufferers are particularly treatment-
resistant. In a metastudy of 119 individual studies, Steinhausen found that 20 per cent of 
people diagnosed with anorexia recorded in the studies were ‘chronic’, in that they had not 
improved during the 4 to 20 years of the study period.27 The illness also varies between 
individuals according to the degree of food intake restriction.28 Efforts have been made to 
develop a so-called ‘staging model’ of anorexia in order to represent these variations.29 In 
recent years there have been calls to separately identify those whose symptoms are acute and 
who do not recover in the long term as experiencing ‘severe and enduring anorexia’.30 Ciao et 
al state that there is ‘theoretical consensus’ that severe and enduring anorexia is a ‘distinct 
clinical population in need of tailored treatment approaches’, but that more empirical 
evidence is still needed to support this claim.31  
Whether or not severe and enduring anorexia endures as a classification, it will remain the 
case that some sufferers of anorexia experience symptoms of anorexia more severely, and for 
longer, than other sufferers. This population, for obvious reasons, is most at risk of death and 
long-term physical impairment arising out of malnourishment, and presents the most 
difficulties for those attempting to treat the illness.32  
C Causes of Anorexia 
Despite a large volume of research on anorexia, its etiology is not understood in detail. The 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (UK) point out two difficulties in 
identifying a particular cause of the illness: firstly, there is no prior population screening for 
risk factors, and secondly, the disorder is often not identified until several years after onset, 
                                                          
25 Steven Touyz and Phillipa Hay, ‘Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa (SE-AN): In Search of a New 
Paradigm’ (2015) 3 Journal of Eating Disorders 26. 
26 Hans-Christoph Steinhausen, ‘Outcome of Eating Disorders’ (2009) 18(1) Child and Adolescent Psychiatric 
Clinics of North America 225. 
27 Ibid. However, there was a wide variation in the length of study period of the studies, ranging from less than 
four years to 20 years. 
28 Touyz and Hay, above n 25.  
29 Sarah Maguire et al, ‘Examining a Staging Model for Anorexia Nervosa: Empirical Exploration of a Four 
Stage Model of Severity’ (2017) 5(1) Journal of Eating Disorders 41. 
30 Anna C Ciao, Erin C Accurso, and Stephen A Wonderlich’ ‘What Do We Know about Severe and Enduring 
Anorexia Nervosa?’ in Touyz et al (eds) Managing Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa: A Clinician's Guide 
(Routledge, 2016). 
31 Ibid, 9. 
32 Steinhausen and Jensen, above n 9.  
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due to the fact that it is hidden by the sufferer.33 However, even if the illness is identified 
immediately, the complex and contingent nature of mental illness diagnoses means that it is 
not possible to identify with certainty a specific cause in any particular individual.34  
Nevertheless, studies on the epidemiology of anorexia have identified three influential 
factors: genetic predisposition, psychological factors, and environmental/social factors.35  
1 Genetic Predisposition 
Research suggests a role for genetics in the disorder, not a directly causal role, but as a risk 
factor.36 This is indicated by the fact that there is a higher level of concordance in the illness 
between identical twins compared to non-identical twins.37 Also, a number of 
endophenotypes associated with anorexia have been identified.38 Endophenotypes are 
heritable traits associated with a specific illness that are state independent, in that they do not 
only manifest during presentation of the illness, and, being heritable, are more prevalent in 
unaffected family members than the general population.39 Amongst the endophenotypes 
associated with anorexia that have been identified are perfectionism40 and a lack of cognitive 
flexibility.41 Also, a study has shown that sufferers of anorexia do more poorly on the Iowa 
Gambling Task, 42 a neuropsychological test which assesses decision-making ability.  
2 Psychological Factors 
Studies have shown that anorexic patients are more likely than the general population to have 
experienced a stressful event in the year before onset of the illness.43 Such events include 
                                                          
33 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, above n 8. 
34 Pierre Beumont and Terry Carney, ‘Conceptual Issues in Theorising Anorexia Nervosa: Mere Matters of 
Semantics?’ (2003) 26(6) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 585, 587. 
35 Rebecca J Park, Lauren R Godier, and Felicity A Cowdrey, ‘Hungry for Reward: How Can Neuroscience 
Inform the Development of Treatment for Anorexia Nervosa? (2014) 62 Behaviour Research and Therapy 47. 
36 Stephanie Kullmann et al, ‘Aberrant Network Integrity of the Inferior Frontal Cortex in Women with 
Anorexia Nervosa’ (2014) 4 NeuroImage: Clinical 615. 
37 American Psychiatric Association, above n 1, 342. 
38 Lindsay P Bodell et al, ‘Longitudinal Examination of Decision-making Performance in Anorexia Nervosa: 
Before and after weight restoration’ (2014) 30 Journal of Psychiatric Research 150. 
39 Mary Lee Gregory, Vera Joan Burton and Bruce K Shapiro, ‘Developmental Disabilities and Metabolic 
Disorders’ in Michael J Zigmond, Lewis P Rowland and Joseph T Coyle (eds) Neurobiology of Brain 
Disorders: Biological Basis of Neurological and Psychiatric Disorders (Elsevier, 2014). 
40 Rachel Bachner‐Melman et al, ‘Anorexia Nervosa, Perfectionism, and Dopamine D4 Receptor (DRD4)’ 
(2007) 144(6) American Journal of Medical Genetics Part B: Neuropsychiatric Genetics 748. 
41 Sara Calderoni et al, ‘Neuropsychological Functioning in Children and Adolescents with Restrictive-type 
Anorexia Nervosa: An In-depth Investigation with NEPSY–II’ (2013) 35(2) Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Neuropsychology 167. 
42 Bodell et al, above n 38.  
43 Ulrike Schmidt et al, ‘Is There a Specific Trauma Precipitating Anorexia Nervosa?’ (1997) 
27(3) Psychological Medicine 523. See also American Psychiatric Association, above n 1, 341. 
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divorce of parents, and other non-anorexia health problems.44 Also, there is evidence that 
childhood trauma, including sexual abuse, is a risk factor in the illness.45 As noted, there is a 
high level of comorbidity associated with anorexia, and it is believed that those comorbid 
psychiatric disorders often share with anorexia a common underlying mechanism.46 For this 
reason, some suggest that for these individuals, it is more helpful to conceive of their 
impairment as being ‘complex trauma’, of which anorexia is just one possible 
manifestation.47  
3 Environmental Factors 
Western ideals of female attractiveness that emphasise thinness are believed to be a factor in 
the etiology of anorexia. In popular understanding of the illness, this is often mistakenly 
thought to be the central or only cause.48 The actual extent of this factor’s influence is very 
difficult to determine; nevertheless, there is research that shows that exposure to thin ‘ideals’ 
increases dissatisfaction with body image,49 which in turn is linked to eating disorders.50 
Relatedly, in recent years there has been a growth in so called ‘pro-ana’ websites, in which 
people with anorexia cast the condition in a positive light, and encourage anorexic behaviours 
in others. A feature of these websites is ‘thinspiration’ materials presented, often in the form 
of very thin fashion models.51 Again, these sites’ precise effect on the epidemiology of 
                                                          
44 Schmidt et al, above n 43.  
45 Linda Smolak and Sarah K Murnen, ‘A Meta-analytic Examination of the Relationship between Child Sexual 
Abuse and Eating Disorders’ (2002) 31(2) International Journal of Eating Disorders 136. 
46 Mae Lynn Reyes-Rodríguez et al, ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Anorexia Nervosa’ (2011) 
73(6) Psychosomatic Medicine 491.  
47 Alexandra Cook et al, ‘Complex Trauma in Children and Adolescents’ (2017) 35(5) Psychiatric Annals 390. 
48 See e.g. Amelia Butterly ‘How Men ‘See Women's Bodies’ Can Help Female Body Image, Says Doctor’, 
BBC Newsbeat, 19 May 2015 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/31942988/how-men-see-womens-
bodies-can-help-female-body-image-says-doctor>. 
49 Lisa M Groesz, Michael P Levine and Sarah K Murnen, ‘The Effect of Experimental Presentation of Thin 
Media Images on Body Satisfaction: A Meta-Analytic Review’ (2002) 31(1) International Journal of Eating 
Disorders 1. 
50 Diann M Ackard, Jillian K Croll, and Ann Kearney-Cooke, ‘Dieting Frequency Among College Females: 
Association with Disordered Eating, Body Image, and Related Psychological Problems’ (2002) 52(3) Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research 129. 
51 Anna M Bardone‐Cone and Kamila M Cass, ‘What Does Viewing a Pro‐anorexia Website Do? An 
Experimental Examination of Website Exposure and Moderating Effects’ (2007) 40(6) International Journal of 
Eating Disorders 537. 
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anorexia is not known, but it is known that exposure to ‘pro-ana’ sites can normalise the 
experience of the illness,52 making sufferers less likely to seek help.53   
D Treatment for Anorexia 
Anorexia is regarded as one of the more difficult mental illnesses to treat, due to its high level 
of ego-syntonicity.54 Fear of weight gain/overvaluing thinness and distortion in body image, 
two of diagnostic criteria of the illness, can be directly associated with avoidance of, and 
resistance to treatment intended to increase body weight.55 Moreover, as evidenced by the 
existence of ‘pro-ana’ websites, there can be an ‘underground subculture’ amongst people 
experiencing the illness that encourages resistance to such treatment.56  
There is controversy around what the most efficacious treatment for anorexia is, and no 
specific treatment has evidence of being highly successful.57 However, there is some 
consensus as to the desirability of psychotherapy over medication or force-feeding.58 In its 
comprehensive review,59 the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 
recommends three front line types of psychotherapy: eating disorder-focussed cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT), the Maudsley Anorexia Nervosa Treatment for Adults,60 and 
specialist supportive clinical management.61 However, an impediment for each of these is 
                                                          
52 Sarah Williams and Marie Reid Understanding the Experience of Ambivalence in Anorexia Nervosa: The 
Maintainer’s Perspective’ (2009) 25(5) Psychology & Health 551. 
53 Ruaidhri Mulveen and Julie Hepworth, ‘An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of Participation in a 
Pro-anorexia Internet Site and its Relationship with Disordered Eating’ (2006) 11(2) Journal of Health 
Psychology 283. 
54 See Hope et al, above n 7.  
55 David I Ben-Tovim, Peter N Gilchrist and M Kay Walker, ‘Evolving Evidence and Continuing Uncertainties 
for Eating Disorders’ (2001) 173 Medical Journal of Australia 238; Allan S Kaplan and Paul E Garfinkel, 
‘Difficulties in Treating Patients with Eating Disorders: A Review of Patient and Clinician Variables’ (1999) 
44(7) Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 665. 
56 Mark L Norris et al, ‘Ana and the Internet: A Review of Pro‐anorexia Websites’ (2006) 39(6) International 
Journal of Eating Disorders 443. 
57 Ben-Tovim et al, above n 55. 
58 Elliot M Goldner, C Laird Birmingham, and Victoria Smye, ‘Addressing Treatment Refusal in AN: Clinical, 
Ethical and Legal Considerations’ in David M Garner and Paul E Garfinkel (eds), Handbook of Treatment for 
Eating Disorders (Guilford Press, 2nd ed, 1997). 
59 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, Eating Disorders: Recognition and Treatment (NG69) 
(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2017).  
60 See Ulrike Schmidt et al, ‘The Maudsley Outpatient Study of Treatments for Anorexia Nervosa and Related 
Conditions (MOSAIC): Comparison of the Maudsley Model of Anorexia Nervosa Treatment for Adults 
(MANTRA) With Specialist Supportive Clinical Management (SSCM) in Outpatients With Broadly Defined 
Anorexia Nervosa: A Randomized Controlled Trial’ (2015) 83(4) Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology 796. 
61 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, above n 59, 41. 
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that successful psychotherapy requires commitment from the patient, something sufferers 
may be reluctant to provide.62 
Recently, there has been research into deep brain stimulation as treatment for anorexia in 
early stages of the illness. More data on its efficacy is needed, but early studies indicate some 
promise.63  
Involuntary treatment for anorexia is an option that is sometimes considered necessary.64 
This requires legal authorisation.65  Compulsory treatment for anorexia most commonly takes 
the form of detention in a psychiatric unit, ideally a specialist eating disorder unit, where food 
intake and weight can be closely monitored. However, this carries specific difficulties, 
because sufferers commonly teach each other methods to increase weight loss, and to mask 
weight loss from the staff.66 At the extreme end of the illness, where malnutrition is life-
threatening, voluntary or involuntary naso-gastric feeding67 is sometimes used in the short 
term in order to restore weight to safer levels.68 Involuntary naso-gastric feeding may require 
chemical sedation or physical restraint of the patient, because otherwise the naso-gastric tube 
can be removed by the patient.69  
There are debates about the efficacy of any forced treatment for anorexia, with some arguing 
that it is clinically counterproductive, as it damages trust between patient and medical care 
givers, lowering the chances of successful psychotherapy in the future.70 Anorexic patients 
frequently report gaining a positive feeling of control and autonomy by restricting their intake 
of food,71 so interfering with that autonomy is dangerous when trust and commitment are 
                                                          
62 Ibid, 5. 
63 Mimi Israël et al, ‘Deep Brain Stimulation in the Subgenual Cingulate Cortex for an Intractable Eating 
Disorder’ (2010) 67(9) Biological Psychiatry 53. 
64 Wayne A Bowers, ‘Civil Commitment in the Treatment of Eating Disorders and Substance Abuse: Empirical 
Status and Ethical Considerations’ in Timothy D Brewerton and Amy B Dennis (eds) Eating Disorders, 
Addictions and Substance Use Disorders (Springer, 2014) 649.  
65 See Chapter 3, Part III A. 
66 Jacinta Tan and Lorna Richards ‘Legal and Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Really Sick Patients with 
Anorexia Nervosa’ in: Paul H Robinson and Dasha Nicholls (eds), Critical Care for Anorexia Nervosa 
(Springer International Publishing, 2015). 
67 Where nutrition is provided directly to the stomach through a tube inserted in the nose. 
68 Joel Yager, Terry Carney and Stephen Touyz, ‘Is Involuntary (Compulsory) Treatment Ever Justified in 
Patients with Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa? An International Perspective’ in Touyz et al (eds) 
Managing Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa: A Clinician's Guide (Routledge, 2016), 190. 
69 Ibid, 189. 
70 Gunther Rathner, ‘A Plea against Compulsory Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa Patients’ in Walter 
Vandereycken and Pierre Beumont (eds), Treating Eating Disorders: Ethical, Legal and Personal Issues 
(Athlone Press, 1998); Rebecca Dresser, ‘Feeding the Hunger Artists’ (1984) 2 Wisconsin Law Review 297. 
71 Sheila MacLeod, The Art of Starvation (Virago, 1981) 83. 
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required for successful treatment.72 Another issue that pertains to naso-gastric treatment is 
that the physical resistance from the patient may itself cause damage, and frequent replacing 
of the tube can have complications.73  
There is conflicting evidence as to whether involuntary treatment is beneficial or detrimental 
in the long term.74 Nevertheless, as a means of avoiding imminent death, it remains a current 
part of the medical response to severe anorexia. Those who argue that it is clinically 
advisable usually argue that this is only as a last resort,75 and if it is resorted to, it should be 
done with as much consultation and patient (and if appropriate, family) involvement as 
possible.76 
1 Treatment for Severe and Enduring Anorexia. 
In the case of severe and enduring anorexia, one issue that arises is futility of treatment.77 A 
person who is known to have had anorexia for a significant period of time is likely to have 
had multiple clinical interventions. Attempting the same, failed treatment numerous times is 
of doubtful medical utility, and in these cases, there may be medical opinion that the best 
course of action is to commence palliative care.78 On the other hand, identifying those for 
whom palliation is appropriate is complicated. A recent study showed that of those who had 
not recovered from anorexia at nine years, about half had recovered at 22 years.79 One cannot 
be certain that clinicians could distinguish between those who would eventually recover from 
                                                          
72 Athanasios Douzenis and Ioannis Michopoulos, ‘Involuntary Admission: The Case of Anorexia Nervosa’ 
(2015) 39 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 31; Rathner, above n 70, 193. 
73 Marc Neiderman et al, ‘Nasogastric Feeding in Children and Adolescents with Eating Disorders: Toward 
Good Practice’ (2001) 29(4) International Journal of Eating Disorders 441. 
74 Bowers, above n 64; Yager, Carney and Touyz, above n 68, 186. 
75 Griffiths and Russell, above n 12, 130. The Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) issued a ‘guidance note 
on the treatment of anorexia nervosa with the Mental Health Act 1983’ to help clinicians with treatment 
decisions when the patient refuses treatment (The Mental Health Act Commission, 2006). This guidance 
emphasises that, in general, ‘compulsory measures are unnecessary in the treatment of anorexia nervosa because 
compulsory treatment may be counterproductive to patient autonomy in the long term’. The Commission 
recognises, however, that ‘in rare cases, when the patients’ physical health or survival is seriously threatened by 
food or fluid refusal, compulsory treatment may be necessary’. 
76 Rosalyn Griffiths and Janice Russell, ‘Compulsory Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa Patients’ in Walter 
Vandereycken and Pierre JV Beumont (eds) Treating Eating Disorders: Ethical, Legal and Personal Issues 
(The Athlone Press, 1998), 134-5. 
77 Patricia Westmoreland and Phillip S Mehler, ‘Caring for Patients with Severe and Enduring Eating 
Disorders (SEED): Certification, Harm Reduction, Palliative Care, and the Question of Futility’ (2016) 
22(4) Journal of Psychiatric Practice 313. 
78 Amy Lopez, Joel Yager and Robert E Feinstein ‘Medical Futility and Psychiatry: Palliative Care and Hospice 
Care as a Last Resort in the Treatment of Refractory Anorexia Nervosa’ (2010) 43 International Journal of 
Eating Disorders 372. 
79 Kamryn T Eddy et al, ‘Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa at 22-Year Follow-up’ (2016) 
78(2) Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 184.  
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those who would not.80 Moreover, some reject the applicability of the concept of futility in 
the case of anorexia.81 Nevertheless, there is a population of sufferers who do not recover in 
the long term, and although it is not without controversy, palliation is one of the options that 
may be considered by doctors. 
 
   CONCLUSION 
Anorexia is a well-researched illness, indeed there is more than one journal dedicated 
specifically to eating disorders.82 Nevertheless, it is uncontroversial to say that anorexia is 
one of the biggest challenges to health authorities. Firstly, its causes are not understood in 
detail. Secondly, the most effective type treatment is talking therapy. However, subjects must 
choose to engage in this therapy, and the illness is characterised by a high degree of ego-
syntonicity, reducing the likelihood of the necessary engagement. Thirdly, the dangerousness 
of the illness, combined with the resistance to treatment, means that clinicians must 
sometimes choose between force feeding and allowing someone to die of starvation.  
It is presumed that further advances will be made in the study of the etiology of and treatment 
for anorexia. However, for the foreseeable future, clinicians, and it follows, the legal system, 
will from time to time have to make the extremely difficult decision of whether to authorise 
involuntary feeding for anorexia. This thesis aims to lessen the burden on those making this 
decision, by giving guidance on how this decision can be made.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Ibid. 
81 Cynthia MA Geppert, ‘Futility in Chronic Anorexia Nervosa: A Concept Whose Time Has Not Yet Come’ 
(2015) 15(7) American Journal of Bioethics 34. 
82 Journal of Eating Disorders, International Journal of Eating Disorders, European Eating Disorders Review.  
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Chapter 2: Capacity and Law 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
Developing an accurate understanding of the law of capacity to make medical treatment 
decisions is a critical component of this thesis. Chapter 2 will perform this task by explaining 
the underlying ethical principles that inform the law, and then assessing the current law to 
determine how and to what extent those principles are in fact reflected in the law. 
This Chapter will first examine ethical principles which are thought to shape both medical 
law generally and the law of capacity for treatment decisions: autonomy and beneficence. 
Part II will explain these concepts and show that there is an ongoing tension between the two 
in the field of medical ethics. Part III of this Chapter will outline the current law of capacity 
for treatment decisions, which has been developed by case law and legislation. Part IV will 
critically assess the extent to which the law described in Part III reflects and supports 
autonomy and beneficence. It will be seen that although autonomy is a primary focus, the law 
also applies beneficence more prominently than is sometimes thought. Finally, Part V will 
discuss a ‘legal realist’ argument that actual legal decision-making on capacity for treatment 
decisions may be even more beneficence-oriented than the analysis of the legal principles 
suggests.   
Overall, it will be seen that the common view that the law of capacity for medical treatment 
decisions is primarily an expression of liberal, autonomy-promoting values is open to 
challenge.  
 
 CAPACITY: AUTONOMY AND BENEFICENCE 
Autonomy is considered a primary interest of the law of capacity.1 There is no widespread 
agreement on the nature of autonomy, and it has been the subject of much debate.2 
Nevertheless, it is possible to distil two main streams of thought. One, associated with the 
                                                          
1 Genevre Richardson, ‘Mental Capacity in the Shadow of Suicide: What Can the Law Do?’ (2013) 9(1) 
International Journal of Law in Context 87, 89. 
2 See for e.g. Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 6; 
Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 29– 34, Nomy Arpaly, 
Unprincipled Virtue: an Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 4. 
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ideas of Kant,3 emphasises autonomy as a kind of authenticity; of self-direction.4 In an 
influential account, Dworkin argues that autonomy is:  
a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, 
desires, wishes and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in the light 
of higher-order preferences and values.5  
Another account of autonomy focuses on a lack of external interference, as freedom of 
action.6  This account can be closely linked with the ideology of liberalism. John Stuart 
Mill’s harm principle, a central tenet of liberalism, holds that the only legitimate justification 
for interfering with another person’s decisions is that those decisions cause harm to others. If 
no harm is caused, or harm is only caused to the decision-maker, Mill believes that no state or 
other third party can rightly interfere with the decision.7 According to Mill, a person’s right 
to make decisions about themselves, or their autonomy, is a central good of society that 
should be protected. Mill states: 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.8 
The Millian view of autonomy is connected to the Kantian—indeed they have been described 
as complementary9—because in order to exercise this sovereignty, an individual must have 
some degree of self-direction. This connection is demonstrated by the case of a person who, 
due to some mental impairment, does not seem to be in full control of their own decisions. 
Both schools of thought on autonomy, the Kantian and the Millian, agree that there is 
substantive content to autonomy; meaning that someone in the grips of a mental illness, or 
with a serious intellectual disability, cannot properly be considered to be autonomous.10 
Therefore, there is a necessary qualification to the harm principle. Immediately after stating 
that ‘the individual is sovereign’, Mill continues: 
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human 
beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons 
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still 
                                                          
3 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Routledge 2005). 
4 Derek Bolton and Natalie Banner, ‘Does Mental Disorder Involve Loss of Personal Autonomy’ in Lubomira 
Radoilska (ed) Autonomy and Mental Disorder (Oxford University Press 2012) 77, 80. 
5 Dworkin, above n 2, 20. 
6 Bolton and Banner, above n 4. 
7 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (WW Norton & Co, 1975) 11. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Mark S Komrad, ‘A Defence of Medical Paternalism: Maximising Patients' Autonomy’ (1983) 9(1) Journal of 
Medical Ethics 38, 38. 
10 Lubomira Radoilska, ‘Introduction: Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder’ in 
Lubomira Radoilska (ed) Autonomy and Mental Disorder (Oxford University Press 2012) x.  
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in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions 
as well as against external injury.11 
Thus, not every person enjoys sovereignty over their body and mind, and for some people 
protection is more important than the absence of outside interference. This qualification has 
been a subject of debate and shifting attitudes over the years, 12 but today, it is given 
expression in the law of capacity, which enacts Mill’s qualification to the harm principle, by 
ostensibly separating out autonomous from non-autonomous decisions.13 Thus, there is a very 
close association between capacity and autonomy.14 However, it will be argued that capacity 
cannot be understood solely by reference to autonomy. The reality is more complex. As well 
as autonomy, there is a competing concept of beneficence, which also plays a role in shaping 
the law.  
In the discipline of medicine, beneficence was, for much of its history, the dominant ethical 
principle.15 Traditionally, the primary duty of a doctor is to do what is, in his or her view, 
best for the patient, even when the patient does not share this view.16 Its ongoing role is a 
matter of some controversy, and modern medical ethics can be viewed, in part, as ‘a conflict 
between the old Hippocratic paternalism [..] and a principle of autonomy’.17 In medical 
ethics, despite the long pedigree of beneficence in the professional discipline of medicine, 
autonomy has become more prominent in recent decades.18 Indeed, its ‘triumph’ has been 
                                                          
11 Mill above n 7, 24. 
12 For example, most would find Mill’s account of people of ‘backwards races’ as lacking in autonomy 
objectionable: ibid. 
13 See e.g. John-Stewart Gordon, ‘Medical Paternalism and Patient Autonomy’ in Michael Boylan (ed) Medical 
Ethics (Wiley & Sons, 2013) 72. ‘Competency’ has been explicitly equated with autonomy by Bennett J in Re: 
Harley: ‘The declaration of competency signifies the child’s attainment of autonomy in relation to medical 
treatment and that the child no longer needs another person with parental responsibility to make the decision.’ 
[2016] FamCA 334, [45]. See also Bailey v Warren [2006] EWCA Civ 51, [2006] CP Rep 26 [105]. 
14 The notion of autonomy discussed in this thesis is purposefully kept broad enough to encompass both Millian 
and Kantian notions, but also wider notions of autonomy as potential for action, and feminist notions of 
‘relational autonomy’. For discussion of relational autonomy see e.g. Catriona MacKenzie, ‘Relational 
Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism’ 39(4) Journal of Social Philosophy 512. 
15 Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma, ‘Conflict between Autonomy and Beneficence in Medical 
Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution’ (1987) 3 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 23; Sheila 
McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge-Cavendish, 2010) 8.  
16 John A Harrington, ‘Privileging the Medical Norm: Liberalism, Self-Determination and Refusal of Treatment’ 
(1996) 16(3) Legal Studies 348. 
17 Robert M Veatch, ‘Autonomy's Temporary Triumph’ (1984) 14(5) Hastings Center Report 38, 38. 
18 See full description and analysis of this trend in Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-making and the Law: 
Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism (Cambridge, 2010), Chapter 1.  
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proclaimed.19 Beneficence, on the other hand, is often associated with the concept of 
‘paternalism’, a term with a pejorative association.20  
However, the ascendancy of autonomy is not complete, and can be overstated. According to 
Donnelly ‘[t]he status of autonomy within ethical discourse has been challenged for almost as 
long as the principle has been revered’.21 Moreover, while autonomy may be more widely 
valued than beneficence at the level of bioethics discourse, this is not necessarily true in the 
practice of medicine. Many writers have noted that beneficence is ‘still dominant in the 
minds of many physicians and patients’ and ‘still shapes the ethos and ethics of medicine.’22 
Evidently, there is an ongoing tension within medical ethics between these two concepts.  
This Chapter illustrates that despite the close association between capacity and autonomy, the 
tension between autonomy and beneficence seen in medical ethics is also present in the law 
of capacity.  
 
   PRINCIPLES OF CAPACITY LAW:  
Most jurisdictions now have definitions of capacity for treatment decisions in statute.23 
However, case law has had a more central role in the development of law in this area. This is 
because legislation on capacity for treatment decisions has followed and reflected 
developments in case law, that is, the principles from this area of law that emerged in cases 
before they were legislated.24 Further, when judicial decisions are made under capacity 
legislation, judges frequently seek more detailed guidance from the case law.25  
Although there is no definitive list of core principles in this area, there are several principles 
that are frequently discussed in judicial decisions on treatment capacity and in texts on 
medical law. Six principles will be discussed here. They have been selected due to their 
importance in the area as shown by the frequency with which they are discussed in legal texts 
                                                          
19 McLean, above n 15, 6. Also see Richard Huxtable, ‘Re B (Consent to Treatment: Capacity): A Right to Die 
or is It Right to Die’ (2002) 14 Child and Family Law Quarterly 341, 354-5, and discussion in Charles Foster, 
‘Autonomy in the Medico-Legal Courtroom: a Principle Fit for Purpose?’ (2014) 22(1) Medical Law Review 48 
and Donnelly, above, n 17, 15. 
20 Donald Vandeveer, Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on Benevolence (Princeton University 
Press, 2014) 16. 
21 Donnelly above n 18, 1.  
22 Pellegrino and Thomasma above n 15, 25.  
23 See below at III B. 
24 See Peter Bartlett and Ralph Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and Practice (Oxford University Press, 3rd 
ed, 2007) 165. 
25 E.g. Re GMH [2003] QMHC 8, UMG [2015] NSWCATGD 54. 
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on treatment capacity, and by the fact that, together, they provide a comprehensive picture of 
law in this area. For the most part, these principles emerged from a series of cases in the 
United Kingdom in the 1990s. Short summaries of these cases will be provided. The 
principles are: 
A. The right to refuse treatment; 
B. Functional capacity; 
C. Presumption of capacity; 
D. Diagnostic threshold; 
E. Irrationality in decision making; and 
F. ‘Risk relative capacity’. 
These principles will be discussed in turn. 
 
A Right to Refuse Treatment 
Adults have a general right to refuse medical treatment, no matter how necessary the 
treatment is deemed to be. This principle does not directly influence the content of capacity 
law, but it is arguably the most important principle in the area of medical law, and provides 
an important context for capacity law. It means that except in emergency situations, it is 
necessary for doctors to obtain a patient’s consent before performing a procedure.26 This 
basic legal position was first stated in the 1914 US case Schloendorff v. Society of New York 
Hospital.27 In this case, a woman had a tumour surgically removed, despite the fact that she 
had refused this treatment when it was offered to her. She subsequently sued the hospital. In 
the judgment, Cardozo J found:  
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation without the patient’s consent 
commits an assault.28 
                                                          
26 See Ruth R Faden, Tom L Beauchamp and Nancy MP King, A History and Theory of Informed Consent 
(Oxford University Press, 1986) 35. 
27 (1914) 105 NE 92. 
28 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital (1914) 105 NE 92, 93. 
32 
 
This statement has been affirmed in numerous cases in the UK and Australia.29 Essentially, 
Cardozo J’s statement is a restatement of Mill’s harm principle, applied specifically to 
medical treatment.30  
The right to reject treatment considered necessary by doctors was confirmed and strengthened 
in the Canadian case of Malette v. Shulman et al.31 There, a card-carrying Jehovah’s 
Witness,32 who had been in a car accident, was given a blood transfusion, despite an explicit 
refusal of this on the woman’s card (of which the doctor had been aware). Mr Justice Robins 
JA found: 
At issue here is the freedom of the patient as an individual to exercise her right to refuse 
treatment and accept the consequences of her own decision. Competent adults, as I have 
sought to demonstrate, are generally at liberty to refuse medical treatment even at the risk of 
death. The right to determine what shall be done with one's own body is a fundamental right 
in our society. The concepts inherent in this right are the bedrock upon which the principles of 
self-determination and individual autonomy are based. Free individual choice in matters 
affecting this right should, in my opinion, be accorded very high priority.33 
Cited with approval in Australia34 and the UK,35 this case is authority for the proposition that 
a person has a right to refuse treatment even if doing so will result in their death.  
This proposition was affirmed in the House of Lords case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.36 
That case involved a football supporter who had been left in a persistent vegetative state after 
getting caught in a crush at Hillsborough stadium. Having been in this state for three years, 
with no hope of recovery, the parents sought an order from the court that it would be lawful 
                                                          
29 E.g. Lord Goff in Re F,[1989] 2 FLR 376, 436, Department of Health & Community Services v JWB & SMB 
("Marion's Case") [1992] HCA 15, at [12]; X v The Sydney Children's Hospitals Network [2013] NSWCA 320 
at [12] Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864; Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321; St 
George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 All ER 673. 
30 See above Part II. 
31 (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
32 The Jehovah’s Witness faith believes it is wrong to receive blood transfusions. Many adherents carry a wallet-
sized advanced directive card refusing blood. See Douglas R Migden and G Richard Braen, ‘The Jehovah's 
Witness Blood Refusal Card: Ethical and Medicolegal Considerations for Emergency Physicians’ (1998) 5(8) 
Academic Emergency Medicine 815. 
33 Malette v. Shulman et al, 166. 
34 X v The Sydney Children's Hospitals Network [2013] NSWCA 320; Hunter and New England Area Health 
Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761; Re the Small Claims Act 1974 and Re An Application of Leave To Appeal 
Janice Mary Ferguson v ACT Electricity and Water [1995] ACTSC 5. 
35 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 (“Re T”); Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust 
[2002] EWHC 429. 
36 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 859 (‘Bland’). 
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to withdraw life support. Although not directly relevant to the particular case (as the adult 
was not in a position to form or communicate his wishes) Lord Goff said that: 
…it is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given 
to the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, 
to consent to treatment or care by which his life would or might be prolonged, the doctors 
responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to 
be in his best interests to do so. … To this extent, the principle of the sanctity of human life 
must yield to the principle of self-determination.37 
Lord Mustill stated in the same case: 
Even if the patient is capable of making a decision whether to permit treatment and decides 
not to permit it his choice must be obeyed, if on any objective view it is contrary to his best 
interests. A doctor has no right to proceed in the face of objection, even if it is plain to all, 
including the patient, that adverse circumstances and even death will or may ensue.38 
This position has been confirmed in Australia in the WA Supreme Court case of Brightwater 
Care Group (Inc) Rossiter.39 There, a quadriplegic man with almost no movement, who 
required artificial hydration and nutrition, and who could only talk through a tracheotomy, 
had asked his caregivers to cease the hydration and nutrition, allowing him to die. The man’s 
capacity was not in question. Martin CJ found that once the adult had been provided with full 
information about the medical consequences of the decision, it would not be lawful to 
continue keeping him alive against his wishes.40  
The issue of treatment refusal has also been addressed in human rights law; both the 
Victorian and ACT Human Rights Acts include an explicit right to refuse medical 
treatment.41 Also, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 3, the 
prohibition of torture, and Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life, as relevant 
to refusal of medical treatment. In X and Y v Netherlands, the European Court of Human 
Rights stated that ‘private life’ of Article 8 included ‘the physical integrity … of the 
                                                          
37 Bland [1993] AC 789, 864.  
38 Bland [1993] AC 789, 1062. 
39 [2009] WASC 229. 
40 [49], [58]. 
41 Sections 10(2) of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and 10 (b) Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). 
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person’,42 and that any compulsory medical intervention would necessarily interfere with the 
right.43  
Therefore, it can be seen that in case law from common law countries, and human rights 
instruments, there exists a general legal right to refuse medical treatment.  
B Functional Definition of Capacity  
A second key principle in the law of capacity for treatment decisions is that a person’s 
capacity to make such decisions is to be determined by their ‘functional’ ability relating to 
the specific decision.  
As is evident from the extracts above, there are qualifications to the general legal right to 
refuse treatment. In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital and Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland, it was held that the right applies only to adults who are ‘of sound mind’; in Malette v. 
Shulman et al the term used is ‘competent’. Thus, those who lack capacity do not have the 
right to refuse medical treatment. These qualifications to the right to refuse treatment are 
given legal effect in the law of capacity for treatment decisions.44   
A seminal case on the law of capacity for treatment decisions was the High Court (England 
and Wales) case of Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment).45 There, a man with schizophrenia, 
who was being detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (UK), refused treatment for a 
gangrenous foot. The treatment in question was an amputation, and C stated (among other 
things), as quoted in the judgment, that ‘he would rather die with two feet than live with 
one’.46 The treating authority sought judicial resolution, arguing that the man ought to be 
required to have the surgery for his own protection. In his judgment, Thorpe J set out what he 
saw as the constitutive requirements of capacity for treatment decisions: 
For the patient offered amputation to save life, there are three stages to the decision (1) to take 
in and retain treatment information, (2) to believe it and (3) to weigh that information, 
balancing risks and needs.47  
                                                          
42 X and Y v Netherlands 8 EHRR 235 [22]. 
43 X v Austria (1980) 18 DR 154 at 156. See discussion in Elizabeth Wicks, ‘The Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2001) 9(1) Medical Law Review 17. 
44 The qualifications can be linked to the substantive requirements of autonomy mentioned above, which require 
an adult to have a minimum level of functioning of the mind in order to be considered to have autonomy. See 
above Part II. 
45 Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 (‘Re C’). See further discussion of this case below at 
Part V D 2. 
46 Re C [1994] 1 WLR 290, 291. 
47 Ibid, 292. 
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For Thorpe J, if an adult was capable of doing this, he or she had capacity and their decisions 
could not be interfered with. Nothing further was required. Thorpe J found that the evidence 
suggested that C was indeed capable of these things, and therefore had the capacity to refuse 
the treatment.48 This judgment frames capacity as a ‘functional’ issue, because Thorpe J’s 
criteria require consideration of how the adult is able to use information related to that 
specific question, not whether or not the decision reached by the adult was seen to be a good 
one, nor whether or not the adult had a mental disability.49 Thorpe J did not cite legal 
authority for these requirements, and it is only a High Court decision, so it is not binding on 
appellate courts, however Thorpe J’s statement has since been widely cited as a description of 
legal capacity. 
The Court of Appeal in Re MB50 was the first appellate judgment to affirm the position in Re 
C (Adult, refusal of treatment). In that case, a pregnant woman was to undergo a caesarean 
birth, as was considered necessary for her and the foetus’ health. The woman initially 
consented to the procedure, but apparently due to a fear of needles, withdrew her consent in 
the operating theatre. She was found to lack capacity, and doctors were authorised by the 
court to override her refusal.51 Citing Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment), the joint judgment 
restated the nature of capacity in this way: 
A person lacks capacity if some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning renders the 
person unable to make a decision whether to consent to or to refuse treatment. That inability 
to make a decision will occur when: 
a) the patient is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material to 
the decision, especially as to the likely consequences of having or not having the 
treatment in question. 
b) the patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as part of the 
process of arriving at the decision.52 
The court found that the woman lacked capacity, because ‘[a]t the moment of panic, ... her 
fear dominated all’, and when she refused ‘she was not capable of making a decision at all’.53  
                                                          
48 Ibid. 
49 See R v Cooper [2009] 1 WLR 1786 [13]. See also discussion in Chapter 5. 
50 [1997] EWCA Civ 3093. 
51 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [36]. 
52 Ibid [30]. This wording adopts the recommendation in the Law Commission report on Mental Incapacity 
(Law Commission, Mental Incapacity Report No 231 (1995)), the formulation of which was adapted from Re C 
[1994] 1 WLR 290. 
53 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [30]. 
36 
 
The statement of law in Re MB was quoted with approval in Australia by MacDougall J in the 
NSW Supreme Court in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A.54 This case also 
involved a Jehovah’s Witness who had a written directive refusing blood transfusions, as well 
as other procedures, on the basis of his religious beliefs. The hospital sought a declaration 
that it would be justified in complying with his wishes as expressed in that directive, which 
was granted.55  
Thorpe J’s formulation, as reworked in Re MB, has essentially become the statutory position 
in England and Wales under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW), which defines capacity as 
being able:  
a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
b) to retain that information, 
c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, and 
d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).56 
It is added that: 
The information relevant to a decision includes information about the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of— 
a) deciding one way or another, or 
b) failing to make the decision.57 
Thus, a ‘functional’ approach to capacity is confirmed. The functional approach can be 
contrasted with an outcome-based approach and a status approach.58 Under an outcome-based 
approach, the nature of the actual decision made, and whether or not it was seen to be a good 
one, would be used to determine capacity.59 Status-based capacity deems particular people 
(for example, people with particular mental illnesses) to lack capacity no matter what 
decision they make or how they make it.  
The functional approach to capacity accommodates the ‘partial, temporary or fluctuating 
nature of impaired capacity that may be experienced by an adult.’60 It allows people to make 
what others see as bad decisions, and means a person can have capacity for a decision despite 
                                                          
54 [2009] NSWSC 761 (‘Hunter’) In turn, this formulation as taken from Re MB is approved in Re JS [2014] 
NSWSC 302. 
55 The central issue in the case was whether the directive covered the precise procedure being offered.  
56 S 3(1) Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW). 
57 3(4). 
58 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity Report No 231 (1995), 32-3. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Report No 67, (2010), 
266. 
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having a mental illness or intellectual disability. To illustrate, the adult in Re C (Adult, refusal 
of treatment) was found to have capacity to refuse treatment for a gangrenous foot despite the 
fact that he had a diagnosis of schizophrenia and was being detained in a psychiatric 
facility.61 
In Australia, most jurisdictions have incorporated comparable capacity definitions into 
statute. In Victoria, the Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016 (Vic) uses a 
close replica of the England and Wales legislation.62 Section 4 states that a person has 
decision-making capacity if the person can: 
a) understand the information relevant to the decision and the effect of the decision; 
b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make the decision; 
c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision; 
d) communicate the decision and the person's views and needs as to the decision in some way, 
including by speech, gestures or other means. 
South Australia has a very similar capacity definition to Victoria and England and Wales.63 
Other states use definitions without the criterion of ‘using or weighing’ information. In 
Queensland, the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 defines capacity in the following 
way: 
capacity, for a person for a matter, means the person is capable of—: 
a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; 
b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and 
c) communicating the decisions in some way.64 
Under the New South Wales Guardianship Act 1987, a person is incapable of giving consent 
to the carrying out of medical or dental treatment and requires a substitute decision-maker if 
the person:  
(a) is incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of the proposed treatment; or  
                                                          
61 Re C [1994] 1 WLR 290, 291. 
62 Morris J in Gardner; Re BWV (2003) 7 VR 487 argued that the comprehensive coverage of the previous Act 
indicated it was not parliament’s intention for matters of medical treatment refusal to be dealt with under the 
parens patriae jurisdiction of the court. [99]-[101]. Consistent with that view, there are no reported decisions 
about treatment capacity made under the common law definition in Victoria. 
63 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 4(2)(a). 
64 Schedule 4. This repeats the definition from the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), sch 3. Although the 
common law capacity definition has not been explicitly abolished in Queensland, the wide coverage of the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (and the Powers of Attorney Act 1998) means there have been no 
reported decisions made wholly under the common law capacity definition since those Acts commenced. 
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(b) is incapable of indicating whether or not he or she consents or does not consent to the 
treatment being carried out.65 
The Tasmanian definition within its guardianship legislation is virtually identical to this 
provision.66 The ACT similarly defines capacity ‘if the person can make decisions in relation 
to the person’s affairs and understands the nature and effect of the decisions’.67 
The capacity definition in Western Australia is distinctive, in that the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) defines incapacity as when a ‘patient is unable to make 
reasonable judgments in respect of any treatment proposed to be provided to the patient’.68 
The term ‘reasonable judgments’ appears to refer to the outcome of the decision, rather than 
the decision making process; therefore, Western Australia is an outlier in this regard. 
However, in Supreme Court of Western Australia case Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v 
Rossiter,69 Martin CJ appears to apply the functional test of capacity as developed in Re C 
(Adult, refusal of treatment) and Re MB.70 
Overall, albeit with some exceptions, the use of a functional capacity test is now widespread, 
and has been widely accepted as the means of determining a person’s capacity to make 
specific medical treatment decisions. 
 
C Presumption of Capacity 
An important complement to the principle of functional capacity is the principle that adults 
are presumed to have capacity to make their own decisions. Authority for this is commonly 
attributed to the Court of Appeal case Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment),71 a case 
involving a purported treatment refusal by a Jehovah’s Witness. In it Lord Donaldson stated: 
                                                          
65 33(2). There is ongoing room for the application of the common law position on capacity, developed in Re C 
and Re MB, for determinations not made under the NSW Guardianship Act, such as determinations made under 
the court’s parens patriae power. See e.g. Hunter [2009] NSWSC 761 and Re JS [2014] NSWSC 302. 
66 Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas) s 36(2). 
67 Powers of Attorney Act 2006 (ACT) s 9(1). 
68 S 110ZD(1). 
69 [2009] WASC 229. 
70 See e.g. Mr Rossiter is assumed to have [..] mental capacity [..] unless and until there is evidence which 
would suggest that he lacks that capacity. There is no such evidence in this case. On the contrary, Dr Benstead 
deposes that based upon his observations of Mr Rossiter, he has the capacity to comprehend and retain 
information given to him in relation to his treatment, and has the capacity to weigh up that information and 
bring other factors and considerations into account in order to arrive at an informed decision 
71 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649. This is the first case in which the presumption was said to apply to medical 
treatment. There are older authorities for the more general proposition that adults have capacity to make 
decisions for themselves: e.g. Borthwick v Carruthers (1787) 99 ER 1300 and Re Cumming (1852) 42 ER 660. 
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The right to decide one's own fate pre-supposes a capacity to do so. Every adult is presumed 
to have that capacity, but it is a presumption which can be rebutted.72 
This presumption was confirmed in Re MB73 and has been incorporated into the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (EW).74 In Australia, the presumption as stated in Re MB was quoted with 
approval by the NSW Supreme Court in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A.75 
Queensland76 and Western Australia77 have incorporated the presumption into their capacity 
statutes.  
 
D Diagnostic Threshold 
Another principle that has emerged from the common law is that in order for someone to be 
found to lack capacity under the functional definition outlined above, this diminution in 
functioning must be related to or accompanied by a mental impairment of some kind. In this 
thesis, this requirement will be described as the ‘diagnostic threshold’ of incapacity. 
As noted, Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) provides the first statement of the positive 
requirements of capacity. Along with the functional definition discussed above, Thorpe J 
states: 
[T]he question to be decided is whether it has been established that C’s capacity is so reduced 
by his chronic mental illness that he does not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and 
effects of the proffered amputation.78 
By using the phrase ‘so reduced by his chronic mental illness that…’ Thorpe J appears to be 
considering whether there is a causal relationship between C’s mental illness and the 
diminution in his capacity. In its 1995 Report on Mental Incapacity,79 the Law Commission 
explicitly considered including a ‘diagnostic threshold’ in its definition of capacity, which 
would mean that there would need to be a connection between the reduction in capacity as 
measured under the functional definition, and a ‘mental disorder’ of some kind. The 
Commission’s recommendation was that the test for capacity ‘should require that a person’s 
                                                          
72 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649 [21]. 
73 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [30]. 
74 S 1(2). 
75 Hunter [2009] NSWSC 761 [23]. 
76 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) Schedule 1, 1(1). 
77 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 4(3). 
78 295. 
79 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995). 
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inability to arrive at a decision should be linked to the existence of a “mental disability”’80 
and that ‘mental disability’ meant ‘any disability or disorder of the mind or brain, whether 
permanent or temporary, which results in an impairment or disturbance of mental 
functioning’.81 Having considered the Law Commission’s recommendation, the Court of 
Appeal in Re MB essentially adopted it:  
A person lacks capacity if some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning renders the 
person unable to make a decision whether to consent to or to refuse treatment.82 
Immediately following this, the Court stated: ‘That inability to make a decision will occur 
when..’ and then set out the functional definition of capacity cited above.83 Therefore, 
according to Re MB, a person can only be found to lack capacity if (a) he or she has an 
inability to make a decision as per the functional definition and (b) that inability was caused 
by ‘some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning’.  
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) maintains the causal threshold as it is in Re MB: 
For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material 
time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain84 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeal in York City Council v C85 considered the wording of this provision and 
confirmed that it requires a causal relationship between the impairment/disturbance in 
functioning and the inability to make a decision, rejecting the trial judge’s use of the less 
direct language of ‘referable to’ or ‘significantly relates to’.86  
In Australia, the formulation from Re MB was cited with approval by the NSW Supreme 
Court in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A 87 and the Queensland Mental 
Health Court in Re GMH.88 However, the legislation on capacity in Australia is not consistent 
with respect to the relationship between ‘disorder’ and the functional aspect of capacity. In 
the Victorian, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australian and Western Australian 
legislation, there is no requirement at all for a ‘disorder’ to be present before someone can be 
                                                          
80 Ibid, 36. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 [30]. 
83 Ibid.  
84 2(1). 
85 [2014] 2 WLR 1. 
86 York City Council v C [58]-[59]. See also Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C, V [2015] 
EWCOP 80 [32]-[34]. See critique of this in Chapter 5, IV A 3. 
87 [2009] NSWSC 761. 
88 [2003] QMHC 8. 
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found to lack capacity to make treatment decisions.89 In Tasmania the test for incapacity 
applies to adults with a ‘disability’,90 however, all that is required is for both ‘disability’ and 
a functional inability to exist, the relationship does not apparently need to be causal.91 In the 
ACT the relationship is presented as causal: 
[a] person has impaired decision-making ability if the person's decision-making ability is 
impaired because of a physical, mental, psychological or intellectual condition or state, 
whether or not the condition or state is a diagnosable illness.92 
Therefore, in Australia the connection between disorder/disability and functional decision 
making ability differs depending on the jurisdiction and the legislation under which a 
determination of capacity is being made.  
 
E Irrationality in Decision Making 
Another important principle that has developed in the case law on capacity is that a person is 
allowed to make a decision to refuse medical treatment even if their decision making is 
irrational or unreasonable. The first statement of this kind came in Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital,93 a case concerning the duty of a surgeon to inform 
a patient of a procedure’s risks, where Lord Templeman stated: 
If the doctor making a balanced judgment advises the patient to submit to the operation, the 
patient is entitled to reject that advice for reasons which are rational, or irrational, or for no 
reason.94 
This principle was not necessary to determine the case at hand, and is thus obiter dictum; 
however it has been repeated in a number of cases. In Re T (adult: refusal of medical 
                                                          
89 Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016 (Vic) s 4; Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 33; 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 4(3); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care 
Act 1995 (SA) s 4(2)(a); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110ZD.  
90 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s 36, Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas) s 36. 
In s3 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) ‘disability’ is defined as ‘intellectual impairment, mental 
disorder, brain injury, physical disability or dementia’; In s3 Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas) 
‘disability’ is defined as ‘any restriction or lack (resulting from any absence, loss or abnormality of mental, 
psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or function) of ability to perform an activity in a normal 
manner’. 
91 S 36 (Vic): ‘“patient” means a person with a disability who—[…] is incapable of giving consent […]’; s 36 
(Tas): ‘This Part applies to a person with a disability who is incapable of giving consent to the carrying out of 
medical or dental treatment’ 
92 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) s 5.  
93 [1985] AC 871 (‘Sidaway’). 
94 Sidaway [1985] AC 871, 28. 
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treatment),95 another case involving a treatment refusal by a Jehovah’s Witness, both Butler-
Sloss J and Donaldson LJ cite Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital 
and Maudsley Hospital when making these statements. Butler-Sloss J remarks: 
A decision to refuse medical treatment by a patient capable of making the decision does not 
have to be sensible, rational or well-considered96 
and Donaldson LJ states: 
[..] the patient's right of choice exists whether the reasons for making that choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent. 97 
Later, in Re MB; the joint judgment repeats this principle and states that it applies in the cases 
of unborn foetuses: 
A competent woman who has the capacity to decide may, for religious reasons, other reasons, 
for rational or irrational reasons or for no reason at all, choose not to have medical 
intervention, even though the consequence may be the death or serious handicap of the child 
she bears, or her own death.98  
The joint judgment then expands on this idea of irrationality: 
Irrationality is here used to connote a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic 
or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the 
question to be decided it could have arrived at it. As Kennedy and Grubb (Medical Law, 
Second Edition 1994) point out, it might be otherwise if a decision is based on a 
misperception of reality (e.g. the blood is poisoned because it is red). Such a misperception 
will be more readily accepted to be a disorder of the mind. Although it might be thought that 
irrationality sits uneasily with competence to decide, panic, indecisiveness and irrationality in 
themselves do not as such amount to incompetence, but they may be symptoms or evidence of 
incompetence.99 
Although not part of the ratio decidendi of these decisions, the principle has been widely 
cited in subsequent cases and legal texts. Lord Donaldson’s version from Re T (adult: refusal 
of medical treatment) was quoted with approval in the NSW Supreme Court case of Hunter 
                                                          
95 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
96 Ibid 474. 
97 Ibid 460. 
98 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093, [30]. 
99 Ibid. 
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and New England Area Health Service v A,100 the Queensland Supreme Court case of Re 
Bridges101 and the WA Supreme Court case of Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter.102  
A related concept was introduced into the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) by this statement 
of principle: 
A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise 
decision.103  
The Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) incorporates a similar idea: 
[T]he right to make decisions includes the right to make decisions with which others may not 
agree104 
ACT guardianship legislation states that incapacity cannot be found ‘only because the 
person— is eccentric’.105  Arguably, these statutory formulations are less strongly worded 
than the case law. There appears to be a difference between eccentricity or decisions ‘with 
which others may not agree’ on one hand, and decisions which are ‘so outrageous in [their] 
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his 
mind to the question to be decided it could have arrived at [them]’ on the other. There are 
decisions which could be classified as the former and not the latter. However, there has been 
no case law on the issue of whether those statutory formulations are substantially different 
from the common law formulation.  
Recent Australian mental health legislation in which capacity is a criterion for involuntary 
treatment includes a related idea. Section 14(2) of the Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) states 
that a ‘person may have capacity to consent to be treated even though the person decides not 
to receive treatment’.106  
Here again, the Western Australian guardianship legislation, with its requirement of 
‘reasonable judgments’107 is an outlier, as this formulation appears to preclude decisions 
adjudged to be irrational from meeting the capacity test.  
                                                          
100 [2009] NSWSC 761. 
101 [2001] 1 Qd R 574. 
102 [2009] WASC 229, 27.  
103 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 1(4).  
104 5(b). 
105 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) s 6A.  
106 See also s5A(3)(d) Mental Health Act 2009 (SA). 
107 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110ZD(1). 
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Apart from the Western Australian legislation, capacity law provides that capacity is not 
equivalent to rationality, and adults are able to refuse treatment even when that decision 
might be seen as unusual or not sensible.108  
F Risk Relative Capacity 
The principle that decisions with a higher level of risk require a greater level of capacity, 
known as ‘risk relative capacity’, has developed in appellate court decisions. The first 
recognisable statement to this effect came in Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment), per 
Lord Donaldson: 
Doctors faced with a refusal of consent have to give very careful and detailed consideration to 
what was the patient’s capacity to decide at the time when the decision was made. It may not 
be a case of capacity or no capacity. It may be a case of reduced capacity. What matters is 
whether at the time the patient’s capacity was reduced below the level needed in the case of a 
refusal of that importance, for refusals can vary in importance. Some may involve a risk to 
life or of irreparable damage to health; others may not.109 
This was cited with approval by the England and Wales High Court in Ms B v An NHS 
Hospital Trust110 and Sheffield City Council v E & Anor.111 In Re MB, citing Re T 
(adult: refusal of medical treatment),112 the joint judgment restates the position: 
The graver the consequences of the decision, the commensurately greater the level of 
competence is required to take the decision.113 
This principle seems to have been accepted in Australian case law. Donaldson LJ’s formation 
of the principle in Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) was cited with approval by the 
Queensland Supreme Court in Re Bridges.114 In Hunter and New England Area Health 
Service v A, the NSW Supreme Court MacDougall J explained it in this way: 
There is a scale, running from capacity at one end through reduced capacity to lack of 
capacity at the other. In assessing whether a person has capacity to make a decision, the 
sufficiency of the capacity must take into account the importance of the decision, as Lord 
Donaldson pointed out in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) (at 113). The capacity required 
                                                          
108 See further discussion of these provisions below at IV B. 
109 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 115-6.  
110 [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) 32. 
111 [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam) 29. 
112 It also cites Sidaway [1985] AC 871 and Gillick [1986] 1 AC 112, although reference to risk relative capacity 
in those sources is vague. 
113 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093, [30].  
114 [2001] 1 Qd R 574. 
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to make a contract to buy a cup of coffee may be present where the capacity to decide to give 
away one's fortune is not.115 
The principle as stated in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A is cited with 
approval in by the NSW Supreme Court in Application of a Local Health District; Re a 
Patient Fay,116 and the principle as stated in Re MB is quoted with approval in the 
Queensland Mental Health Court in Re GMH.117 However, this principle is not stated in any 
of the capacity statutes.  
 
    BENEFICENCE AND AUTONOMY IN CAPACITY LAW 
A Autonomy a Natural Fit for Capacity Law? 
There are a number of reasons why it might be expected that the law generally would be a 
vehicle for the promotion of autonomy.118 The foundation of the principle of autonomy is 
often seen to have emanated from the doctrines of individual and political rights as 
propounded in Enlightenment texts.119 McLean argues that the current ‘ascendancy’ of 
autonomy is associated with the growth in importance of the language of human rights, which 
have become more central in legal systems in recent decades.120 As noted above, certain 
human rights instruments specifically protect the right to refuse treatment.121  
Also, law has a ready-made vehicle for the defence of the non-interference version of 
individual autonomy in the law of tort.122 Under the common law, anyone who interferes with 
the body of another without consent commits a trespass, specifically a battery.123 The 
complainant does not even need to prove any harm or intention to harm.124 It follows then 
that a doctor who performs a procedure on a patient without their consent has prima facie 
committed a battery.125 In Australia, McHugh J in Marion’s Case stated: 
                                                          
115 Hunter [2009] NSWSC 761 [24]. 
116 [2016] NSWSC 624. 
117 [2003] QMHC 8. 
118 Richard Huxtable, ‘Autonomy, Best Interests and the Public Interest: Treatment, Non-treatment and the 
Values of Medical Law’ (2014) 22(4) Medical Law Review 459, 461. 
119 Pellegrino and Thomasma, above n 15, 24. 
120 McLean, above n 15, 7. 
121 Above Part III A. 
122 Margaret Brazier, ‘Do No Harm—Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too? (2006)  (65(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 397, 400, cited in Donnelly, above n 18. 
123 Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod 149. 
124 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 73. 
125 Ibid 12. 
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It is the central thesis of the common law doctrine of trespass to the person that the voluntary 
choices and decisions of an adult person of sound mind concerning what is or is not done to 
his or her body must be respected and accepted, irrespective of what others, including doctors, 
may think is in the best interests of that particular person.126 
In the same paragraph, McHugh J links the trespass doctrine to the law’s respect for 
autonomy: 
[t]he common law respects and preserves the autonomy of adult persons of sound mind with 
respect to their bodies. By doing so, the common law accepts that a person has rights of 
control and self-determination in respect of his or her body which other persons must respect. 
Those rights can only be altered with the consent of the person concerned. Thus, the legal 
requirement of consent to bodily interference protects the autonomy and dignity of the 
individual and limits the power of others to interfere with that person's body.127 
The idea that law is a vehicle for the promotion of autonomy is apparent in academic legal 
literature on medical treatment decisions. Morgan and Veitch point out that the central focus 
of this literature has been ‘criticism of cases where the judiciary has not recognised or upheld 
the appeal to the autonomy, or rights, of patients’.128 They note that authors tend to be 
concerned with ‘the emancipation, through law, of patients from clinical capture by the 
medical model.’129  
People who are found to lack capacity will not have the right to make decisions for 
themselves, and in common law countries, the law authorises a ‘substitute decision’ to be 
made on their behalf.130 The standard that the substitute decision maker must apply when 
making a decision (in most jurisdictions) is the adult’s ‘best interests’.131 There may be cases 
where it is found that adult’s best interests is not what the adult him or herself wishes; for 
example, it might be found that it is in the patient’s best interests to accept medical treatment 
even though the patient has refused that treatment.132 In such cases, the law authorises 
doctors to treat the patient against his or her wishes, even if that means treatment by force.133 
                                                          
126 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v. JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) [1992] HCA 
15, McHugh [3]; 175 CLR 218, 309. 
127 Ibid 309. 
128 Derek Morgan and Kenneth Veitch, ‘Being Ms B: B, Autonomy and the Nature of Legal Regulation’ (2004) 
26 Sydney Law Review 107, 108. 
129 Ibid. 
130 See e.g. Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 46. 
131 See e.g. Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) s 4.  
132 See Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649.  
133 Australian Capital Territory v JT [2009] ACTSC 105. 
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This is a very clear application of beneficence, rather than autonomy, and meets Dworkin’s 
definition of paternalism:  
[…] the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and 
defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected 
from harm. 134  
However, this aspect of the law is not necessarily at odds with protecting autonomy; in fact, 
this type of paternalism has been described as ‘autonomy-orientated or autonomy-respecting 
paternalism’.135 It can also be described as ‘soft paternalism’—intervening only when the 
individual cannot act voluntarily—as opposed to ‘hard paternalism’, in which intervention in 
the individual’s perceived best interests is authorised regardless of the voluntariness of 
action.136 The argument is that treating people who lack capacity against their will does not 
compromise their autonomy, because such people are not autonomous.137 
A number of principles discussed in Part III138 can be seen as promoting the right of 
individuals to make their own decisions. 
B Capacity Law and Autonomy 
The fact that people with capacity have freedom to refuse medical treatment, no matter how 
necessary it is, for irrational reasons, or even for no reason at all, is a clear affirmation of the 
liberal ideal of autonomy.  
The functional test of capacity is also considered an important aspect of the law’s 
commitment to autonomy, especially in comparison with the other possible approaches. This 
view is expressed in the Law Commission’s report on Mental Capacity139 (which influenced 
case law and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW)). It found that the outcome-based approach 
to capacity assessment ‘penalises individuality and demands conformity at the expense of 
personal autonomy’,140 and that the status approach was ‘quite out of tune with the policy aim 
of enabling and encouraging people to take for themselves any decision which they have 
                                                          
134 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N 
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capacity to take.’141  Donnelly concludes that the functional approach is an important element 
of ‘the law’s endorsement of the liberal principle of autonomy.’142  
However, there are elements of the law of capacity that may also be considered to support 
beneficence. 
 
C Capacity Law and Beneficence 
1 Outcomes May ‘Tip the Balance’ 
The irrationality principle, by allowing decisions to be made for ‘irrational reasons’ or ‘no 
reason at all’, appears to confer unlimited freedom in decision making. However, this 
freedom is circumscribed by the test of capacity in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW), 
because it requires an adult to understand information relevant to the decision and then to be 
able to ‘use or weigh’ that information in making the decision.143 Thus, the functional test of 
capacity requires an assessment of a reasoning process.144 There is appellate court authority 
to suggest that outcomes can be relevant to this assessment. Immediately after affirming the 
right to make decisions for no reason at all, Donaldson LJ states: 
That his choice is contrary to what is to be expected of the vast majority of adults is only 
relevant if there are other reasons for doubting his capacity to decide. The nature of his choice 
or the terms in which it is expressed may then tip the balance.145 
The words ‘contrary to what is to be expected of the vast majority of adults’ in this sentence 
can be taken to mean unwise or irrational. A similar point is made in Re MB, as quoted 
above: 
[P]anic, indecisiveness and irrationality in themselves do not as such amount to 
incompetence, but they may be symptoms or evidence of incompetence146 (emphasis added.) 
These statements appear to allow the court’s appraisal of the rationality of the decision, not to 
determine, but to influence its determination of capacity. This conclusion is not disturbed by 
the following provision of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW): 
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A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise 
decision.147   
It has been argued that this section requires that outcomes be irrelevant to the determination 
of someone’s capacity.148 However, by use of the word ‘merely’, this provision implicitly 
allows the fact that someone has made an ‘unwise’ decision to be a part of the determination 
of whether they have capacity.149  
Therefore, the existing law of capacity allows for a characterisation of the wisdom of a 
person’s decision to influence the determination of capacity. To what extent it is possible or 
desirable to genuinely remove consideration of outcomes from a functional capacity 
assessment will be considered in Chapter 5.150 What is concluded here is that current case law 
allows for outcomes, and therefore, beneficence, to have some role in the determination of 
capacity, and as noted by the Law Commission, this is at the expense of autonomy.  
 
2 Risk Relative Capacity and Beneficence 
That ‘graver’ consequences require a higher level of capacity is another way in which 
‘outcome’ is relevant to the determination of capacity. Significantly, risk relative capacity 
means that one could have the capacity to accept treatment and lack the capacity to refuse it. 
This point was made, without questioning, in Application of a Local Health District; Re a 
Patient Fay [2016] NSWSC 624: 
As McDougall J observes in Hunter at [24], there is a scale or spectrum of capacity. The 
nature of the decision and its importance are both highly relevant to any decision-making 
process and an assessment of capacity. 
… 
B Collier, C Coyne and K Sullivan in their work Mental Capacity: Powers of Attorney and 
Advance Health Directives (Federation Press 2005 at 74 – 75) [sic] express the view that the 
capacity needed to refuse a particular treatment may well differ from that needed to consent to 
it. The authors suggest that this may be particularly so where refusal involves a high risk and 
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a low benefit but the risks of treatment are low with a high probability of benefit. However in 
a complex case like the present the distinction may well be difficult to discern.151 
Donnelly questions the importance of the line of authority supporting risk relative capacity, 
because all the statements were made in obiter dictum.152 Yet the fact that the statements 
were obiter may not significantly lessen their position in the case law. For this principle to 
form part of the ratio decidendi of a decision, the court would need to be considering two 
different decisions made by one person, and reach the conclusion that the adult had capacity 
for one decision and not the other due to the differing level of risks of the two decisions. It is 
hard to imagine a plausible fact scenario of this nature. Moreover, the principle was stated 
without any apparent controversy in any of the cases in which it featured.  
Here again there is an element of ‘outcome’, and therefore, beneficence, not as determinative 
of capacity, but as contributing to the test of capacity. 
 
3 Status and the ‘Diagnostic Threshold’ 
Although the Law Commission concluded that a status-based approach to capacity was an 
inappropriate encroachment on autonomy, it retained an element of ‘status’ in the form of a 
diagnostic threshold. As noted in Part III D, the presence of a mental impairment is not 
sufficient to determine incapacity, but it is necessary; if a lack of functional decision making 
ability was not caused by a mental impairment, a person cannot be found to lack capacity. 
Therefore, the attributes and effects of medically recognised disorders play role in the 
determination of an adult’s capacity.153 
This is important, because the writers of the most widely recognised compendiums of mental 
illness do not base their determinations on autonomy, nor a legally-relevant concept of 
capacity. In fact, the writers of the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual (DSM5) issue a 
‘cautionary statement for forensic use’ stating that the text is ‘primarily designed to assist 
clinicians in conducting clinical assessment, case formulation and treatment planning’, and 
while it may be used as part of legal decision making, it is not designed for that purpose, and 
                                                          
151 [36], [38]. Note that the work cited in the judgment is an edited monograph; the piece in which this point is 
made is Malcolm Parker and Colleen Cartwright, ‘Mental Capacity in Medical Practice and Advance care 
Planning: Clinical, Ethical and Legal Issues’, in Berna Collier, Chris Coyne and Karen Sullivan (eds) Mental 
Capacity: Powers of Attorney and Advance Health Directives (The Federation Press, 2005).  
152 Donnelly, above n 18, 103, 108.  
153 See for example Re C [1994] 1 WLR 290; Australian Capital Territory v JT [2009] ACTSC 105; Re E 
(Medical Treatment Anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639.  
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should not be taken as determinative of legal questions.154 In fact, in being ‘primarily 
designed to assist’ clinical assessment and treatment, the goal of the text can be described as 
medical beneficence.  
This goal is reflected in how disorders are identified and described in the compendiums. 
Bolton and Banner note that throughout the DSM5, there is frequent usage of normative 
language in the definition of disorders, like ‘rational’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘appropriate’.155 The 
concept of disorder is thus ‘relative to norms of good-functioning, such as health or 
wellbeing,’156 and disorders can be found whether or not the person diagnosed believes 
themselves to be disordered.  
As described in Part III, the ‘status’ of a person as having a disability is not determinative of 
capacity; the functional test must still be performed.157 Nevertheless, by including an element 
of ‘status’ in the capacity assessment, the diagnostic threshold means that a beneficence-
focussed concept plays a role in the determination of whether or not individuals have 
capacity.158  
Overall, it can be seen that there a number of elements to capacity law which do protect 
autonomy. Nevertheless, within the principles of capacity law there is an ongoing influence 
of beneficence in the way ‘outcomes’ and ‘status’ are used.  
 
 CAPACITY IN LAW: A REALIST CHALLENGE 
A Legal Realism in Decisions on Capacity 
The above analysis has shown that the law implicitly allows a role for beneficence in the 
determination of capacity. However, there is a ‘legal realist’ critique of the legal cases on 
capacity for treatment decisions that argues the operation of the law in this area is actually 
even more beneficence focussed than it appears.  
                                                          
154 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 
(American Psychiatric Association, 5th ed, 2013) 25. 
155 See Bolton and Banner, above n 4.  
156 Fabian Freyenhagen, Tom O'Shea, ‘Hidden Substance: Mental Disorder as a Challenge to Normatively 
Neutral Accounts of Autonomy’ (2013) 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 53. 
157 Above Part III D. 
158 Note that under the cases and legislation discussed in Part III D, the presence of mental illness is not 
determinative of capacity, but is part of the determination.   
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Legal realism, a school of thought that developed in the USA in the 20th century, holds that 
judges have far more discretion to reach decisions they believe to be right than is apparent on 
the law as written.159 As an approach, it is typically contrasted with formalism, the theory that 
judges are bound by the existing law, whether that is statute or precedent, and thereby have 
little room for discretion.160 Although legal realism is sometimes considered a controversial 
jurisprudential theory,161 modern support for realism does not usually take the radical 
position that legal decisions are solely products of non-legal biases.162 The more measured 
realist argument is that legal rules ‘do not provide the complete answer to the actual 
behaviour of courts.’163 The extent to which judicial decisions generally, or a particular type 
of judicial decision, or a specific decision, are affected by non-legal factors is difficult to 
determine. What is asserted in a realist argument is that while the judge or judges purport to 
simply apply the law to the circumstances of the case, their decisions are determined or 
influenced by other unstated reasons, of which they may not even be aware.164 This type of 
argument is difficult to conclusively demonstrate. 
A realist argument has emerged with respect to judicial decisions on capacity for treatment 
over the decades in which the principles of this area of law have developed. The argument is 
that although courts generally purport to apply an autonomy-supporting, functional test of 
capacity, in fact, they take a flexible approach to capacity which allows them to override 
treatment refusals made by people experiencing mental illness, whatever the actual functional 
ability of the person refusing the treatment. In doing so, judges are presumably motivated by 
a desire to protect these people, and therefore allow beneficence to play an unspoken role in 
legal capacity decisions. Overriding these treatment refusals allows courts to facilitate the 
beneficent goal of providing ‘necessary’ medical treatment for people with mental or 
intellectual disabilities. This general position has been put forward by a number of 
scholars.165 Part V will discuss those arguments in relation to cases on capacity for treatment 
decisions.  
                                                          
159 Karl Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in theory and practice (University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
160 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012), ch 7. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Brian Leiter, ‘American Legal Realism’ in Martin P Golding and William A Edmundson (eds) Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 53.  
163 Michael Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 2001), 810. 
164 Leiter, above n 162, 54. 
165 See LH Roth, A Meisel and CW Lidz, ‘Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment’ (1977) 134 American 
Journal Psychiatry 279; Harrington, above n 16; Margaret Brazier, ‘Hard Cases Make Bad Law’ (1997) 23 
Journal of Medical Ethics 341, 343; Sabine Michalowski, ‘Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical 
Treatment: The Relativity of an Absolute Right’ (2005) 68(6) Modern Law Review 958; Mary Ford, ‘The 
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It has already been argued that there is a greater role for beneficence in the legal principles 
than is sometimes thought. If the critiques discussed in this Part are accurate, the role of 
beneficence is again stronger.   
 
B Potential for Beneficence to Distort Decisions Acknowledged 
That an unspoken beneficent goal could play a role in legal decisions on capacity was 
acknowledged in the widely cited High Court (England and Wales) case of Ms B v An NHS 
Hospital Trust.166 In that case, Ms B was paralysed from the neck down, and suffered 
respiratory problems, as a result of which she was completely dependent on a ventilator. Ms 
B requested that the ventilation be withdrawn, in the knowledge that this action would 
ultimately result in her death. Although she had been assessed as having capacity, the treating 
clinicians were unwilling to accede to the request, arguing that she was ambivalent in her 
desire to die and had not fully come to terms with the nature of the death that would follow 
switching off the ventilator. After finding that Ms B’s capacitous request ought to be 
followed, and the ventilator withdrawn, Butler Sloss P made the following statement of 
principle: 
If there are difficulties in deciding whether the patient has sufficient mental capacity, 
particularly if the refusal may have grave consequences for the patient, it is most important 
that those considering the issue should not confuse the question of mental capacity with the 
nature of the decision made by the patient, however grave the consequences. The view of the 
patient may reflect a difference in values rather than an absence of competence and the 
assessment of capacity should be approached with this firmly in mind.167 
In the Court of Protection (England and Wales) case Re CA (Natural Delivery or Caesarean 
Section),168 Mr Justice Baker was more explicit: 
The court must avoid the ‘protection imperative’ – the danger that the court, like all 
professionals involved with treating and helping CA, may feel drawn towards an outcome that 
                                                          
Personhood Paradox and the “Right to Die”’ (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 80; John Coggon, ‘Varied and 
Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?’ 
(2007) 15(3) Health Care Analysis 235, Lindy Willmott, ‘Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an 
Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?’ (2009) 38(4) Common Law World 
Review 295; Richardson, above n 1, Foster, above n 19. 
166 [2002] EWHC 429. 
167 [100] per Butler-Sloss. This statement is cited with approval in NHS Trust v T [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam) 42 
and A Local Authority v A & Anor [2010] EWCOP 154. 
168 Re CA (Natural Delivery or Caesarean Section) [2016] EWHC 51. 
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is more protective of her and fail to carry out an assessment of capacity that is detached and 
objective.169 
Jackson J in Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust v JB170 talks of the specific issue of 
equating capacity and the acceptance of medical treatment: 
The temptation to base a judgment of a person’s capacity upon whether they seem to have 
made a good or bad decision, and in particular on whether they have accepted or rejected 
medical advice, is absolutely to be avoided. That would be to put the cart before the horse or, 
expressed another way, to allow the tail of welfare to wag the dog of capacity. Any tendency 
in this direction risks infringing the rights of that group of persons who, though vulnerable, 
are capable of making their own decisions. Many who suffer from mental illness are well able 
to make decisions about their medical treatment, and it is important not to make unjustified 
assumptions to the contrary.171 
Thus, courts are apparently aware of the ‘danger’ of allowing a protective impulse to 
compromise a fair and objective determination of capacity. Have they avoided this danger?  
 
C Pre-Selection of Cases 
It should be noted that all of the cases discussed in this Chapter involve medical treatment 
refusals. Therefore, there is a pre-selection of cases which tends towards overturning patient 
decisions where they have refused treatment, but not when they have accepted treatment.  
Court assessment of capacity only occurs in a minority of cases. This is necessary, as the 
courts could not cope with having to be the final arbiter on every single medical decision ever 
made by a patient. The Code of Practice which accompanies the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(EW) states that capacity should only be assessed by a court in ‘rare circumstances’.172 
However, the fact that there is not a single reported court case on capacity for consent to 
treatment (rather than treatment refusal) in England and Wales or Australia is significant.  
This point stands outside the other arguments discussed in this Part, because it does not relate 
to the decisions that are actually made by the courts. However, it is closely connected. It 
indicates that those cases in which there are ‘reasons for doubting’ a person’s capacity to 
decide, and the adult has accepted treatment, do not make it to court for consideration. This is 
                                                          
169 Ibid [19]. 
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not surprising. The fact that a person who assents to treatment does not, in practice, have their 
capacity questioned or assessed by medical staff has been widely noted.173 In fact, one study 
has shown that among ‘compliant’ patients there are significant numbers who would not be 
found to have capacity under regular psychiatric capacity assessment.174  
It might be thought that this is not a problem. In those cases where an adult is ‘compliant’ but 
incapacitous, a ‘best interests’ substitute decision would probably result in the same 
outcome—the treatment being performed—but with more administrative procedure.175 
Whether or not one accepts that argument, the fact that only a certain type of case is 
represented in the case law on capacity for treatment decisions means that the body of the law 
is to some extent skewed. That only treatment refusals, never acceptances of treatment, are 
overruled by the courts, adds weight to the argument of beneficence playing a greater role in 
capacity law than is apparent on its face. This fact must be borne in mind when considering 
the following arguments. 
 
D Arguments Made to Support Realist argument 
1 Deficiencies in Reasoning of Individual Cases 
A common method by which authors have made the case for an unspoken beneficence focus 
in capacity decisions is by highlighting what they see as deficiencies in the reasoning of 
individual cases.  
Foster purports to do this with regards to the case of Re MB, discussed above. It will be 
recalled that in this matter, a pregnant woman, who had consented to a caesarean birth, 
withdrew her consent in the operating theatre as an apparent result of a needle phobia. Foster 
argues that finding her incapacitous was, based on the statements of the law in that particular 
case, incorrect. The court in that case found: 
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‘[a]t the moment of panic […] her fear dominated all […] at the actual point she was not 
capable of making a decision at all […] at that moment the needle or mask dominated her 
thinking and made her quite unable to consider anything else’.176 
Foster contrasts this decision with the irrationality principle, which was set out in this case. 
Foster argues that on the facts of the case, the woman ‘fell clearly into the category of 
persons who choose not to have medical treatment for ‘irrational reasons’’, and thus this 
decision that she lacked capacity and therefore could be treated despite her refusal is legally 
incorrect, and is actually an instance of covert beneficence.177  
In The NHS Trust v Ms T,178 Ms T, who suffered from borderline personality disorder, and 
had self-harmed on a number of occasions, made an advance directive refusing blood 
transfusion. One of her stated reasons for this was that her blood was ‘evil’, and mixing more 
blood with her own increased the volume of evil blood in her body and therefore increased 
the danger of her committing ‘acts of evil’.179 Charles J found that this assertion represented a 
disorder of the mind ‘and further or alternatively symptoms or evidence of incompetence’.180 
This finding has been criticised by Coggon181 and Willmott.182 Coggon argues that the case 
involved a ‘disrespect for her ability to be in possession of a worthwhile premise’, noting that 
‘Ms T might have been right—her reasons were metaphysical and beyond proof’.183 Willmott 
concludes that ‘there was enough evidence upon which the court could have held T to have 
capacity’,184 suggesting that this decision was made due to reluctance to uphold a directive 
which would result in the woman’s death. 
Maclean185 and Scott186 both discuss the case of Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v C,187 in 
which a pregnant woman was refusing a Caesarean section, due to the fact that she had had 
the procedure before and stated she would rather die than have it again. In this case, the 
consultant obstetrician was of the opinion that the woman had capacity. However, Johnson J 
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overruled this finding, without speaking to the woman, simply on the basis of her statement 
about preferring to die, which for him demonstrated a lack of capacity. Maclean says the 
evidence could not have sustained this conclusion, and therefore the case provides a ‘graphic 
example’ of a court upholding the right to refuse treatment in principle, but simply refusing to 
apply it in practice.188 Scott argues that there was clear evidence that the woman was able to 
understand and weigh the consequences of her decision, based on her prior experience. For 
Scott, this case therefore rested on the judge balancing the foetus’ interests against the 
mother’s, and as such was incorrectly decided because a foetus does not have legal status.189 
2 Cases in Which the Patient Is Found to Have Capacity  
As noted, all of the cases discussed in this Chapter involve a treatment refusal.190 This means 
that if the court finds the adult lacks capacity, a substitute decision can be made, which in 
most cases will be for the treatment to proceed. In cases where the adult is found to have 
capacity, the patient has the right to refuse the treatment. Cases in which the adult is found to 
lack capacity fit the realist critique that there is an unspoken beneficence focus in capacity 
decisions, because the result of the capacity decision facilitates the beneficent outcome of the 
adult being provided with the ‘necessary’ treatment. However, a number of other cases have 
been mentioned in this Chapter in which the adult was found to have capacity. Prima facie, 
these might be seen to be evidence of the court’s beneficent impulse being overridden in the 
name of autonomy. However, this is not necessarily the case. 
In Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust, there were six medical experts consulted and not one of 
them believed that Ms B had a mental disorder, much less that she lacked capacity. Given 
that the settled case law that someone with capacity is allowed to refuse life-saving 
treatment,191 the fact that this case even made it to court can be seen as a demonstration of a 
reluctance to allow someone to make a treatment decision that leads to their death.192 
Secondly, it has been pointed out that the court appeared to require more from Ms B than 
what the stated test of capacity requires in order to accede to her wishes. Consider the 
following statement about Ms B by Butler-Sloss P: 
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Her wishes were clear and well-expressed. She had clearly done a considerable amount of 
investigation and was extremely well-informed about her condition. She has retained a sense 
of humour and, despite her feelings of frustration and irritation which she expressed in her 
oral evidence, a considerable degree of insight into the problems caused to the hospital 
clinicians and nursing staff by her decision not to remain on artificial ventilation. She is, in 
my judgment, an exceptionally impressive witness. Subject to the crucial evidence of the 
consultant psychiatrists, she appears to me to demonstrate a very high standard of mental 
competence, intelligence and ability.193 
As Morgan and Veitch argue, the fact that this was put forward in the judgment indicates that 
if she had been less ‘impressive’, there might have been a different finding. The impression 
given, therefore, is that: 
[..] if such a grave decision were to be condoned, there needed to be much more than a bare 
explanation of the risks and benefits of medical treatment. In other words, here, the law, in 
ascertaining the existence of mental capacity, demands much more of the patient than its own 
tests appear to require.194 
Bratton argues that: 
its extended discussion of autonomy and the subjective character of experience suggested that 
the court felt that an additional ethical justification was required for an otherwise 
straightforward legal determination195 
The Australian cases of Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A and Brightwater 
Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter,196 like Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust also find patients to have 
capacity, thereby allowing them to refuse lifesaving treatment, but similarly involve patients 
about whom there was no suggestion of a mental disability.  
The seminal case of Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) is sometimes held as a counter 
example to the realist critique. This is because C was able to reject what was considered to be 
necessary treatment even though he suffered from schizophrenia, was being detained under 
the Mental Health Act 1983 (UK), and had delusions he was a famous doctor. All this was in 
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the face of some medical evidence that C lacked capacity. Gordon and Barlow’s views are 
representative of how this case is often discussed: 
Re C represents the victory of legalism over medicalism [..] in the context of patient choice. 
The court has rejected the right of doctors to substitute their perception of a patient's best 
interests for the patient's view. The court has not simply paid lip service to the principle of 
self determination, but has applied it in extreme and difficult circumstances. In so doing the 
court has reaffirmed the right of a patient, even a mental patient, to make life and death 
decisions which, once made, may subsequently become irrevocable. The coercive 
enforcement of such a directive against health care providers was a courageous and 
significant advance. The court has once again signalled its unflinching willingness to protect 
the human rights of one of society's weakest and most powerless members.197 
However, the facts of this case do not permit such an interpretation. Gordon and Barlow’s 
argument rests on a popular perception of this case that C’s refusal was against medical 
advice.198 But that is an inaccurate characterisation. When amputation was first been 
suggested, the vascular surgeon had estimated the mortality risk of the gangrene without 
amputation to be 85 per cent.199 This is the figure that is often reported from the case.200 
However, due to C’s initial refusal, the surgeon had performed—with C’s consent—a less 
intrusive intervention that had been successful, and thus the immediate risk of the gangrene 
had passed. At the trial, the surgeon gave evidence that the gangrene might return in the 
future, but that it would not necessarily be life-threatening if it did. Further, he gave evidence 
that a below-knee amputation carried a 15 per cent mortality risk.201 The psychiatrist arguing 
for amputation apparently believed, based on the vascular surgeon’s initial assessment, that 
not amputating carried a present, high mortality threat.202 However, she had not recently 
discussed the issue with the vascular surgeon and thus did not know of the significant change 
in risk outlook. She also was apparently unaware of the mortality risk involved with 
amputation.  
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Therefore, according to the evidence of the surgeon, which understandably the court 
preferred to that of the psychiatrist, at the time of the trial, the amputation being proposed 
was not currently necessary, carried a 15 per cent mortality risk, and carried a 100 per cent 
risk of losing a limb. In this context, amputation was arguably the riskier decision.203  
Reviewing the facts of this case, Harrington thinks that ‘an unarticulated dispute as to the 
probable benefits of amputation and the risks of foregoing it produced the conflict in the 
medical evidence as to C's capacity’.204 Certainly, allowing the refusal in these circumstances 
is not the clear instance of the law favouring autonomy that Gordon and Barlow present. The 
‘principle of self-determination’ is surely only tested when a patient’s refusal is seen by the 
court as a bad idea. The result of this case, which allowed the court to approve what to it 
appeared to be the best course of action for the patient, does not disrupt the argument that 
beneficence plays an unspoken role in capacity decisions.  
A final reason why cases where capacity is found may not disrupt the realist critique, is that 
in the case the treatment had already happened. Decisions about medical procedures can 
sometimes be urgent, and authorisation for treatment may be given by an emergency hearing 
of a first instance court. A later, published decision then determines whether to award 
compensation for the unwanted interference. Two of the founding cases establishing the right 
to refuse treatment, Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital and Malette v. Shulman et 
al, fall into this category. In St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S.205 court found a woman 
competent to refuse a caesarean section. However, in this case the procedure had already 
been performed. A judge had allowed the treatment despite her refusal in an emergency ex 
parte hearing which was called after labour had commenced. The question of capacity was 
not addressed in that emergency hearing, apparently due to error. The court granted the 
woman relief, however, this was too late to actually enforce the woman’s refusal. 
These cases can be seen as autonomy-supporting, but they also do not undermine the 
argument that there is an unspoken beneficence focus in capacity for medical treatment 
decisions, because the purported object of this focus—overriding the treatment refusals of 
people with mental illness in order to provide ‘necessary’ treatment—is no longer relevant.  
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3 Pregnancy Cases 
A number of authors have focussed on cases involving pregnant women who have refused a 
caesarean section.206 In her critique written in 2002, Scott points out that the common result 
is a finding of incapacity, allowing the procedure to be authorised. This trend has apparently 
continued; of the 15 cases of which the author is aware regarding refusal of caesarean section 
in England and Wales to 2018,207 only one decided that the woman had capacity to make this 
decision, but in that case the procedure that already been performed.208  
Significantly, the beneficent impulse in pregnancy cases has been openly acknowledged. 
Writing extra-judicially on the topic, the then Court of Appeal judge Lord Justice Thorpe 
stated: 
It is simply unrealistic to suppose that the preservation of each life will not be a matter of 
equal concern to the Family Division judge surveying the medical dilemma. Whatever 
emphasis legal principle may place upon adult autonomy with the consequent right to choose 
between treatments, at some level the judicial outcome will be influenced by the expert 
evidence as to which treatment affords the best chance of the happy announcement that both 
mother and baby are doing well209 (emphasis added.) 
This statement arguably comes close to creating the unusual case of an incontrovertible legal 
realist argument. It is stated in black and white that ‘the judicial outcome’ will be influenced 
by concern for protecting mother and baby, ‘legal principle’ notwithstanding. 
As indicated by Lord Justice Thorpe’s comment, there is potentially an even greater 
beneficent impulse of the court in pregnancy cases, due to the perception of two lives being at 
stake. Scott notes that the concept of ‘risk relative capacity’ may mean that a pregnant 
woman, whose decisions potentially affect two lives, may be required to be ‘more competent’ 
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than the ordinary patient, even though, as decided in Re F (in utero),210 a foetus lacks legal 
status.211  
 
E Case that Challenges the Realist Argument 
All of the cases discussed in this Part have been selected for discussion by people making the 
‘realist’ argument. However, there is a widely reported Court of Protection (England and 
Wales) case that appears to challenge the realist argument, and does not fall into the 
categories discussed in Part V D 2. In Kings College Hospital Trust v C212 a woman 
diagnosed with a personality disorder had attempted suicide. As a result, she was put on 
kidney dialysis, which was keeping her alive. She asked for the dialysis machines to be 
switched off, allowing her to die. Doctors provided opinions to the court stating that owing to 
her personality disorder, she did not have capacity to understand the decision she was 
making.213 However, the court heard evidence from C’s daughters that C placed high value 
on living a ‘sparkly’ lifestyle,214 had said that she wanted to ‘go out with a bang’, and did not 
want to grow old.215 In this context, the court found that C did have capacity to make the 
decision to refuse the kidney dialysis.  
 
F Limitations of the Realist Argument 
The general position of those mounting the legal realist argument set out in this Part is that 
courts, either knowingly or unknowingly, bend the law in order to prevent a person with a 
mental illness to make a risky treatment refusal. In Foster’s words, they allow beneficence to 
operate ‘covertly.’ This may well be true, and the arguments referenced above appear sound. 
However, how could it be certain that such covert influence is operative? The court, 
obviously, does not admit this. Therefore, there is a large amount of inference in all of the 
arguments referenced in this Part. 
Moreover, while the decision on capacity is a legal determination, it is to be made based on 
the specific facts of the case. This also limits the potency of the realist arguments. For 
                                                          
210 [1988] 2 WLR 1297. 
211 Scott, above n 186, 27. 
212 [2015] EWCOP 80. See further discussion of this case in Chapter 5, Part III A. 
213 Kings College Hospital Trust v C [2015] EWCOP 80 [41]-[55]. 
214 Ibid [8]. 
215 Ibid [10]. 
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example, in the case of Foster’s critique of Re MB,216 whether the woman’s fear of needles 
was an ‘irrational reason’ for a decision on one hand, or an impairment causing incapacity on 
the other, is a question of fact, to be determined on the evidence, not by doctrinal analysis. 
The entirety of the evidence on which this decision is based is not available to the reviewer. 
Although Foster makes a compelling case, it is not and cannot be definitive.  
Conclusively demonstrating the truth of a legal realist argument is inherently difficult, and 
the limitations discussed here do not demonstrate any deficiencies in the arguments of those 
making it. Nevertheless, these limitations must be recognised.  
 
   CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has shown that although autonomy is a central value in the law of capacity, 
beneficence plays a greater role in this law than is sometimes acknowledged. By allowing for 
‘outcomes’ and ‘status’ to influence the determination of capacity, the law introduces a clear 
element of beneficence. This means that although primarily directed at autonomy, the law 
cannot be characterised as solely autonomy focussed. Secondly, according to the realist 
critique described here, there is a greater role for beneficence than can be appreciated from 
the law as written.  
The arguments for an unspoken role for beneficence that prevents people with mental 
illnesses from refusing what is seen to be as necessary treatment are very important. This 
thesis addresses the issue of what reasoning process courts should use when deciding a 
person’s capacity to refuse medical treatment. Understanding the extent to which the realist 
critique is accurate is essential for this project. Any convincing recommendations developed 
in this thesis must take into account an accurate understanding of how the law currently 
operates.  However, despite the cogency of the arguments presented, and despite some 
patterns that seem to confirm the realist critique, the fact that capacity decisions are fact- and 
evidence-specific means that the arguments are ultimately limited. Moreover, as shown by 
Kings College Hospital Trust v C, not all cases can be explained by the realist critique.  
Therefore, there is room for closer investigation of the operation of capacity in the law, in 
order to more conclusively determine whether beneficence plays a greater role than the face 
of the law prescribes. In particular, there is room for analysis of legal decision making that 
                                                          
216 Above, Part V D 1. 
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does not rely on assessing the correctness of individual decisions. Providing this analysis is 
one of the aims of Chapters 3 and 4.  
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Chapter 3: Case Analysis of Capacity Decisions in 
Queensland, Australia 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
To further develop a critical understanding of capacity and its role in the legal system, a case 
analysis of legal capacity decisions was performed in the jurisdiction of Queensland. This 
Chapter presents the results of this case analysis. Chapter 2 discussed a realist critique that 
capacity cases involve a greater application of beneficence than is provided on the face of the 
law. It showed that despite the cogency of the arguments of those making that allegation, 
their arguments were ultimately limited by the fact that the correct finding in any legal 
determination of capacity depended on the nature of the facts and the evidence presented in 
the particular case. The purpose of this study is to seek to identify patterns that do or do not 
support the realist argument on a survey of cases, rather than on analysis of any individual 
cases.  
There is not a high number of judicial decisions on capacity for medical treatment decisions. 
To illustrate, across Australian jurisdictions, searches in major legal databases1 revealed only 
six published court decisions under capacity law that have included a determination of an 
adult’s capacity to make a specific medical treatment decision: Re Bridges,2 Brightwater 
Care Group (Inc) Rossiter3, Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A,4 Australian 
Capital Territory v JT,5 Re JS,6 and Application of a Local Health District; Re a Patient 
Fay.7 Of those, whether or not the adult had capacity was only at issue in three cases.8 
Therefore, the potential to analyse patterns in decision making in the area of capacity for 
medical treatment decisions is limited.  
It was therefore decided to broaden the investigation, and look at legal capacity decisions 
across a range of contexts. Capacity to make medical treatment decisions has attracted a 
                                                          
1 Austlii, Westlaw, LexisNexis. 
2 [2001] 1 Qd R 574. 
3 [2009] WASC 229. 
4 [2009] NSWSC 761. 
5 [2009] ACTSC 105. 
6 [2014] NSWSC 302.  
7 [2016] NSWSC 624. Re GMH [2003] QMHC 8 makes a conclusion on capacity, but is decided under mental 
health law. Pere v Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service [2017] QCA 225 briefly rules out the 
possibility of incapacity to consent to a blood test when refusing leave to appeal a compensation claim. 
8 Re Bridges, Application of a Local Health District; Re a Patient Fay and to a lesser extent, Australian Capital 
Territory v JT. 
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substantial amount of academic attention.9 However, there are a number of other less 
examined contexts in which capacity is determined. A prominent example is testamentary 
capacity, which is the subject of many Supreme and Appeal Court decisions across Australia 
each year.10 Judicial decisions are also made on capacity to instruct lawyers,11 capacity to 
contract,12 as well as general ‘financial’ and/or ‘personal’ capacity matters. Capacity is 
decision-specific, so each type of capacity determination has particular factual circumstances. 
For example, in testamentary capacity cases, courts usually determine capacity after the adult 
has passed away, whereas most other types of capacity are usually determined while the adult 
is alive. These different factual circumstances affect the pressures decision makers face when 
determining capacity. Yet essentially the same process is being followed in each case. In all 
areas, capacity is a matter for determination by the tribunal/court, making use of medical 
evidence, but without delegating the decision to medical practitioners.13 Generally, in each 
determination the court/tribunal is required to assess the decision-making process (the 
‘function’), not the actual decision (the ‘outcome’).14 Finally, these decisions must frequently 
be made in the context of an alleged ‘impairment of the mind’, whether that be a psychiatric 
illness, an intellectual disability, or other impairment.15 These similarities mean that useful 
comparisons can be made between decisions in the different contexts. They also mean that 
important differences may be highlighted.  
Different types of capacity decisions in Queensland courts and tribunals were analysed to 
understand how courts/tribunals make capacity determinations, and whether this differs 
depending on the particular capacity context. The results from this study provide an empirical 
understanding of legal decision-making processes in this area. They also provide a basis for 
critical analysis in Chapter 4, in which the question of whether the results lend support to the 
                                                          
9 E.g. George J Annas, and Joan E Densberger, ‘Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Autonomy vs. 
Paternalism’ (1983) 15 University of Toledo Law Review 561; Paul S Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso, 
‘Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment’ (1988) 319(25) New England Journal of Medicine 
1635; Cameron Stewart and Paul Biegler, ‘A Primer on the Law of Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment’, 
(2004) 78(5) Australian Law Journal 325. Also see many regular articles on the topic in Journal of Law and 
Medicine, and Oxford University’s Medical Law Review.  
10 E.g. Frizzo & Anor v Frizzo & Ors [2011] QCA 308; Zorbas v Sidiropoulous (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197. 
11 E.g. Pratt v Dickson [2000] QSC 314. 
12 E.g. Gibbons v Wright [1954] HCA 17; Ford by his Tutor Beatrice Ann Watkinson v Perpetual Trustees 
Victoria Limited [2009] NSWCA 186. 
13 XYZ v State Trustees Ltd (2006) 25 VAR 402; Zorbas v Sidiropoulous (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197 [65]; L v 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2006] FCAFC 114 [27]. 
14 See Chapter 2, Part III B, and Part II B below. 
15 See Table 2 below. 
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realist critique will be addressed. The findings of this Chapter and Chapter 4 will then inform 
Chapter 5, which will set out a positive argument about the proper role of capacity in the law.  
 
 METHODOLOGY 
A Scope 
Chapter 2 showed that the law on capacity to make medical treatment decisions is essentially 
equivalent across England and Wales and Australian jurisdictions.16 Therefore, conclusions 
in one jurisdiction are relevant in others, as evidenced by the use of inter-jurisdictional case 
law in legal decisions on this type of capacity.17 However, not all contexts in which capacity 
is determined legally has such clear inter-jurisdictional character. Personal/financial capacity 
matters represent the largest body of accessible legal decisions on capacity in Australia, and 
so are a useful area for broader pattern-based case analysis. These matters are dealt with by 
guardianship and administration legislation, which is state based.18 Therefore, while 
broadening the study in terms of the type of capacity being considered, this study restricted 
the analysis to one jurisdiction in order to make comparisons between capacity decisions in 
different areas of law more straightforward.  
It will be recalled that capacity for medical treatment decisions are made under a functional 
definition of capacity,19 and this is thought to be a salient, autonomy-supporting feature of the 
law.20 Queensland is a useful jurisdiction for cross-context analysis of capacity 
determinations, because other than the Australian Capital Territory, the 
guardianship/administration legislation of all other states and territories uses a capacity 
definition that can be defined as outcome-focussed, rather than functional.21 This means that 
                                                          
16 With the partial exception of Western Australia. See Introduction Part V; Chapter 2, Part III.  
17 Hunter [2009] NSWSC 761, Re GMH [2003] QMHC 8, Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] 
WASC 229. 
18 See s 3 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), ss 22(1) and 46(1) Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) 
and sch 4 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld).  
19 Chapter 2, Part III B. 
20 Chapter 2, Part IV B. 
21 Although Chesterman has a different view of the Victorian guardianship legislation, which defines incapacity 
as when an adult ‘is unable by reason of the disability to make reasonable judgments’ s 22(1)(b) Guardianship 
and Administration Act 1986: John Chesterman, ‘Capacity in Victorian Guardianship Law: Options for Reform’ 
(2010) 36 Monash University Law Review 84, 93. He argues that because the test states ‘is unable’, not ‘has not 
been able’, the focus is shifted to ‘the person’s current functioning abilities, rather than placing the emphasis on 
the details or outcomes of their previous decision-making practices’. However, while this may change the 
‘focus’, the presence of the concept ‘reasonable judgments’ means that outcomes are not extracted from the test. 
Indeed, Chesterman acknowledges this when he then says ‘[t]hat is not to say that outcomes play no part in the 
process. Evidence of prior ‘unreasonable’ exercises of judgement is routinely introduced as evidence of a 
person’s incapacity’ 93. 
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in most Australian states and territories, a different test for capacity is used in the context of 
guardianship/administration than is used for most other types of capacity decision.  
To illustrate, in New South Wales, the guardianship legislation describes a ‘person in need of 
a guardian’ as ‘a person who, because of a disability, is totally or partially incapable of 
managing his or her person’.22 This cannot be described as a ‘functional’ test, because it 
requires the court/tribunal to consider the overall effect of an adult’s decisions on the 
‘managing of their person’, not on the decision making process they use. The Victorian 
legislation is also outcome- not function-focussed. It defines a person for whom a 
guardianship or administration order can be made as someone who, by reason of a disability, 
is ‘unable’ ‘to make reasonable judgments’ regarding their person or finances.23 The term 
‘reasonable judgments’ requires consideration of the quality of the decision, not just the 
process of decision-making. In comparison, in Queensland’s Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000, the capacity definition requires an adult to be capable of: 
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; and  
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and  
(c) communicating the decisions in some way. 
In this definition there is no reference to ‘reasonable judgments’ or ‘managing his/her 
person’. To pass this test, one needs to understand the decision, freely decide one way or 
other, and communicate that decision. It is the same test as that for medical treatment 
decisions in that jurisdiction.24 Therefore, by restricting the analysis to Queensland decisions, 
more direct comparisons can be made between guardianship/administration decisions and 
other capacity decisions, and there is more overlap between capacity decisions in the context 
with the highest volume of cases, and the overall topic of this thesis. 
In this study, three types of capacity were considered: personal/financial, testamentary, and 
‘legal matters’ capacity. They represented the largest number of capacity cases in reported, 
accessible decisions in Queensland, with 317, 55 and 26 cases respectively.25 This allows for 
some statistical comparison to be made between the different types of decisions. These three 
contexts also provide an interesting contrast. The court/tribunal’s power to determine 
personal/financial capacity historically derives from the parens patriae jurisdiction, as is the 
                                                          
22 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 3.  
23 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) ss 22 (1)(b) and s46(1)(a)(2).  
24 Re Bridges [2001] 1 Qd R 574.  
25 Hundreds of decisions are made each year in the Mental Health Review Tribunal, however those matters are 
not publicly available. 
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case for capacity to make medical decisions.26 This is the jurisdiction that derives from the 
sovereign’s status as guardian of the people, which entailed a duty to take care of children 
and people of ‘mental incapacity’.27 Thus, the sovereign’s power in this role was one with an 
explicitly protective imperative. Although now governed largely by statute, the protective 
function of these jurisdictions is still visible. In most personal/financial capacity cases, the 
reason a person’s capacity is being assessed may be that a healthcare worker or family 
member is concerned about the welfare of the adult. Legislation directs the Tribunal to make 
an appointment only when it believes that without one, either an ‘adult’s needs will not be 
adequately met’, or ‘the adult’s interests will not be adequately protected’28 (emphasis 
added.) Thus, although the test of capacity is supposed to be functional, and not guided by a 
protection imperative, the justification for the overall process of application to the tribunal 
and appointment of a guardian or administrator is the protection of the adult.  
On the other hand, testamentary capacity decisions are of a different nature. The court’s 
power to determine the validity of a will does not derive from the parens patriae 
jurisdiction.29 Clearly, protection of the adult whose capacity is being assessed is not a 
relevant concern to the court in these matters because the adult has died.  
Having a set of judicial capacity determinations from the same time and place, but in a 
jurisdiction not rooted in a protective function, allows for some analysis and assessment of 
the role of protection, or beneficence, in the way capacity decisions are reached. 
Legal matters capacity presents an interesting addition. The court/tribunal’s power to rule on 
this type of capacity may also be seen as part of the protective function of the court; they too 
historically emanate from the parens patriae jurisdiction. However, there are important 
differences between legal matters capacity and personal/financial capacity matters in this 
regard. Firstly, personal/financial capacity matters cases can cover entire categories of 
decision making, and therefore may have a very significant potential impact on the wellbeing 
of the person whose capacity is being assessed. Legal matters capacity cases, on the other 
                                                          
26 CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 498, [27]. See John J Regan, ‘Protecting the Elderly: The New Paternalism’ (1980) 
32 Hastings Law Journal 1111, 1114; Terry Carney, and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment: 
Tribunals and Popular Justice (Federation Press, 1997) 25; Joan L O'Sullivan, ‘Role of the Attorney for the 
Alleged Incapacitated Person’ (2002) 31 Stetson Law Review 687. 
27 See Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogative of the Crown (Butterworth, 1820) 155; George B 
Curtis, ‘The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant’ (1975) 25 DePaul Law Review 
895. 
28 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s12(1)(c). 
29 For a description of the complex provenance of this jurisdiction see Thomas E Atkinson, ‘Brief History of 
English Testamentary Jurisdiction’ (1943) 8 Missouri Law Review 107. 
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hand, have the effect of determining the adult’s ability to run a particular civil case, not legal 
matters generally, nor criminal matters. A finding of capacity could expose the adult to the 
risk of a negative costs order, but the risk is far more contained. In legal matters cases heard 
before QCAT, each party is usually self-represented and only bears its own costs,30 so there 
the only risk is losing the case. Secondly, in one of the categories of legal matters capacity 
(see below, Part II B 3)—determinations made under section 59 of the Public Trustee Act 
1978 (Qld)—the decision on capacity does not have the potential to put the subject adult at 
risk. In those matters, if the court finds the adult lacks capacity to reach the settlement, the 
next step is for the court to sanction it if it thinks the compromise is reasonable, or refuse to 
sanction it if not. Therefore, in the case where a compromise is put before the court that the 
court thinks is reasonable and would sanction if the person lacked capacity, the determination 
of capacity only has administrative implications. Either way, given the court’s power to 
refuse to sanction an agreement it considers unreasonable, these determinations of capacity 
cannot affect the adult’s vulnerability. Therefore, while sharing its historical parens patriae 
roots with personal/financial capacity, legal matters capacity cases may be less likely to 
enliven the court/tribunal’s putative protective instincts.   
The time frame of the study was January 2000 to December 2015, or from the date the 
decision making body commenced to December 2015. The Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) was established in 2009, so all available QCAT decisions 
were included. Before 2009, personal/financial capacity decisions were made by the 
Guardianship and Administration Tribunal. It was decided that only those made by QCAT 
would be included, to eliminate the possibility of data being affected by the fact a different 
body was making the decision. All reported testamentary capacity and legal matters capacity 
decisions made between 2000 and 2015 were included in the analysis. 
 
B Types of Matter Considered 
1 Personal/Financial Capacity Matters 
Not all QCAT decisions on personal/financial capacity cases are available, as QCAT only 
publishes them when reasons for the decision are requested by a party. QCAT does not keep 
records on the proportion of cases in which reasons are requested, but it estimates the 
                                                          
30 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 s 100. 
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proportion to be around 30 per cent.31 Those matters that are published are publically 
available on Austlii.32 Personal/financial capacity decisions occur in the Guardianship and 
Administration division of QCAT, and can be located by looking for ‘matter type: 
Guardianship and Administration.’ 
Each published Guardianship and Administration matter during the period was read and 
analysed, and all cases where a decision was made on financial and/or personal capacity 
matters were recorded. During the study period, there were 205 of these decisions, all 205 
were included in this study. All of the matters involved an application to make, continue or 
remove a guardianship or administration order under section 12 of the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld). Sometimes only financial or personal capacity was decided, 
sometimes both. When considering both, QCAT decided on personal and financial capacity 
separately, and in some matters, it concluded that an adult had one type of capacity but lacked 
the other.33 The 205 guardianship/administration cases comprised 52 on financial capacity, 
41 on personal capacity, and 112 on both; thus, a total of 317 individual decisions on capacity 
were analysed.  
Financial or personal capacity may also need to be determined in the context of a decision of 
an Enduring Power of Attorney (EPA). Where an EPA is in place, but on review the adult is 
found to have lacked the capacity to make it, the tribunal must consider whether to make a 
guardianship/administration order, thus it will need to assess personal/financial capacity. EPA 
decisions were excluded from the study set, as they operate in a distinct context, and there 
was not a significant number of them compared to the other contexts. However, where a 
decision included an EPA capacity decision and a personal/financial capacity decision the 
matter was included in the study set.  
2 Testamentary Capacity 
In the study period there were 53 reported matters in which a decision was made on 
testamentary capacity. In two of those matters, capacity with respect to two different wills 
was determined;34 therefore, there were 55 individual decisions on capacity in total. These 
cases were identified through a series of searches on the Austlii, Lexisnexis and Westlaw 
databases. The first search was for ‘testamentary capacity’ (no other terms for this type of 
                                                          
31 Personal communication with QCAT staff member, 12 February 2016. 
32 See <http://www.qcat.qld.gov.au/qcat-decisions/published-decisions> accessed 11 February 2016. 
33 E.g. MGC [2015] QCAT 80. 
34 Lando v Sutton [2011] QSC 339 and Calabrese v Calabrese [2010] QSC 277. 
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capacity were located in the cases). Then searches were done for cases which cited important 
international and Australian cases on testamentary capacity e.g. Banks v Goodfellow,35 Bailey 
v Bailey36 and Timbury v Coffee.37 Finally, searches were done for other cases which cited 
Queensland cases on testamentary capacity. As with the personal/financial capacity cases, not 
all decisions were available, only those which were reported. 38 Cases from the Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeal were included in the data set.  
There were two contexts in which testamentary capacity decisions were made. The most 
common was in probate matters. Where a will was challenged and the Supreme Court had to 
determine whether probate would be granted, one of the matters with which it had to satisfy 
itself was whether the testator had testamentary capacity39 and there were 38 of these cases. 
Testamentary capacity may or may not have been in dispute, but even when it was not, the 
granting of probate was necessarily accompanied by an explicit or implicit finding of 
capacity. All such cases were included in the study set.  
The second context in which the Supreme Court made a testamentary capacity decision was 
in the matter of statutory wills.40 There, decisions were made when the adult was still alive, 
but applied precisely the same law with respect to capacity. There were 14 of these decisions.  
The definition of testamentary capacity is taken from the Banks v Goodfellow:41 
[A] testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the 
property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which 
he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall 
poison his affections, avert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties – that 
no insane delusions shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal 
of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.42 
As a task-specific test, this can also be described as a functional capacity definition.43  
                                                          
35 (1870) LR 5 QB 549. 
36 [1924] HCA 21. 
37 [1941] HCA 22. 
38 E.g. the Court of Appeal case Flemming v Gibson [2001] QCA 244, used in the data here, was appealed from 
a Supreme Court decision, but the Supreme Court decision is not available.  
39 A A Preece, Lee’s Manual of Queensland Succession Law (Thompson Reuters, 2013) 48. 
40 Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 21. 
41 (1870) 5 QB 549. 
42 Banks v Goodfellow (1870) 5 QB 549, 565-66. 
43 Carmelle Peisah and Kenneth I Shulman, ‘Testamentary Capacity’ in George J Demakis (ed) Civil Capacities 
in Clinical Neuropsychology: Research Findings and Practical Applications (Oxford, 2011) 95.  
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3 Legal Matters Capacity 
The third category of capacity was that of legal matters, on which there were 26 reported 
decisions in the study period.44 This category brings three specific capacity decision types 
together.45 They all involve the capacity to conduct legal matters, but the precise contexts 
differ. The first context is the application for the appointment of a guardian or administrator 
under section 12 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000. The tribunal has the 
power to declare someone lacks capacity for all financial matters, and/or all personal matters. 
However, the tribunal can also make an appointment under section 12 for a specific legal 
matter. These matters were located by searching within those QCAT matters listed as 
‘guardianship and administration’ types for legal matters capacity. There were 10 of these 
decisions. These decisions use the same functional definition of capacity as used in 
personal/financial capacity matters.46 
The second context is the question of whether an adult has capacity to run particular legal 
proceedings, and therefore whether a litigation guardian needs to be appointed under rr72 and 
95(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR). The difference is that this is 
determined in the Supreme Court, not QCAT, and the capacity definition is taken from 
Schedule 2, Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991. These matters were located by 
searching Austlii, Lexisnexis and Westlaw for cases citing the relevant legislation. Further 
searches were done for the phrase ‘capacity to instruct’ (no other terms for this type of 
capacity were located in the cases) and for cases which cited other cases in the area, but they 
did not uncover any cases not found in the initial legislation search. There were seven of 
these decisions. The capacity definition is taken from the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 
1991: 
person with impaired capacity' means a person who is not capable of making the decisions 
required of a litigant for conducting proceedings47 
This is further explained in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co:48 
                                                          
44 Re Crowson [2001] QSC 393 included a decision on testamentary capacity and legal matters capacity, and 
therefore is included in both sets of data.  
45 A fourth context: extension of limitations under Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 29 for parties found to 
be under a legal disability due to ‘unsound mind’. There were 6 of these matters in the study period. They were 
not included, as the definition of capacity associated with ‘unsound mind’ is one of outcome as opposed to 
function.  
46 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 sch 2(1)(o), 2(i). 
47 Schedule 2, Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 sch 2. 
48 [2002] EWCA Civ 1889. 
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[The question] is whether the party to legal proceedings [..] is capable of understanding, with 
the assistance of such proper explanation from legal advisers and experts in other disciplines 
as the case may require, the issues on which his [or her] consent or decision is likely to be 
necessary in the course of those proceedings.49 
Directed at a person’s capacity to understand relevant information, this can be described as a 
functional definition of capacity.  
The final context is where the Supreme Court is required under s59 of the Public Trustee Act 
1978 (Qld) and r72 of the UCPR to sanction settlements reached with parties who lack 
capacity. The capacity to reach a settlement is an individual decision, unlike the other 
contexts considered in legal matters capacity. However, it is a decision which requires 
understanding and consideration of the whole legal process of bringing a claim to court. In 
the Supreme Court case Aziz v Prestige Property Services P/L & Anor,50 it was described as a 
question of ‘whether he has impaired capacity in relation to legal matters and particularly 
whether he has capacity to bring or defend a proceeding including settling a claim.’51 
Therefore, this type of capacity is essentially the same as that being considered in the other 
three contexts. These matters are heard in the Supreme Court, but the definition of capacity is 
identical to that in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000, so it is the same as for all 
other guardianship/administration matters.  These matters were located by searching the three 
databases for cases citing the relevant legislation, and for cases citing other cases in the area. 
There were nine of these decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2002] EWCA Civ 1889 [75]. 
50 [2007] QSC 265. 
51 Aziz v Prestige Property Services P/L & Anor [2007] QSC 265 (‘Aziz’) [23]. 
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Table 1 Sources, availability and method of finding cases for study 
Decision type Dates 
available 
Availability 
of decisions 
Database(s) Method of finding 
Financial/personal 
capacity 
2009 – 
2015  
Matters 
where a 
party 
requested 
reasons 
Austlii Cases defined as 
‘matter type: 
Guardianship and 
Administration’ 
Testamentary capacity 2000 – 
2015 
Reported 
cases 
Austlii, 
Lexisnexis, 
Westlaw  
Search for 
‘testamentary 
capacity’; search for 
citation of major 
testamentary capacity 
cases 
Legal 
matters 
capacity 
In context of 
guardianship/ 
administration 
order 
2009 – 
2015 
 
Matters 
were a party 
requested 
reasons 
Austlii Search within 
financial/personal 
capacity results 
Other 
contexts 
2000 - 
2015 
Reported 
cases 
Austlii, 
Lexisnexis, 
Westlaw 
Search for citation of 
legislation e.g. s59 
Public Trustee Act 
1978 (Qld); search for 
phrases ‘‘litigation 
guardian’, ‘incapacity’ 
and ‘sanction’; search 
for citation of major 
legal matters capacity 
cases. 
 
C Data Identification 
1 Quantitative Analysis 
Each of the available 398 cases was read in full, and the following data was recorded for each 
case: 
1) type of capacity decision being made; 
2) forum;  
3) sources of evidence used, including: 
a) a characterisation of the source, as either  
(i) medical evidence,  
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(ii) evidence from friends/family,  
(iii) evidence from non-medical third parties, or  
(iv) from the adult themselves, and 
b) for (i)-(iii), how many individual sources of this type; 
4) for (i)  
a) the description in the judgment of the medical expert providing the evidence; and 
b) whether the medical opinion was capacity or incapacity; 
5) whether a diagnosis of the adult was recorded; 
6) whether a normative characterisation of the adult’s decision/s (wise/unwise, 
unusual/not unusual) was considered in the determination of capacity 
7) whether the vulnerability or risk of the adult was considered in the determination of 
capacity; and 
8) whether capacity or incapacity was found by the tribunal. 
Fields one to five and eight were apparent on the face of the judgments and were 
uncontroversial.  
Field six, the normative characterisation of the decision, was determined firstly by searching 
each case for ‘poor’ and ‘wise’ and synonyms ‘unwise’ and ‘sensible’, and then by reading 
each case and identifying normative characterisations otherwise visible on the face of the 
text. Data were only included in this field if there was an explicit or implicit normative 
characterisation of the decision/s either by medical experts or by the tribunal itself. The 
researcher’s own opinion on the wisdom of decisions described was not included or recorded. 
Only information obtained directly from the judgment was included in this field. 
Field seven, consideration of vulnerability and risk of the adult, was determined firstly by 
searching cases for the search term ‘vulnerab*’ and ‘risk’. The researcher then read each case 
and located other consideration of these concepts that was visible on the face of the text, 
either by medical experts or by the tribunal itself.  
All of the data were collated in an Excel spreadsheet. Calculations were then made as to 
which fields were present for each capacity type. 
2 Qualitative Analysis 
For the purposes of qualitative analysis, sections of the judgments in which fields three to 
seven (above) were referred to or discussed were extracted. Extracts from the judgments that 
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were relevant to each particular field are presented in the Results section, Part III B of this 
Chapter. 
D Limitations of Study 
1 Study Does Not Include Capacity for Specific Medical Treatment Decisions 
The cases considered in this study do not specifically deal with the question of capacity to 
refuse a particular medical treatment, which is the topic of this thesis. Therefore, the 
description and analysis in this Chapter and Chapter 4 will not directly describe how capacity 
to make medical treatment decisions is, in fact, decided in law.  
2 Study Is Confined to Single Jurisdiction 
It was beyond the scope of the study to include decisions from multiple jurisdictions. 
Therefore, it is possible that the patterns in the data found in this study were specific to 
Queensland, and would not be present elsewhere. It is hoped that future studies will be able to 
replicate this study in other jurisdictions in order to assess the extent to which the patterns 
found here are replicated in other Australian and international jurisdictions.  
3 Most Decisions in Study Are Made by a Tribunal, Not a Court 
The decisions QCAT makes have the same legal effect as courts; and they perform the same 
function the Court of Protection (England and Wales) does when making decisions on 
whether or not to appoint a deputy.52 However, there are important differences between 
courts and tribunals as decision making bodies. Members making decisions do not have the 
legal training of judges, and need not follow the rules of evidence that apply to courts.53 
Tribunals also tend to be under greater resource pressure than courts, both in regards to 
hearing time, and in time to write up reasons.54  
A major study by Carney and Tait provided evidence of the potential for differences in the 
decision making between courts and tribunals.55 They showed that the early decision making 
of the New South Wales and Victorian guardianship tribunals was more ‘inclusive and 
democratic than its court equivalent’.56 Carney and Tait showed that tribunal decisions 
specifically on sterilisation differed from court decisions on the same topic, in that tribunal 
                                                          
52 Introduction II D. 
53 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 28(3). 
54 Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements (2014) vol 1, 346. 
55 Carney and Tait, above n 26. 
56 Ibid, 136.  
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decisions were more likely to challenge medical evidence, and use strategies to preserve the 
autonomy of the subject of the tribunal hearing.57 Writing in 2012, Carney noted that the 
move from a specific guardianship/administration tribunal to a generalist tribunal (as has 
occurred in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria since Carney and Tait’s initial study) 
may have been accompanied by a ‘reversion in outcomes for consumers’ and that the 
realising of the empowering principles in the tribunal system may have ‘faded over time’.58  
Whatever the current situation, it is clear that there is potential for differences in the decision 
making of the courts as compared to tribunals such as QCAT. This means that the results of 
this study will not describe or necessarily predict how decisions might be made by courts. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of overlapping circumstances between QCAT decisions in 
the guardianship/administration jurisdiction and capacity for medical treatment decisions 
made by courts that make data on the former useful in the study of the latter. The applicable 
law is equivalent, the ‘protection imperative’ may be potentially in the minds of the decision 
makers, and finally, tribunals, like courts, must make capacity decisions assisted by medical 
evidence.  
If the patterns identified in the study data do reflect a role for beneficence over that 
prescribed by law, they would represent an example of the influence of the ‘protection 
imperative’ identified by Mr Justice Baker in Re CA (Natural Delivery or Caesarean 
Section),59 in the context of a functional definition of capacity. They would provide an 
example how this ‘protection imperative’ alleged to be operative in capacity for medical 
treatment decisions60 may manifest.  
4 Possible Confounding Variables in Data 
The adults subject to the three types of different capacity decisions are different groups of 
people, and it is possible that difference in the data shown in this study might be caused by 
differences in the cohorts. Moreover, there are differences in the way these groups were 
‘selected’ that may influence the results of this study. Personal/financial capacity decisions 
are generally prompted by concern that a vulnerable adult’s needs are not being met.61 Legal 
                                                          
57 Terry Carney and David Tait, ‘Sterilization: Tribunal Experiments in Popular Justice?’ (1999) 22(2) 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 177, 192. 
58 Terry Carney, “Guardianship, “Social” Citizenship and Theorising Substitute Decision-Making Law” in Israel 
Doron and Ann M Soden (eds), Beyond Elder Law (Springer, 2012) 13. 
59 Re CA (Natural Delivery or Caesarean Section) [2016] EWHC 51. 
60 In the ‘realist critique’ described in Chapter 2, Part V. 
61 Reviews of guardianship/administration orders, which comprised a significant proportion of these matters, 
may have been prompted simply by the coming to the end of a previous order; orders are never indefinite, and 
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matters capacity cases may be commenced for that reason, but they might also be 
commenced by lawyers representing an opposing side, perhaps because they are concerned 
about the enforceability of a settlement reached with an adult whose capacity could be 
challenged.62 On the other hand, the originating concern of testamentary capacity matters is 
most commonly that of a disappointed family member, who either was not provided for under 
a will, or was given a lesser share of the estate than he or she hoped or expected. It may be 
that in some of these matters, the reason for the hearing is the disappointment of the legatee, 
rather than genuine concerns regarding the capacity of the testator.  
For these reasons, quantitative analysis of differences in the three capacity contexts alone will 
have limited value. Therefore, whenever possible, qualitative analysis will be used in 
conjunction with quantitative analysis, in order to develop a justifiable picture of the trends in 
decision making in the three contexts. 
 
   RESULTS  
A Key Findings 
1 Summary 
Table 2 Overall comparison of the three types of capacity decisions 
Capacity type Number of 
decisions 
Adult found 
to have 
capacity (%) 
Medical 
evidence 
used 
 
Diagnosis 
recorded 
Evidence 
from 
friends/ 
family 
used 
Evidence 
from non-
medical 
third parties 
used 
Personal/ 
financial 
317 11 (3.5%)63 315 (99%) 302 (95%) 145 (46%) 11 (3.5%) 
Testamentary 55 27 (49%) 50 (91%) 42 (76%) 19 (35%) 30 (55%) 
Legal matters 26 14 (54%) 26 (100%) 28 (88%) 1 (3.8%) 3 (12%) 
                                                          
are normally made for three years. Therefore, in those cases the proximate cause of the capacity determination 
was not concern for the adult. Nevertheless, the ostensible reason for the original application for appointment, 
and therefore the ultimate reason for the review, was concern for the adult.  
62 This was often the originating concern of matters decided under Public Trustee Act 1978 (Qld) s 59. 
63 Where there was a finding that an adult had capacity for simple financial/personal but not complex 
financial/personal matters, this was counted as a finding of incapacity. There were 4 such cases. They were 
counted as incapacity findings, because an appointment will only be made if there is a lack of capacity for 
complex matters, In 2 of the 4 cases, no order was made, as the adult’s needs were being met (LJM [2014] 
QCAT 252, ER [2010] QCAT 688) and in the other two (AJM [2014] QCAT 251, PP [2013] QCAT 247) full 
administration orders were made. 
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Table 2 provides a broad summary of the data collected. An overall comparison of the three 
different types of capacity decision reveals that adults are rarely found to have capacity in the 
personal/financial capacity decisions: just 11 times out of 317 decisions, compared to 27 out 
of 55 for testamentary capacity, and 14 out of 26 for legal matters capacity.  
2 Sources of Evidence 
Tables 3.1-3.3 show the rate of use of different sources of evidence used by capacity type.  
Table 3.1 Use of evidence in personal/financial capacity cases 
 No of matters (%) 
Medical evidence  315 (99%) 
Only medical evidence  75 (24%) 
Evidence from adult  87 (27%) 
Evidence from friends/family  134 (42%) 
Evidence from non-medical third parties  10 (3.5%) 
Previous decisions characterised as poor or 
wise 
64 (20%) 
Future risk/vulnerability 41 (13%) 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, it is less common in personal/financial capacity cases for 
evidence from the adult to be used than it is for evidence from friends/family to be used (27 
per cent compared to 42 per cent); but that medical evidence is used significantly more 
frequently than all other sources (99 per cent of cases).  
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Table 3.2 Use of evidence in testamentary capacity matters per context: probate and statutory 
will 
 Number of matters: 
Probate 
Number of matters: 
Statutory will 
Medical evidence  36 (88%) 14 (100%) 
Only medical evidence  8 (20%) 12 (86%) 
Evidence from friends/family  18 (44%) 1 (7.1%) 
Evidence from non-medical third parties 29 (71%) 1 (7.1%) 
Unusual or surprising dispositions  11 (27%) n/a 
 
Table 3.2 shows that when only probate matters are considered, the rate of use of non-
medical evidence increases, as does the rate of use of unusual or surprising dispositions. 
Evidence from non-medical third parties is used more frequently than for the other two 
contexts (71 per cent for probate matters, compared to 3.5 per cent for personal/financial 
capacity matters, and 12 per cent for legal matters capacity). 
Table 3.3 Use of evidence in legal matters capacity 
 No of matters (%) 
Medical evidence 26 (100%) 
Only medical evidence  15 (58%) 
Evidence from adult  11 (42%) 
Evidence from friends/family  1 (3.8%) 
Evidence from non-medical third parties 3 (12%) 
Previous decisions characterised as poor or 
wise 
1 (3.8%) 
Future risk/vulnerability 1 (3.8%) 
 
Table 3.3 shows that there was a higher proportion of cases using only medical evidence in 
legal matters cases (58 per cent, compared to 20 per cent for probate matters, and 24 per cent 
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for personal/financial capacity matters). It also shows a lesser use of evidence from non-
medical third parties in legal matters capacity decisions than probate matters (12 percent, 
compared to 71 per cent for probate matters), but this is a greater use of that evidence than in 
personal/financial capacity cases (3.5 per cent). 
3 Use of Medical Evidence 
Tables 4.1-4.3 show the agreement between medical evidence and court/tribunal decisions 
where there was either only one medical expert that offered an opinion on capacity, or there 
was more than one expert and they concurred on the question of capacity.  
Table 4.1 Tribunal agreement with medical experts in personal/financial capacity cases64 
 Number of decisions Tribunal agreement with expert/s 
One medical expert 82 81 (99%) 
Multiple experts 205 198 (97%) 
 
Table 4.2 Court agreement with medical experts in testamentary capacity (probate) cases65 
 Number of decisions Court agreement with medical expert/s 
One medical expert 12 9 (75%) 
Multiple experts 25 21 (84%) 
 
Table 4.3 Court agreement with medical experts in legal matters capacity cases66 
 Number of decisions Court agreement with medical expert/s 
One medical expert 7 6 (86%) 
Multiple experts 11 10 (91%) 
 
Table 4.1 shows that there was little difference in agreement between tribunal and medical 
opinion depending on whether there was one or many medical experts, in each case 
                                                          
64 Cases with disagreement within medical evidence removed. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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agreement was high. Overall, in 98 per cent of personal/financial capacity cases, the tribunal 
did not depart from unanimous medical opinion. For legal matters the rate is 89 per cent 
(Table 4.3), and for testamentary capacity probate cases, the rate is 81 per cent (Table 4.2). 
Thus, the tribunal in personal/financial capacity cases went against undisputed medical 
opinion approximately one in 50 times, compared to one in nine for legal matters, and one in 
five for testamentary capacity probate cases. 
Tables 5.1-5.3 show the rate of agreement between individual medical opinion offered on 
capacity and ultimate court/tribunal decision, separated into opinions that the adult had 
capacity and opinions that the adult did not have capacity.  
Table 5.1 Agreement between medical opinion and tribunal decision by nature of medical 
opinion: Personal/financial capacity 
Medical 
opinion 
provided 
Number of 
individual opinions 
Tribunal: 
Agree 
Tribunal: 
Disagree 
Capacity 45 12 (27%) 33 (73%) 
Incapacity 374 370 (99%) 4 (1%) 
 
Table 5.2 Agreement between medical opinion and court decision by nature of medical 
opinion: Testamentary capacity 
Medical 
opinion 
provided 
Number of 
individual opinions Court: Agree 
Court: 
Disagree 
Capacity 39 32 (82%) 7 (18%) 
Incapacity 42 27 (64%) 15 (36%) 
 
Table 5.3 Agreement between medical opinion and court/tribunal decision by nature of 
medical opinion: Legal matters capacity 
Medical 
opinion 
provided 
Number of 
individual 
opinions 
Court/Tribunal: 
Agree 
Court/Tribunal: 
Disagree 
Capacity 22 20 (91%) 2 (9%) 
Incapacity 20 13 (65%) 7 (35%) 
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As can be seen in Table 5.1, in personal/financial capacity matters, the tribunal agreed with 
medical opinions that the adult did not have capacity 99 per cent of the time; whereas the rate 
of agreement when the opinion was that the adult had capacity was 27 per cent.  
 
B Factors Taken into Account in Capacity Decisions 
1 Medical Evidence 
(a) Personal/Financial Capacity 
Table 6.1 Description of party providing medical evidence in personal/financial capacity 
decisions 
 
 
Table 6.1 lists the types of experts that provided evidence in the personal/financial capacity 
decisions, as they were described by the court or tribunal in each matter. The fact that this is 
taken from how experts were described in the cases limits the specificity of these data. To 
illustrate, the category ‘doctor’ could include GPs, geriatricians, or psychiatrists. The most 
commonly cited medical expert is someone described as a ‘doctor’ (or in some cases 
‘physician’). It can be seen that there is a far greater representation of medical doctors than 
any other type of expert.  
It is clear that medical evidence plays a central role in personal/financial capacity decisions. 
Of the 317 matters, the only two that did not make use of medical evidence in the 
determination of capacity were matters in which a husband was preventing contact with his 
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wife (the same couple were involved in two different matters),67 so it was not possible to 
obtain any medical evidence. Table 3.1 shows that due to the much higher frequency of 
medical opinion than non-medical opinion, almost a quarter of cases (24 per cent) apply 
solely medical evidence in the decision.   
Of the 287 matters in which there was either only one expert, or all the experts agreed, the 
tribunal went against their opinion only eight times (Table 4.1), representing a much lower 
rate of disagreement between court/tribunal and experts than for testamentary capacity and 
legal matters capacity.  
In one matter, the tribunal explained that it was not bound by the medical opinion:  
The tribunal has taken the views of these doctors into account [..] but it is the role of the 
tribunal to reach its own conclusion, based on all the evidence, about PM’s capacity.68  
This statement,69 along with the eight instances of tribunal disagreement, demonstrate that the 
medical evidence is not necessarily determinative of personal/financial capacity. 
Nevertheless, the overall level of agreement between the tribunal and the experts appear to 
indicate that QCAT gives medical opinion significant weight.  
This observation is strengthened by an element of QCAT practice with respect to 
guardianship/administration applications. The QCAT application process requires an 
applicant to have a ‘Health Professionals Report’ completed and submitted. Although there is 
no statutory requirement for this evidence to be presented before a matter is to be heard, 
QCAT practice is for an application to be dismissed under s 47 Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act 200970 as being ‘lacking in substance’ if no report is provided. In 
the course of this research, 38 matters were found to have been dismissed without a hearing 
by QCAT either for want of a report, or because the health professional’s report that was 
provided did not support the application. Twenty-six of these matters were applications for 
appointments where medical evidence of a lack of capacity had not been provided; 12 were 
applications in the context of existing appointments, so capacity had not been shown in the 
application. Applications dismissed under section 47 were not considered in the study set, 
                                                          
67 SZ (2010) QCAT 64; SZ (2010) QCAT 641. 
68 PM [2011] QCAT 363 [10]. 
69 This is the only statement of similar meaning found in these cases. 
70 Dismissing, striking out or deciding if unjustified proceeding or part 
(1) This section applies if the tribunal considers a proceeding or a part of a proceeding is— 
(a) frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or 
(b) lacking in substance; or 
(c) otherwise an abuse of process. 
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because they did not involve a substantive decision on capacity, nevertheless they provide 
another demonstration of the centrality of medical evidence. They show that without medical 
evidence, the tribunal will consider an application for an appointment, or for a declaration of 
capacity, to be so lacking in substance as to not require a hearing.  
Thus, despite very occasionally going against expert opinion, QCAT tends to give medical 
opinion central importance in its determination of personal/financial capacity.  
As shown in Table 5.1 it the rate of agreement between medical opinion and QCAT decision 
is much higher when the medical opinion is that the adult lacked capacity. There was nothing 
on the face of the decisions that explained this result. This pattern will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
(b) Testamentary Capacity 
Table 6.2 Description of party providing medical evidence in testamentary capacity decisions 
 
 
Table 6.2 shows that the frequency of evidence from different types of medical expert (as 
they are described in the cases) is fairly similar to that for personal/financial capacity. Again, 
there is a much greater representation of medical doctors, rather than other medical 
professionals or allied health parties. The greater proportion of ‘other medical experts’ used 
may be explained by the necessity of using the evidence of specialists (not otherwise 
classified here) who were involved with end of life treatment.  
Tables 4.1-4.3 show that court disagreement with medical opinion is much more common in 
testamentary capacity cases compared to personal/financial capacity. This appears to show 
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that medical opinion, while still very important evidence, is less determinative in these 
matters than in personal/financial capacity matters. 
Moreover, there is a perceptible difference in the treatment of medical evidence represented 
not in the numerical data shown in those tables, but as shown by statements made by the 
court regarding this type of evidence. In testamentary capacity matters the court often stated 
that it is necessary for more than just medical evidence to be considered in the determination 
of capacity. For example, in Sargent and Anor v Brangwin,71 Dalton J stated that:  
There are any number of authorities to the effect that the court determines the question of 
testamentary capacity on all the evidence before it, not just on medical evidence.72 
In Conroy v Unsworth-Smith, Justice Mullins restated the following propositions put forward 
by Isaacs J in the seminal High Court case on testamentary capacity, Bailey v Bailey: 
• The opinion of witnesses as to testamentary capacity is usually for various reasons of 
little weight on the direct issue; and  
• While, for instance, the opinions of the attesting witnesses that the testator was competent 
are not without some weight, the Court must judge from the facts they state and not from 
their opinions.73   
 
The witnesses under consideration in that case included medical experts. Isaacs J’s statement 
was also repeated with approval by the Supreme Court in the context of medical expert 
witnesses in Bertoldo v Cordenos,74 Jones v Jones,75 Frizzo & Anor v Frizzo & Ors,76 Birt 
and Anor v The Public Trustee of Queensland and Anor,77 and by the Court of Appeal in 
Frizzo & Anor v Frizzo & Ors.78  
In contrast, there was just one equivalent statement within the 317 personal/financial capacity 
matters.79 Although QCAT, as a tribunal with more informal decision making than the court, 
might not be expected to enunciate legal maxims with the same regularity, this difference 
coheres with the much higher rate of agreement between medical expert and QCAT decision 
in those cases. Overall, it can be seen that there was a perceptibly lesser weight given to 
                                                          
71 [2013] QSC 306. 
72 Ibid [97]. 
73 [2004] QSC 81. 
74 [2010] QSC 79. 
75 [2012] QSC 113. 
76 [2011] QSC 107. 
77 [2013] QSC 13. 
78 [2011] QCA 308. Similar statements are made in In The Will of Roland Kent Bulger Deceased [2011] QSC 36 
and In The Will of Bruce George Gillespie Deceased [2012] QSC 335. 
79 PM [2011] QCAT 363 [10]. 
88 
 
medical evidence in testamentary capacity cases when compared with personal/financial 
capacity.  
(c) Legal Matters Capacity 
Table 6.3 Description of party providing medical evidence in legal matters capacity decisions 
 
 
Table 6.3 shows that there was a significant difference in the medical parties providing 
evidence to legal matters capacity decisions. Here, there was a far greater use of psychiatrists, 
and a correspondingly lesser use of parties described just as a ‘doctor’ when compared to the 
other two contexts. However, as noted above, this only represents how the expert was 
described, and ‘doctor’ could describe a psychiatrist, so it is not clear to what extent this 
recorded difference represents an actual difference in the experts used.   
The rate of agreement between judicial decisions on legal matters capacity and the medical 
opinion (16 out of 18 cases) is less than personal/financial capacity and greater than 
testamentary capacity.  
The fact that a court on two occasions disagreed with the only available medical evidence 
confirms that medical evidence is not necessarily determinative.  
It was not possible to identify any specific comments on the role of medical evidence in these 
legal matters capacity cases, so it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the relative 
weight given to medical evidence here. 
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2 Evidence Directly from Adult 
(a) Personal/Financial Capacity 
 
Table 7 Personal/financial capacity: Number of hearings with evidence directly from the 
adult 
 
Table 7 shows that of the 205 total matters, there were 163 in person hearings (the rest are 
decided ‘on the papers’), and that the adult was only present for 86 of those matters. In 53 
cases (25.9 per cent), evidence from the adult was used by the tribunal in its decision on 
capacity. That is, the tribunal noted, described or discussed its direct perception of the adult 
in its decision on capacity. In the study set, six cases were identified in which evidence 
directly from the adult appeared to be the most important evidence.80  
In some matters, this amounted only to an observation of the manner in which the adult 
presented during proceedings.  For example: 
During the hearing CSY was given a pen and some paper by his wife and according to the 
interpreter CSY wrote the Chinese character for “word”. He took a long time to create the 
character and then appeared to lose interest in the activity. 
CSY had very limited mobility and attended the hearing in a wheel chair. He had an 
occasional productive cough and his wife wiped his mouth after coughing. He did not 
                                                          
80 PP [2013] QCAT 247, CJP [2013] QCAT 663, MJH [2012] QCAT 594, FM [2013] QCAT 135, PM [2011] 
QCAT 363 and SK [2015] QCAT 433. In each of those cases except SK, this evidence was used to support a 
finding of incapacity in the context of medical evidence which suggested capacity. 
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vocalise at all during the hearing but appeared to listen to the translation of the proceedings 
by the interpreter and at times registered sadness about the evidence that was being adduced 
and at other times smiled broadly. The Tribunal did not attempt to ask CSY any questions.81 
In other matters, the tribunal had a direct conversation with the adult, and through his/her 
responses, the adult revealed a lack of understanding about the matters under consideration, 
therefore supporting a finding of incapacity. For example:  
WIV provided minimal input to the hearing. She stated she did not know the purpose of the 
proceedings, nor did she remember granting any enduring power of attorney. She incorrectly 
informed the Tribunal she resides in the property she shares with her husband, rather than 
within a secure residential aged care facility.82 
Another form the direct evidence could take is the recording of the adult’s agreement that 
he/she lacked capacity: 
On the issue of her capacity, PMD acknowledged she needs help with decisions in a range of 
matters, including budgeting and her health care.83 
There were a handful of cases in which the tribunal itself asked quite specific questions 
designed to elicit understanding of financial decision-making. For example: 
Mrs PP’s lack of knowledge of the contents of the accounts her husband had previously 
utilised came in the face of her having the bank book for at least one of the accounts in her 
purse at the hearing. When asked by the Tribunal to consider the bank book and advise how 
much was contained in the account, Mrs PP made an error when trying to interpret the 
document. Similarly, when asked to advise the contents of the account which she has always 
operated, she accessed her passbook but again was unable to interpret it to provide the 
accurate balance. The Tribunal notes that it appears that Mrs PP may have confused two 
similarly shaped numbers, thereby misinterpreting the balance of her account by tens of 
thousands of dollars. Given Mrs PP’s problems with vision this can be easily explained. Of 
more concern to the Tribunal is that she had no real knowledge, within tens of thousands of 
dollars of her actual account balance and her lack of surprise or acknowledgement when the 
balance she read was so considerably different to the real balance, leads the Tribunal to infer 
that she takes no real interest in her greater financial position and has no understanding of it.84  
                                                          
81 CSY [2010] QCAT 49. 
82 WIV [2012] QCAT 608; see also CDM [2010] QCAT 317. 
83 PMD [2011] QCAT 353 [20]. 
84 PP [2013] QCAT 247; see also MEA [2011] QCAT 617. 
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The discussion was sometimes used as evidence of understanding, supporting a finding of 
capacity, e.g.: 
During the hearing, RDJ spoke confidently about his currently circumstances and plans for 
the future in the context of the probably compensation settlement. He is in a long-term 
relationship with LC and also receives good support and encouragement from his parents. 
RDJ gave no indication that he would squander the settlement windfall, indeed, he gave the 
opposite impression. 
He spoke about seeking and taking financial advice about the most effective way of using the 
money either by investment products or accelerated payments to reduce the mortgage. His 
decision would be based upon the advice he receives. He intends to continue working in his 
current job, sensibly in an expanding business where he is paid well. His one concession 
would be the updating of his current motor vehicle, although he states that he would limit the 
amount used to about $10,000.85 
In other matters,86 direct evidence from the adult indicated that their decision-making was 
being influenced by a third party or parties. In FAJ,87 there was concern from family 
members that a woman was being allegedly cheated by a man known to the FBI for similar 
crimes, who was ‘borrowing’ large amounts of money from her and using it for gambling. 
Direct evidence from the adult revealed that she was convinced of the reality of her 
relationship with the man, and was unconcerned about the unpaid loans, and her acceptance 
of his ongoing cancellations of his plans to visit her. She was held to lack capacity.  
In some matters, the adult did speak to the tribunal, but this evidence does not seem to have 
been used in the decision on capacity. For example, in TJR88 in which medical evidence was 
led indicating incapacity: 
The attendees at the hearing, other than TJR, agree with Dr MC’s report. CD indicated that in 
his opinion TJR’s mental health has deteriorated since Dr MC’s report. TJR considers he is 
able to manage his own affairs. Although he spoke of ‘clearance’ from a doctor, he did not 
provide a report from the doctor concerned.  
I accept the un-contradicted evidence of Dr MC, with which those at the hearing, except TJR 
agreed. TJR’s assertions were unsupported. I am satisfied that the presumption of capacity has 
                                                          
85 RDJ [2014] QCAT 592 [9]-[10]. 
86 See MJH [2012] QCAT 594 and KJM [2010] QCAT 552. 
87 [2013] QCAT 703. 
88 [2011] QCAT 527. 
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been rebutted and that TJR has impaired capacity for decisions about complex personal 
matters’89 (emphasis added). 
In this matter, although the adult expressed the opinion that he had capacity, there was no 
recorded discussion with the adult on decision making on personal matters, and the evidence 
from the one medical expert was described as un-contradicted. Finally, there are also a 
number of matters where the adult was listed as present, but was not mentioned in the 
capacity decision.90  
Therefore, evidence directly from the adult was only used in approximately one quarter of 
cases, so overall it was of far less importance than medical evidence. 
(b) Testamentary Capacity 
Evidence directly from the adult was usually not available in testamentary capacity cases, as 
the adult had died before capacity was assessed. However, there were two cases where a 
video recording of the adult was available: Jee v Goodman & Ors;91 and Re Crowson.92 In 
both of these cases the court took consideration of this evidence, and found it to be probative. 
(c) Legal Matters Capacity 
Data was only available on this source of evidence in 16 of the 26 legal matters capacity 
cases; in 10 cases it was not clear whether or not that source of evidence had been used. Of 
the 16 cases in which it was clear, the adult was physically present for nine cases, and 
evidence from the adult was used in each case. In a further three cases the adult was not 
present, but evidence from them was provided by affidavit93 or from a video recording.94  
Tables 3.1 and 3.3 above show that the use of evidence directly from the adult was higher for 
legal matters than for personal/financial capacity matters (42 per cent vs 27 per cent). 
In the case of Thomson v Smith,95 the trial judge’s decision was challenged for, inter alia, 
overruling expert medical evidence on the basis of his own assessment of the adult’s 
capacity. The Court of Appeal dismissed this objection, finding that the primary judge had 
                                                          
89 TJR [2011] QCAT 527 [9]; see also SFW [2011] QCAT 237 and JB [2010] QCAT 689. 
90 E.g. HCD [2014] QCAT 643 and NMR [2015] QCAT 34. 
91 [2001] QSC 474. 
92 [2001] QSC 393. 
93 Morris v Clair [2004] QSC 127; Welland v Payne [2000] QSC 431. 
94 Crowson, Re [2001] QSC 393. 
95 Thomson v Smith [2005] QCA 446. 
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had opportunity to assess ‘the mental capabilities of the appellant’96 over the course of the 
hearing, and was entitled to reach his own conclusion on this matter.97  
Evidence directly from the adult was also significant in Aziz v Prestige Property Services P/L 
& Anor.98 In five of the 10 QCAT cases on legal capacity,99 evidence taken from in depth 
discussion between the adult and the tribunal member played a central role in those 
determinations.  
Overall, direct evidence from the adult had a more significant role in legal matters capacity 
cases than it did in personal/financial capacity cases.  
 
3 Evidence from Friends/Family 
(a) Personal/Financial Capacity 
Table 3.1 shows that evidence from family and friends was relied upon in reaching the 
conclusion in 134 personal/financial capacity matters (42 per cent). Therefore, evidence from 
friends or family was used more often than evidence directly from the adult. This might be 
partly explained by the large number of cases in which the adult did not attend the hearing. 
Frequently, applications for guardianship/administration orders were made by family 
members, who then attended the hearing. Also, it was often the case that family members had 
previously been appointed as administrator or guardian, and therefore they had an active 
interest in the result of the hearing, and would attend.  
However, despite a significant volume of cases making use of this type of evidence, it did not 
appear to play a major role in any of those cases. Of the 134 matters in which family/friend 
evidence was relied upon, it was mostly restricted to an observation that those family/friends 
in attendance agreed with the conclusions of the medical experts. For example, in MEA100 the 
tribunal said:  
                                                          
96 Ibid [126]. 
97 Ibid [132]. 
98 Aziz [2007] QSC 265. 
99 SK [2015] QCAT 433, RFG [2012] QCAT 561, HS [2010] QCAT 616, MC [2010] QCAT 677 and AB [2010] 
QCAT 646. 
100 [2011] QCAT 617. 
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The observations of MEA’s friends, who have known her for many years are consistent with a 
significant decline in cognitive function and decision making ability and are also consistent 
with the views expressed by Ms Kelly Jones in her health professional report.101 
In another matter it was stated: 
Those attending the hearing [including adult’s parents] were invited to comment on these 
reports. There was consensus that FPC was dependent on others and required considerable 
decision-making support.102 
In one matter, a lesser role for family/friends evidence compared to medical evidence 
appeared to be acknowledged. Under the heading ‘Does that BS have capacity to make her 
own decisions?’ [sic] the tribunal set out reports from a registered nurse, a GP, and a 
psychiatrist (SU). It then stated: 
[BS’ father’s representative] informed the Tribunal that BS’ father and her brother conceded 
that BS did not have capacity and needed to be supported making more important decisions. 
The Tribunal accepts the evidence of Dr Connolly and SU.103 
Thus, the tribunal indicated that it is the psychiatrist and the GP’s evidence that was crucial; 
the father and the brother’s opinion was mentioned, but was apparently not necessary in the 
actual conclusion.  
No cases were identified in which this form of evidence appeared to be given significant 
weight by the tribunal. 
Therefore, while evidence from friends and family was often presented to the tribunal, overall 
it had limited weight in the determination, especially when compared to medical evidence.  
(b) Testamentary Capacity 
Evidence from friends or family was used in 19 of the 55 (35 per cent) testamentary capacity 
decisions. This is less than for personal/financial capacity (42 per cent); however an analysis 
of the decisions demonstrates that this type of evidence is given more weight than it is in 
personal/financial capacity decisions.  
In contrast to personal/financial capacity matters, there are a number of cases on testamentary 
capacity where significant detail is taken from, and weight is given to, evidence from a friend 
                                                          
101 MEA [2011] QCAT 617 [24]. 
102 FPC [2012] QCAT 689 [8]. 
103 BS [2014] QCAT 281 [10]. 
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or family member. For example, in In The Will of Roland Kent Bulger Deceased,104 there was 
one medical opinion presented as evidence, that of the adult’s GP, who doubted the adult had 
testamentary capacity. However, in this matter the court reached a different conclusion, based 
partly on the evidence of the testator’s son, Allen Bulger. McMeekin J stated:  
[..] Mr Allen Bulger was in a particularly good position to judge his father’s mental state. He 
knew his father very well. He relates that they met nearly every week end and often met 
during the week as well. His father’s principal asset and his business had consisted of a 
grazing property. He states that his father remained interested in the running of that property, 
which his son had taken over in 2002, and was able to attend to the caring for the 30 beasts 
that he kept, until shortly before entering a nursing home in October 2007. He remained 
generally interested in matters associated with the cattle industry and with matters pertaining 
to the family – principally the doings of his grand children.105 
The son’s evidence here appears to be very important in the court’s finding of capacity. 
Similarly, in Daley v Barton,106 the judge found the testator had capacity when the only 
medical expert to present evidence argued against a finding of capacity. In coming to this 
conclusion, the judge relied on the evidence of the solicitor who drew up the will, and the 
testator’s wife (Vitita Sukrod), whose recounting of a conversation she had with her husband 
helped establish that he satisfied the second part of the Banks v Goodfellow test: 
I also consider that the discussions the testator had on 28 July 2005, first with the plaintiff and 
then with Vitita Sukrod, clearly indicate that the testator had a good knowledge of his assets. I 
accept Ms Sukrod’s evidence that when she and the testator returned from the plaintiff’s 
office that day the testator fully explained to her what his assets were and he expressed his 
wishes in relation to her future. I consider that Vitita Sukrod was a careful and credible 
witness and I accept her evidence. [..] I consider her evidence as to the conversation she had 
with the testator on 28 July to be entirely believable. I consider that the descriptions and the 
values written down were clearly those of the testator and included his valuations, which I 
consider were sufficiently accurate. Indeed, I consider that the terms used to describe the 
property are in fact indicative of dysphasia in that he did not give the properties the more 
sophisticated descriptions by reference to their addresses but, rather, gave them the very 
simple descriptions of house, money, farm, bank, and building.107 
                                                          
104 [2011] QSC 36. 
105 In The Will of Roland Kent Bulger Deceased [2011] QSC 36 [15]. 
106 [2008] QSC 228. 
107 Banks v Goodfellow (1870) 5 QB 549 [82]. 
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Evidence from family and friends was also found to have assisted in some cases where there 
was not unanimity in the expert opinion.108 Therefore, it can be seen that although used in 
slightly fewer cases, this type of evidence plays a greater role in the determination of 
testamentary capacity than personal/financial capacity.  
(c) Legal Matters 
Table 3.3 shows that evidence from friends/family was used less frequently in legal matters 
capacity; just twice in the study set.109 Due to the small number of applicable cases, reliable 
observations about how this evidence tends to be used in legal matters cases cannot be made, 
although in Aziz v Prestige Property Services P/L & Anor use was made of the adult’s ex-
wife’s evidence in order to help resolve a difference of opinion between the medical 
experts.110  
4 Evidence from Other Parties (e.g. Solicitors, Trust Officers) 
(a) Personal/Financial Capacity 
As shown in Table 3.1, evidence from other third parties is not used frequently in 
personal/financial capacity matters, just 10 matters were found to have used it, four of which 
involved the evidence of Public Trustee officers.111 
In HM,112 the evidence from the Public Trustee officer assisted when the experts did not 
agree as to capacity. In the other three matters using the evidence of a Public Trustee 
officer,113 this evidence assisted the tribunal get a picture of the success or lack of success the 
adult had in managing their own finances. Apart from those with Public Trustee officer 
evidence, none of these cases appeared to turn on the evidence provided by these non-
medical parties.  
This fact, combined with the infrequent use of this type of evidence, means that it could not 
be described as a major source of evidence of capacity for personal/financial capacity 
matters.  
                                                          
108 Clare, Re (deceased) [2009] QSC 403, Challen v Pitt & Anor [2004] QSC 365, Conroy v Unsworth-Smith 
[2004] QSC 81, and Jee v Goodman & Ors [2001] QSC 474. 
109 SK [2015] QCAT 433 and Aziz [2007] QSC 265. 
110 [40]-[42]. 
111 MAD [2014] QCAT 123, HM [2013] QCAT 351, RRP [2010] QCAT 191, TR [2014] QCAT 513. Other 
parties were an accommodation provider: BI [2012] QCAT 444, a solicitor: MEA [2011] QCAT 617, a police 
officer: SAA [2012] QCAT 707 and a homeopath: MEA [2011] QCAT 617. 
112 [2013] QCAT 351. 
113 MAD [2014] QCAT 123, RRP [2010] QCAT 191, TR [2014] QCAT 513. 
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(b) Testamentary Capacity 
Testamentary capacity cases made significantly more use of evidence from other parties than 
the other types of capacity matters. In fact, the majority of testamentary capacity cases—55 
per cent—contain some evidence of this type; the figure is 71 per cent if only probate matters 
are considered.114  Analysis of the use of this type of evidence shows that it is given 
significant weight in the determination of capacity.  
As wills are in most cases drawn up by solicitors, and solicitors ought not draw up a will if 
they believe the testator lacks capacity, it will often be possible for a party propounding a will 
to call this solicitor to support their case. Some testamentary cases placed high importance on 
this evidence. For example, in In The Will of Roland Kent Bulger Deceased,115 the evidence 
of a son and a solicitor was found to have more weight than the sole medical opinion (the 
adult’s GP). Here, the solicitor was considered ‘in a position to best judge the precise 
question now under consideration’, as he had known the testator for 25 years, and had spent 
an hour and twenty five minutes discussing the testator’s affairs: 
He had long familiarity with him and his habits. His affidavit shows that he has a detailed 
recollection of the events surrounding the taking of instructions and there is therefore good 
reason to rely on his testimony as accurate.116 
In two other testamentary capacity cases, a solicitor’s perception as to the testator’s capacity 
was explicitly preferred to medical opinion on the matter.117  
In some other cases, the way the court was able to make use of this type of evidence was not 
through third parties’ opinions on the adults’ capacity, but rather in their account of their 
interactions with the testator, which the court used to draw its own conclusions on capacity. 
In the following example, the court used evidence of the conversation the testator had with a 
solicitor (Mr Sargent) in its capacity assessment:  
I find that Mr Ryan was aware and understood the nature of his act in making a will and the 
effects that it would have. He had a perfectly sensible discussion as to his prior will and the 
changes he wished to make to it. He demonstrated an understanding that he was changing his 
prior will in a way which disadvantaged his daughter, and I find that he understood the nature 
                                                          
114 See Table 3.2.  
115 [2011] QSC 36. 
116 Ibid [21]. 
117 Theophanous & Ors v Gillespie [2002] QCA 117; Sargent & Anor v Brangwin [2013] QSC 306. There is 
also In the Will of Ruth Barlow, Deceased, where the only medical assessment was done posthumously. This 
was rejected in favour of contemporary evidence of a trust officer and an officer of a parliamentarian.   
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of that disadvantage because he felt the need to explain the change to Mr Sargent, and 
because he participated with Mr Sargent in discussing, albeit briefly, whether or not his 
daughter would challenge the will. Further, I find on the basis of Mr Sargent’s description of 
what transpired on both 9 and 11 February 2011 that Mr Ryan understood the extent of the 
property of which he was disposing. He had quite a technical discussion about the joint 
tenancy of the Urangan house; the annuity nature of his superannuation fund, and the detail of 
his six bank accounts. He gave accurate and detailed instructions to Mr Sargent about all the 
property he owned.118 
Evidence of exchanges between the parties also supported findings of incapacity. In the 
following case, the judge focused on medical records from the testator’s accommodation, and 
what transpired at the meeting the testator had with his lawyer, Mr Devlin, in order to take 
instructions for the will:   
Of concern is that the testator made fundamental errors initially in his meeting with Mr 
Devlin about the number of children and grandchildren that he had. Even allowing for the 
approach of adapting the Banks v Goodfellow test to modern life, the testator could not give 
Mr Devlin any detail of his financial worth and could not tell Mr Devlin that he had an 
enduring power of attorney.119 
Here, the solicitor’s evidence contributed to a finding of a lack of capacity, even though the 
solicitor did not doubt capacity at the time.  
With both direct and indirect input into capacity decisions, it can be seen that third parties’ 
evidence played a more central role in testamentary capacity matters than in 
personal/financial capacity matters.  
(c) Legal Matters 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the frequent use of solicitors in testamentary capacity matters, 
evidence from other third parties was used infrequently in legal matters capacity cases. Only 
three cases were found to make use of this evidence. In SZ,120 the solicitor’s evidence was 
used to help establish the fact that the adult’s husband was preventing anyone from accessing 
or assisting his wife. The solicitor’s evidence in Aziz v Prestige Property Services P/L & 
Anor121 is used in a similar manner to that described in the testamentary capacity matters.122 
                                                          
118 Sargent and Anor v Brangwin [2013] QSC 306 [99].  
119 Ruskey-Fleming v Cook [2013] QSC 142 [69] [71]. 
120 [2010] QCAT 64. 
121 [2007] QSC 265. 
122 In Crowson, Re [2001] QSC 393 evidence from a barrister was used. 
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Overall, however, the lesser frequency of use of evidence from third parties shows that it is 
not of great importance for legal matters capacity. 
5 Characterisation of Decisions Made by Adult as ‘Poor’ or ‘Unwise’ (or not 
so) 
(a) Personal/Financial Capacity 
As noted in Table 3.1, 64 matters, or 20 per cent of matters, included evidence of previous 
decisions made by the adult which were characterised by either an expert, or the tribunal, as 
poor or unwise (or in a small number of matters, sensible or wise). Some of these matters 
inferred conclusions on capacity from their characterisation of the decisions. 
The tribunal accepts the evidence that LC has been assessed with an intellectual impairment 
in the mild range and that she had reduced ability with abstract and quantitative reasoning. 
The tribunal accepts the evidence that LC’s actions reveal impulsive spending beyond her 
means. A reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence that LC does not appreciate 
the consequences of her spending habits until she is faced with demands for repayments that 
she cannot afford to make123 (emphasis added). 
In RP a similar formulation was used: 
.. there had been incidents on the ward that have indicated his impaired financial judgement, 
poor decision making, a level of disorganisation and impulsivity124 (emphasis added). 
In both of these cases, the ‘poor’ decisions were described as indicative of incapacity; the 
relationship between the two was therefore indirect, not automatic. All other matters in which 
decisions characterised as ‘poor’ were considered in the determination of capacity, the 
tribunal did not describe the relationship between the characterisation of the decision and the 
determination of capacity. Instead, it appears to treat the relationship between the two as 
direct. For example, in MAD,125 a psychiatrist presents evidence on the capacity of a person 
with Bipolar Affective Disorder, a relapsing mental illness: 
Dr Stephenson is of the view that when MAD is well she is very well and able to manage her 
affairs. Dr Stephenson is concerned that there is a risk with MAD not taking her medication 
that she will have a relapse. When she is unwell she has been unable to make good financial 
decisions126 (emphasis added). 
                                                          
123 LC [2013] QCAT 328 [7].  
124 RP [2012] QCAT 253 [10]. 
125 [2014] QCAT 123. 
126 MAD [2014] QCAT 123 [8]. 
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This evidence was used by the tribunal to decide that the adult had capacity when she was 
well and incapacity when she was unwell. A number of other decisions included explicit 
characterisation of decisions made by the adult as ‘poor’ (or a synonym), all of which are 
accompanied by a finding of incapacity.127   
In other cases, evidence of previous poor decisions is presented as relevant to capacity, even 
though they may not have been explicitly characterised as such. For example, in six matters, 
evidence was presented to the tribunal about a patient’s non-compliance with medical 
treatment.128 In each of these matters, that evidence appears to be taken to represent poor 
decision-making, and in all of these matters, the conclusion was that the adult lacked 
capacity.  
Other evidence of past decisions implicitly characterised as poor included: 
• TS struggles to manage her finances. During one episode she spent $200 on a taxi fare to 
Innisfail. As previously mentioned, she often loses her keys and smashes windows to gain 
entry.129 
• DLB talked about the fact that [the adult] had given all his property way to his ex-partner and 
that she had to take legal action on his behalf to recover his funds. 130 
• In regard to finances in 2010 [NM] received a sizeable compensation payment of more than 
$75,000. This was spent in a short period of time on various items including expensive 
furniture and landscaping. None of these funds remain and he has had to rely on family loans 
to pay day to day living expenses, legal fees associated with his compensation claim and the 
breach of the Protection Order131 (emphasis added). 
All of these matters involved a finding of incapacity. In the following matter, a positive 
characterisation of a previous decision by the tribunal appears to support its finding of 
capacity: 
The purchase of a unit has utilised most of MAD savings. This seems an appropriate 
decision132 (emphasis added). 
                                                          
127 See SAS [2014] QCAT 26 [6], CMR [2014] QCAT 154 [5], BSA [2014] QCAT 206 [16] and FAJ [2013] 
QCAT 703 [58]. 
128 See HD [2010] QCAT 523 [6], PM [2011] QCAT 363 [7], NR [2013] QCAT 662 [68], MHV [2015] QCAT 
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Therefore, it can be seen that in a number of cases, the tribunal hears evidence of poor (or 
good) decisions, and considered this in its determination of capacity. Although in a minority 
of those cases the tribunal described the relationship between the two as one of inference; in 
the majority of cases, the tribunal did not explain the relationship between its characterisation 
of the decision and its determination of capacity. However, the impression given by the 
reasoning is that the characterisation of the decisions were directly relevant to the 
determination of capacity. 
(b) Testamentary Capacity 
Eleven testamentary capacity cases in the study set were found to include consideration of 
whether dispositions within the will were unusual or surprising. Three of these involved 
unusual/surprising dispositions, eight noted that the dispositions were not unusual or 
surprising.  
These considerations can be seen as roughly equivalent to the consideration of previous poor 
(or good) decisions in the personal/financial capacity section, in that they focussed on the 
nature of the decision made (outcome) rather than the decision making process used 
(function). There does not appear to be significant difference between the proportion of cases 
which use these measures between testamentary capacity and personal/financial capacity 
matters (27 per cent for probate matters, vs 20 per cent for personal/financial capacity 
matters). However, analysis of those cases shows a difference in the use of this type of 
evidence. In testamentary capacity matters, the court is more consistent in its account of the 
relationship between its characterisation of a testamentary provision as ‘poor’ or otherwise 
and its determination of the testator’s capacity. When unusual or not unusual decisions are 
referenced in the testamentary capacity cases, it is done in a way which shows that these are 
indicative, not constitutive, of incapacity or capacity. Here are two examples of where 
capacity is found, and mention is made of the unsurprising nature of the bequests: 
None of the bequests is surprising. Nor does the choice of charities to share in residue call 
Mrs Barlow’s cognitive functioning into question. 133 [..]  
It is not surprising that Mrs Barlow wanted to substitute the Public Trustee for Mr Carroll as 
executor. The facts earlier related show why that was not an irrational decision indicative of 
cognitive malfunction.134 
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A similar approach is seen here: 
Finally, there is nothing in the terms of the last will to arouse any suspicion. It is not a 
complex will. It is not so different from those that had preceded it. Generous provision was 
made for the persons that the testator cared for.135 
The phrasing of these statements indicates that strange or surprising dispositions would not 
constitute impaired function, but may require a decision-maker to look closely at the decision 
making process used. 
In Sargent & Anor v Brangwin, a testator had left his daughter out of his will, and instead left 
all of his assets to three friends. The following quote is taken from the judge’s consideration 
of capacity: 
I find the observations of Hamilton J in Grynberg v Muller136 apposite here. In a case which 
involved both lay and medical evidence, he prefaced his conclusions as to the testator's 
capacity as follows: 
I have not found the question of the testator's capacity to make the 1987 will an easy 
one. In the authorities which I have cited the point is made that the decisions as to 
whether particular conduct or speech bespeak merely eccentricity on the one hand or 
lack of capacity on the other, harsh judgments of people on the one hand or paranoid 
delusion concerning them on the other, are in the end matters of value judgment’137 
(emphasis added). 
The use of the word ‘bespeak’ in this statement shows that ‘particular conduct’—in this case 
unusual testamentary dispositions—does not constitute incapacity, rather it may point 
towards a lack of capacity; yet it may also point to eccentricity or harshness, and it is for the 
court to decide which it is by analysing the decision making process. Throughout the court 
judgments on testamentary capacity, this conceptual relationship is consistently 
maintained.138 In this way, unusual dispositions in wills seem to have been treated differently 
to poor decisions in personal/financial capacity matters, where they are more likely to have a 
determinative role.  
                                                          
135 In The Will of Roland Kent Bulger Deceased [2011] QSC 36 [22]. 
136 [2001] NSWSC 532 [47]. 
137 Sargent and Anor v Brangwin [2013] QSC 306 [98]. 
138 See also Scattini & Anor v Matters [2004] QSC 459 [69]: ‘a testator’s caprice, eccentricity or folly does not, 
of itself, establish lack of testamentary capacity’. 
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(c) Legal Matters Capacity 
Only two legal matters capacity cases using a characterisation of the adult’s decisions were 
identified, one using a ‘poor’ decision to support a finding of incapacity, one using a ‘wise’ 
one to support a finding of capacity. The case using the past poor decision is OTR:139  
OTR demonstrates poor appreciation of the effect of decisions, that is, that his applications 
have not succeeded in the past, are based on flawed arguments, and that future outcomes 
based on discredited arguments relied on in the past are unlikely to differ from past outcomes. 
He is not dissuaded by his experiences from continuing to rely on the same legal issues 
despite a spectacular lack of success.140 
It can be seen that the tribunal is not concluding on capacity based on these past poor 
decisions, but does so on the fact that the adult has not adjusted his strategy despite the bad 
outcomes of those decisions. In Foran v Jalbao,141 the following positive report on the 
adult’s decisions support a finding of capacity: 
[..] the plaintiff, so far as the evidence reveals, has been successful in living independently 
and supporting himself from his disability support pension. He has given consideration to the 
best use of the settlement fund and his plans are sensible and practical. He has sought and 
taken advice in respect of the conduct of his affairs including the action and plainly has the 
valuable assistance of his sister and her husband.142 
However, given only two cases use this evidence, it is not possible to draw overall 
conclusions as to how this evidence is used in the legal matters capacity context.  
6 Vulnerability/Risk 
(a) Personal/Financial Capacity 
In the study set, 41 personal/financial cases appeared to use evidence of vulnerability or risk 
in the capacity decision; six involved an absence of risk, 35 involved the presence of risk. 
This represents 13 per cent of the cases. Often, evidence with respect to risk was included in 
expert evidence, for example:  
                                                          
139 [2015] QCAT 325. 
140 OTR [2015] QCAT 325 [32]. 
141 [2001] QSC 42. 
142 Foran v Jalbao [2001] QSC 42 [11]. 
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• ‘Dr Wickganttinga, medical intern, provided a health professional report dated the 19 
February 2015 which noted problems with recall, and that she was being at risk 
financially’143 (emphasis added.) 
• On 25 September 2002 Dr Wilkie submitted he had been treating the adult for 20 years and 
confirmed his opinion the adult was, at that time, unable to manage money and would be 
likely to gamble and drink the entire amount of his pension should it be made available to 
him144 (emphasis added.) 
• Recent medical evidence indicates that ER has chronic anxiety and has suffered a severe grief 
reaction following the death of his wife and that he is vulnerable to financial exploitation145 
(emphasis added.)  
• GJ [A Public Trustee official] told the Tribunal that the Trustee had no evidence of 
vulnerability or poor decision-making’146 (emphasis added.) 
This consideration was also presented in the tribunal’s deliberations; for example: 
• I am not satisfied that LLJ has capacity to manage his entire financial portfolio. There is clear 
evidence of vulnerability in the past. He made significant decisions that adversely affected his 
security and would have continued to do so without intervention147 (emphasis added.) 
There were some matters where an absence of risk was used in the determination of capacity. 
The following three cases found the adult did have capacity: 
• If MAD’s mental state deteriorates her family have demonstrated the ability to work with the 
mental health service to ensure that MAD gets treatment. The Tribunal is of the view that 
there is not an unreasonable risk to MAD's finances148 (emphasis added.) 
• There is no evidence given that she is, or will be, vulnerable to personal or financial 
exploitation and she is aware of her financial obligations to her household in regard to paying 
a portion of utility and other household bills149 (emphasis added.) 
• Taking each of these conditions in turn, RDJ is fully aware of the quantum of the probable 
settlement amount. He shows a sensible approach to determining how he might maximise the 
impact of the “windfall” by taking financial/investment advice that will have a long- rather 
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than short-term effect. He shows no inclination to spend the money impulsively but is mindful 
of the importance of using it wisely150 (emphasis added.) 
Therefore, it can be seen that evidence of risk was considered by the tribunal in its 
assessment of capacity in some cases. 
(b) Testamentary Capacity 
Future risk or vulnerability of the adult did not appear to be a factor in any testamentary 
capacity decision, which is unsurprising.  
(c) Legal Matters Capacity 
Only one matter was found which considered risk. In that case, an absence of risk with 
respect to the adult’s pursuit of a personal injury claim helped to support a finding of 
capacity.151 However, one case was not enough to establish a pattern as to how this evidence 
was used.    
 
    CONCLUSION 
This case analysis has revealed a number of similarities between capacity assessments in 
personal/financial capacity, testamentary capacity and legal matters capacity. Most 
significantly, in each of those contexts, medical evidence of capacity was central to the 
ultimate decision of the court/tribunal. It was common for multiple medical experts to present 
evidence, and it was common for that evidence to include a conclusory opinion on whether 
the adult had or did not have capacity to make a particular decision or type of decision. In all 
three contexts, if medical opinion was unanimous, the court/tribunal decision mostly 
concurred with that opinion. 
However, there were a number of differences between personal/financial capacity, 
testamentary capacity and legal matters capacity decisions. Firstly, although most decisions 
concurred with unanimous medical opinion across the three contexts, there was a lower rate 
of disagreement between court/tribunal and medical opinion on capacity in personal/financial 
capacity matters than in testamentary capacity and legal matters capacity, and the difference 
was more pronounced compared with testamentary capacity. Relatedly, testamentary capacity 
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matters tended to rely more heavily on other sources of evidence, specifically, evidence from 
friends/family and evidence from other third parties, than personal/financial capacity matters.  
Another notable pattern from the analysis was that the tribunal in personal/financial capacity 
matters was more likely to agree with medical opinion that the adult did not have capacity 
than opinion that the adult had capacity. A smaller difference in this regard was found in 
testamentary capacity and legal matters capacity decisions; however, importantly, the 
difference seen there was in the other direction, in that opinions that the adult had capacity 
were more likely to find concurrence with the ultimate court/tribunal decision.  
Finally, characterisation of decisions as wise or unwise by the tribunal or medical experts 
appears to have been used in a number of personal/financial capacity matters as directly 
relevant to the question of capacity. Comparable factors were also considered in testamentary 
capacity matters, however there the characterisation of decisions was consistently and 
explicitly described as only indirectly related to capacity, in that it required further 
investigation, not determinative of capacity. Future risk to the adult also appears to have 
helped determine capacity in a number of personal/financial capacity cases; something not 
present in the other two contexts. 
The implications of the findings of this survey will be analysed in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion of Results 
 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will critically analyse the results of the case analysis presented in Chapter 3. It 
will show that the personal/financial capacity decisions in the case analysis support the 
‘realist’ argument discussed in Chapter 2, in that there are patterns indicating a role for 
beneficence that is not prescribed by law. Secondly, it describes some adverse features of the 
decision making associated with this role for beneficence.  
This thesis is concerned with capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. It will be recalled that 
the case analysis looked at three types of capacity decisions, personal/financial capacity, 
testamentary capacity, and legal matters capacity. Of those legal contexts, personal/financial 
capacity decisions are most similar to capacity for medical treatment decisions, as ‘health 
care’ is a type of ‘personal matter’ for the purposes of guardianship orders.1 Moreover, both 
jurisdictions can trace some of their roots to the parens patriae jurisdiction, the court’s 
inherent power to make protective orders over vulnerable people.2 Testamentary capacity 
decisions are different, because protection of the decision maker is not relevant, testamentary 
capacity is usually only determined by a court when the adult has died. The court’s power to 
determine testamentary capacity does not derive from the parens patriae jurisdiction.3 
Therefore, the primary focus of the analysis in this Chapter will be personal/financial 
capacity decisions, but testamentary capacity matters provide an interesting comparator, and 
serve to highlight the influence of beneficence in other types of capacity decisions.  
Four different trends in the personal/financial capacity results were identified that, taken 
together, suggest an influence of beneficence in the personal/financial capacity decisions that 
cannot be accounted for by the applicable law. The limitations described in Chapter 3, Part II 
D, are relevant to these findings. In particular, it will be recalled that the cohort of people 
subject to guardianship/administration proceedings are different from the other two capacity 
contexts. Moreover, there are factors in how these cohorts are ‘selected’ that mean that it is 
more likely for people before the guardianship/administration jurisdiction to be found to lack 
capacity. Nevertheless, it will be argued that, taken as a whole, the trends discussed here, do 
                                                          
1 Sch 2, 2(2)(g) Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). 
2 Terry Carney, and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment: Tribunals and Popular Justice 
(Federation Press, 1997) 25. 
3 Thomas E Atkinson, ‘Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction’ (1943) 8 Missouri Law Review 107. 
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represent a focus on protection that cannot be explained by the differences in the cohorts. The 
individual trends to be discussed are: 
• high rates of incapacity findings; 
• heavy reliance on medical evidence over other sources, including directly from the 
adult; 
• preference for medical evidence of incapacity compared to capacity; 
• use of outcomes and risk as direct evidence of capacity in some cases. 
These trends will be explained.  
 
 TRENDS INDICATING ROLE FOR BENEFICENCE IN PERSONAL/FINANCIAL 
CAPACITY DECISIONS 
A High Rate of Incapacity 
Table 2 in Chapter 3 shows a significant difference in the proportion of cases which found 
capacity or incapacity between the different contexts. An adult was far less likely to be found 
to have personal/financial capacity than either of the other two types of capacity; 96.5 per 
cent of people who come before QCAT in personal/financial capacity matters are found to 
lack capacity, compared to 49 per cent for testamentary capacity and 54 per cent for legal 
matters capacity.4 
A finding of incapacity allows the tribunal to make a protective appointment for the adult, so 
at face value this could indicate an influence of beneficence in those cases. However, the 
comparatively high rate of incapacity in personal/financial capacity matters cannot on its own 
demonstrate this effect. It will be recalled that decisions on personal/financial capacity 
matters are most often prompted by concern over the welfare of the adult whose capacity is 
then assessed, a circumstance that is not necessarily present in the other two contexts. Given 
these different circumstances, the differing rates of capacity do not of themselves 
demonstrate a role for beneficence in personal/financial capacity assessments not prescribed 
by law. Indeed, due to those differing circumstances, it is to be expected that there would be a 
higher rate of incapacity in personal/financial capacity cases. Nevertheless, considered with 
the other trends explained here, they are part of a general pattern indicating this role. 
                                                          
4 Chapter 4, Table 2.  
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B Preference for Medical Opinion over Evidence from the Adult 
A role for beneficence in personal/financial capacity cases not prescribed by law was 
indicated by the differing ways medical evidence was used by courts/tribunals in the capacity 
cases analysed, especially in comparison to evidence taken directly from the adult. This is 
shown in Tables 4.1-4.3 in Chapter 3, which show that there was a strong association 
between tribunal findings and medical opinion where there was undivided medical opinion in 
personal/financial capacity matters. Only one in 50 personal/financial capacity decisions 
disagreed with undivided medical evidence, in comparison to one in nine for legal matters 
and one in five for testamentary capacity matters.  
This comparative preference for medical opinion over other sources of evidence cannot be 
explained by its greater availability in personal/financial cases. It is true that unlike most 
testamentary capacity cases, in personal/financial capacity cases the adult is still alive, and 
therefore the tribunal deciding that capacity can request a medical assessment, and thus will 
be able to make use of contemporaneous medical evidence on that point. However, it is also 
the case that in personal/financial capacity cases the tribunal is able to question the adult 
directly, and use that evidence in its determination of capacity.5 Despite this available source 
of evidence, only six matters were found in which evidence from the adult themselves was 
found to be more probative than medical evidence in personal/financial capacity cases.6 In 
this, there is a notable contrast with the approach in testamentary capacity cases. Hodgson 
JA’s statement in the NSW Court of Appeal case of Zorbas v Sidiropoulous (No 2) expressed 
the general approach of Australian courts to demonstrating testamentary capacity:  
The criteria [of testamentary capacity] are not matters that are directly medical questions, in 
the way that a question whether a person is suffering from cancer is a medical question. They 
are matters for commonsense judicial judgment on the basis of the whole of the evidence. 
Medical evidence as to the medical condition of a deceased may of course be highly relevant, 
and may sometimes directly support or deny a capacity in the deceased to have understanding 
of the matters in the Banks v Goodfellow criteria. However, such evidence may come from 
non-expert witnesses. Indeed, perhaps the most compelling evidence of understanding would 
be reliable evidence (for example, a tape recording) of a detailed conversation with the 
deceased at this time of the will displaying understanding of the deceased’s assets, the 
deceased’s family and the effect of the will. It is extremely unlikely that medical evidence that 
                                                          
5 See further Sam Boyle, ‘Medical Evidence of Capacity in a Legal Setting: To What Extent Do Courts and 
Tribunals Make Their Own Decisions?’ (2018) 25(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 572. 
6 Chapter 3, fn 80. 
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the deceased did not understand these things would overcome the effect of evidence of such a 
conversation7 (emphasis added). 
This view of the role of medical evidence appears to be reflected in testamentary capacity 
cases in this study set. It was stated in a number of cases that medical evidence should not be 
elevated over other types over evidence.8 Also, there were two cases where a video recording 
of the adult was available: Jee v Goodman & Ors9 and Re Crowson.10 In keeping with 
Hodgson JA’s statement, in both of these cases the court took consideration of this evidence, 
and it found to be probative. The impression given in the testamentary capacity matters was 
that the most important source of evidence in capacity decisions was the adult themselves. 
This suggests that if the court could somehow transport itself in time and communicate 
directly with the adult, it would, and would give this evidence considerable weight.  
This impression contrasts sharply with the use of evidence directly from the adult in personal/ 
financial capacity cases. There, despite its greater availability (as the adult whose capacity is 
being determined is still alive), the tribunal only made use of direct communication with the 
adult in just 27 per cent of its decisions, compared to 99 per cent that used medical 
evidence.11 Moreover, only six cases were identified in which evidence taken directly from 
an adult was preferred to that provided by medical professionals.12 That the tribunal considers 
medical evidence to be significantly more important than evidence directly from the adult is 
reflected in the following statement from TJR,13 in which medical evidence was led 
indicating incapacity. The tribunal noted: 
The attendees at the hearing, other than TJR, agree with Dr MC’s report. CD indicated that in 
his opinion TJR’s mental health has deteriorated since Dr MC’s report. TJR considers he is 
able to manage his own affairs. Although he spoke of “clearance” from a doctor, he did not 
provide a report from the doctor concerned. 
I accept the un-contradicted evidence of Dr MC, with which those at the hearing, except TJR 
agreed. TJR’s assertions were unsupported. I am satisfied that the presumption of capacity has 
been rebutted and that TJR has impaired capacity for decisions about complex personal 
matters14 (emphasis added). 
                                                          
7 Zorbas v Sidiropoulous (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197 [65]. 
8 See Chapter 3, Part III B 1. 
9 [2001] QSC 474. 
10 [2001] QSC 393. 
11 Chapter 3, Table 5.1.  
12 Chapter 3, Part III B 2.  
13 [2011] QCAT 527. 
14 [8]-[9]. See also SFW [2011] QCAT 237; JB [2010] QCAT 689. 
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In this matter, although the adult expressed the opinion that he had capacity, there was no 
recorded discussion with the adult on decision-making on personal matters. Moreover, the 
evidence from the one medical expert was described as ‘un-contradicted’, despite being 
contradicted by the adult himself.  
There does not appear to be an evidentiary reason why evidence directly from the adult 
should be considered so significantly less probative than medical evidence. Capacity is a 
matter for the tribunal to determine, not on the medical evidence alone.15 The probative 
nature of evidence directly from the adult is demonstrated in those cases (although a 
minority) where the tribunal did interact with the adult, and made use of that interaction in its 
determination.16 For example, in CJP,17 the medical evidence had indicated capacity, but 
after an extensive discussion with the adult, the tribunal went against the medical evidence. 
The tribunal found: 
The adult did not demonstrate an understanding of his personal circumstances in relation to 
his complex co-morbidities and the type of treatment, care and service provision that is 
necessary to meet his increasing medical needs. He was unable to demonstrate he understands 
the nature of his assets, income and expenditure. He is not cognisant of the complex issues 
involved in the tenancy of his residence and the implications of the arrangement on his 
Centrelink pension and taxation obligations.18 
With respect to the weight given to the medical evidence compared to the evidence from the 
adult, the tribunal stated: 
On balance the Tribunal places greater weight on the evidence of the adult in relation to his 
complex personal and financial matters in its determination of the adult’s decision-making 
capacity. 19 
Obviously, medical evidence will be important in the determination of capacity. However as 
the above case and the testamentary capacity matters show, there is room for judicial 
interrogation of the question of capacity. After all, it is a matter for the court/tribunal to 
decide. Interestingly, the deference to medical opinion seen in personal/financial capacity 
matters is also reflected in the only reported case in Queensland in which capacity to make a 
particular medical treatment decision was decided. In Re Bridges,20 Ambrose J had to decide 
                                                          
15 XYZ v State Trustees Ltd (2006) [2006] VSC 444. 
16 See Chapter 3 Part III B 2. 
17 [2013] QCAT 663. 
18 Ibid [49]-[50]. 
19 Ibid [48]. 
20 [2001] 1 Qd R 574. 
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whether Bridges had capacity to refuse renal dialysis. Ambrose J noted that Bridges’ son 
thought that she had capacity to make that decision. His Honour then stated: 
I must say, having watched her give evidence and answer questions, she would impress one 
from what she says and the way she says it that she does have a capacity to make a decision. 
However, to come to that conclusion would disregard entirely the expert evidence of the 
psychiatrists who have been treating her.21 
His Honour did not explain why the impression he gained of Bridges’ capacity was incorrect, 
other than by describing evidence from three medical experts, all of whom found that Bridges 
lacked capacity.  
This tendency to favour expert evidence above all other sources has relevance to decisions on 
capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. It will be seen that in the published decisions 
involving anorexia, conclusions on capacity have tended to rest on evidence from the medical 
experts, despite the adult being alive and capable of providing probative evidence of their 
own capacity.  
 
C Preference for Evidence of Incapacity 
Another trend identified from the case analysis is that there is a significant preference for 
medical opinion that the adult lacks capacity in the personal/financial capacity context. In 
testamentary capacity and legal matters capacity, the court or tribunal is somewhat more 
likely to agree with medical evidence that the adult had capacity than it is to agree with 
evidence that the adult lacked capacity.22 This slight preference for evidence of capacity 
coheres with a presumption of capacity.  
On the other hand, in personal/financial capacity cases, 99 per cent of medical opinions 
provided to the tribunal that stated the adult lacked capacity were reflected in the Tribunal 
decision; medical opinions that the adult had capacity were agreed with by the Tribunal 27 
per cent of the time.23 This is a dramatic divergence in the treatment of medical opinion by its 
conclusion on capacity. It suggests the operation of a role for beneficence not prescribed by 
                                                          
21 Re Bridges [2001] 1 Qd R 574, 578. 
22 Chapter 3, Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
23 Chapter 3, Table 5.1. 
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law.24 It means that if there is any medical evidence of incapacity presented to the tribunal, a 
protective order will be made.  
It will be seen that this pattern is relevant to legal determinations of capacity to refuse 
treatment for anorexia. There is a widespread medical view that anorexia is associated with a 
deficit in capacity with regards to decisions about food. Therefore, most cases in which 
capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia is decided will receive evidence from at least one 
medical expert that the adult lacks capacity. If there is a strong tendency to ‘side’ with the 
evidence of incapacity, it is unlikely someone with anorexia will be found to have capacity to 
refuse its treatment. 
 
D Use of Outcomes and Risk in the Determination of Capacity  
Also pointing to a greater role for beneficence than is present on the face of the law is the 
way the characterisation of the decisions reached is used in personal/financial capacity 
decisions.  
As shown in Chapter 3, Queensland’s guardianship legislation is unusual in Australia for 
having a definition which is functional, not outcome-focussed. It requires the court/tribunal to 
assess how decisions are made, not the nature of those decisions. The outcome neutrality of 
the Queensland legislation is supposedly strengthened by 5(b) of the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000:  
[This Act acknowledges the following—] the right to make decisions includes the right to 
make decisions with which others may not agree.  
The Queensland Law Reform Commission stated that this provision ‘reinforces the functional 
approach to assessing capacity’ and ‘has the effect of discounting the use of the outcome 
approach in assessing capacity in practice’.25  
The functional test does not preclude any consideration of outcomes. In fact, it will be shown 
in Chapter 5 that outcomes necessarily play some role in any functional assessment of 
capacity. Nevertheless, treating outcomes as providing direct evidence of capacity/incapacity 
does offend the functional approach. As shown in Part III B 5 of Chapter 3, this appeared to 
                                                          
24 See further, Sam Boyle, ‘Determining Capacity: How Beneficence Can Operate in an Autonomy-Focused 
Legal Regime’ (2018) 26 Elder Law Journal 35. 
25 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws (2010, Report No 67) 
Volume 1, 295. 
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occur in a number of personal/financial capacity cases, none of which mentioned the outcome 
neutral protection provided by section 5(b) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000. 
Significantly, in six cases, evidence of adults refusing medical treatment appeared to be used 
as direct evidence of incapacity.26 Chapter 3 contrasted that approach with the way outcomes 
were used in testamentary capacity matters.27 There, when outcomes were considered by the 
court, it was made clear that they were not direct evidence of capacity, but could raise a 
question (or in some cases, not raise a question) about capacity, which then needed to be 
determined by a functional assessment.28  
Also, as noted in Chapter 3, 13 per cent of personal/financial capacity cases appear to use 
future risk to the adult in its determination of capacity.29 Whether an adult’s interests will be 
protected is a factor the tribunal is required to consider when deciding whether to make 
guardianship or administrative order.30 However, this is a separate consideration from 
whether the adult has capacity, and should only occur once it has been established that the 
adult lacks capacity.31  
Using outcomes as determinative of capacity involves an application of beneficence.32 Using 
risk to help decide capacity is also a straightforward application of beneficence. Therefore, 
the way some personal/financial capacity cases use outcomes and risk in their decisions 
demonstrates a greater role for beneficence in those determinations than the face of the law 
authorises.  
This tendency is also relevant for cases deciding capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. It 
is easy to see how the decision of someone who is malnourished to refuse food will be 
characterised as unwise by a legal body. If that characterisation plays a role in the 
determination of capacity, it will be difficult for someone with anorexia to be found to have 
capacity to refuse its treatment.  
 
                                                          
26 Chapter 3, Part III B 5. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Part III B 6. 
30 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 s 12(1)(c)(ii). 
31 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 s 12(1). 
32 Chapter 2, Part IV B. 
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E  Summary: Beneficence in Personal/Financial Capacity Decisions 
To summarise, the following features of personal/financial capacity determinations have been 
identified: 
• high rates of incapacity; 
• reliance on medical evidence over other sources, including directly from the adult; 
• preference for medical evidence of incapacity; 
• use of outcomes and risk as direct evidence of capacity in some cases. 
All of these features point towards a role for beneficence within personal/financial capacity 
decisions over that which is prescribed by law. These patterns were visible on a review of all 
the cases, rather than in any specific case. It is not alleged here that any specific decision on 
capacity was incorrect; each capacity determination is decided on the facts of the case, and 
without having all of the evidence presented to the tribunal, such a conclusion would be 
inappropriate. Nevertheless, these patterns have important implications that will be discussed 
below in Part III. 
F  Legal Matters Capacity: Why Were These Cases Different? 
It could be asked why legal matters capacity cases did not follow the results of 
personal/financial capacity in displaying the patterns outlined above. Personal/financial 
capacity matters were clearly more likely to engage the protective impulse of the Tribunal 
than testamentary capacity matters. However, as noted above, jurisdictions involved in 
determining legal capacity matters also historically derive from the parens patriae 
jurisdiction.  
It is not possible to explain this divergence with certainty, however, one possible explanation 
for the difference between personal/financial capacity and legal matters capacity is the 
differing effects that decisions in these areas have on the risk of the adult whose capacity is 
being determined. As noted in Chapter 3, Part II A, risk in legal matters capacity cases is 
more contained than it is for personal/financial capacity matters, and in some instances33 it is 
non-existent. This explanation sits comfortably alongside the conclusion about the role for 
beneficence in personal/financial capacity advanced in this Part. The ‘protection imperative’ 
alleged by those making the legal realist critique is not operative owing to the historical roots 
of the jurisdiction in which the legal decision is made. Rather, it is the attitude of the judges 
                                                          
33 Decisions made under s59 of the Public Trustee Act 1978 (Qld). 
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to the situation of those individuals who are before them, and for whom the determination of 
capacity can make such a significant difference.   
 
   NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF BENEFICENCE FOCUS 
A Decisions Do Not Follow the Law 
Although it has not been argued here that any specific personal/financial capacity decision 
was incorrect on the matter of capacity, the patterns in decision making identified do indicate 
a lack of adherence to the applicable law.34 Given the preference for evidence of incapacity 
over evidence of capacity, it can be argued that QCAT is not implementing the presumption 
of capacity in its guardianship and administration decisions.35 This pattern of results also 
appears to indicate a problem with regards to international law. As noted above,36 Australia 
has issued an interpretive declaration to say that it believes that substitute decision making 
does not violate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in disagreement 
with the findings of the relevant United Nations committee.37 Nevertheless, the Australian 
government has stated: 
In Australia, substituted decision-making will only be used as a measure of last resort where 
such arrangements are considered necessary, and are subject to safeguards in accordance with 
article 12(4). For example, substituted decision-making may be necessary as a last resort to 
ensure that persons with disabilities are not denied access to proper medical treatment because 
of an inability to assess or communicate their needs and preferences38 (emphasis added). 
Given the preference for evidence of incapacity over capacity, the Queensland regime cannot 
be described as using substituted decision making ‘as a last resort’.  
Secondly, as noted above, by apparently using outcomes in the form of previous bad 
decisions and future risk as direct evidence of capacity, many decisions in this jurisdiction 
may not be implementing the functional capacity test established by the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld).  
                                                          
34 Boyle, above n 5. 
35 Schedule 1, part 1, 1. 
36 Introduction, Part III. 
37 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment no 1: Article 12: 
Equal Recognition before the Law, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 May 2014) [1.4]. 
38 Australian Government, ‘Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, 
submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 7 June 2012, 15. 
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Finally, it can be argued that by resting so heavily on medical evidence, the Tribunal may be 
inappropriately delegating its role as a decision maker. In XYZ v State Trustees Ltd,39 
Cavanough J criticised a Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) decision on 
financial capacity, in which the tribunal’s decision appeared to rest very heavily on a 
neuropsychologist’s report that concluded the adult lacked capacity. The transcript of 
proceedings and the written reasons revealed that the tribunal member had been unwilling to 
accept the possibility that evidence directly from the adult could displace the impression 
given by that expert report. Cavanough J set aside the VCAT decision, finding that the 
tribunal had treated the neuropsychologist’s report as ‘presumptively correct’,40 and had 
‘effectively abdicated its role as decision-maker’ to the neuropsychologist in a manner which 
‘went beyond legitimate use by VCAT of expert evidence and involved an inappropriate 
delegation of the “ultimate issue” to the expert’.41 The case was referred back to VCAT to be 
reheard, and based on more inclusive evidence, the tribunal found the adult in fact had 
financial capacity.42 The evidence provision considered in this case is identical to that which 
applies to QCAT.  
No case in the study set appeared to overtly treat medical opinion as ‘presumptively correct’. 
Nevertheless, that finding in XYZ v State Trustees Ltd was only apparent on reading the 
transcript of discussion from the Member during the hearing. Given the overwhelming rate of 
agreement with medical evidence in its decisions, particularly medical evidence giving an 
opinion of incapacity, it is possible similar attention to the QCAT cases would reveal a 
comparable attitude to medical evidence in at least some instances.43  
 
B Adults’ Autonomy Suffers 
As described in Chapter 2, the presumption of capacity, a functional test of capacity, and the 
right to make decisions seen as irrational are features of capacity law that purport to protect 
autonomy.44 The above analysis shows that these provisions appear to not have been adhered 
to in many personal/financial capacity matters. There is room for debate over whether the 
outcomes for individuals subject to personal/financial capacity matters is improved or 
                                                          
39 [2006] VSC 444. 
40 XYZ v State Trustees Ltd [2006] VSC 444 [53]. 
41 Ibid [55]. 
42 XYZ (Guardianship) [2007] VCAT 1196. 
43 This is an area for future research.  
44 See Chapter 2, IV B. 
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worsened by these patterns. Some may argue that by erring on the side of incapacity, and by 
using ‘outcomes’ to assist in its determinations of capacity, the Tribunal is simply allowing 
vulnerable people to gain the necessary protection of a guardianship or administration order. 
Nevertheless, that explicitly autonomy-supporting protections in the law have been 
contravened is a matter for concern, and is an important finding for this thesis. Moreover, this 
lack of adherence was for the most part only visible from the aggregate patterns revealed by a 
survey of cases, rather than in the reasoning of individual cases. Therefore, it is less likely 
that any subject of these decisions would be able to successfully challenge their decision.  
There is another aspect of these findings that have a negative impact on autonomy, associated 
with the heavy reliance on medical evidence at the expense of other sources, in particular, the 
adult themselves. As implied by Cavanough J’s decision, medical evidence is not the only 
probative source of evidence on capacity. If greater attention was given to other sources of 
evidence, in particular, testimony of the adult themselves, it is possible that in some cases the 
tribunal would have found that despite medical evidence of incapacity, the adult in fact did 
have capacity, as ultimately occurred for XYZ. Perhaps more importantly, if more attention 
was given to the adults themselves as a source of evidence, many would be able to more 
actively participate in proceedings which have profound implications for their autonomy, and 
freedom of decision making. Being excluded, or considered irrelevant to these proceedings, 
must have negative impact on these adults’ agency and autonomy.  
 
    CONCLUSION 
Two things have been shown in this Chapter: firstly, that there is a role for beneficence in 
personal/financial capacity decisions in Queensland that is not prescribed by law; secondly, 
that there are important problems that arise from this role.  
These findings should be of interest to those involved in the guardianship and administration 
jurisdiction of QCAT. However, these results have a greater significance. It was noted in 
Chapter 2 that there is a reasonably widespread acceptance of the ‘legal realist’ argument 
regarding legal capacity decisions; that despite what the law says on its face, actual decisions 
apply a protection-focussed regime at the expense of individual liberty.45 However, this 
critique tends to be made by analysing the reasoning of individual decisions, and given the 
                                                          
45 Chapter 2, Part V. 
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fact-specific nature of legal capacity determinations, such critiques have limitations.46 In 
contrast, the results of this case analysis are based on features of cases that can be objectively 
assessed, and the arguments mounted in this Chapter do not rely on any appraisal of what 
ought to have been the correct result in any particular case, nor the strength of the evidence in 
any particular case. Therefore, these results add an important evidentiary pillar to the realist 
argument.  
More importantly, these results represent an important example of how legal determinations 
of capacity in the context of a beneficent impulse are made. They are therefore relevant to the 
analysis of capacity to make medical treatment decisions. The preference for evidence of 
incapacity over capacity indicates how this tendency can manifest without any one case 
overtly misapplying the law. Using outcomes as determinative of capacity shows how it is 
easy for the distinction between ‘function’ and ‘outcome’ to be breached. Finally, the 
association between these results and a lack of engagement with evidence directly from the 
adult when assessing capacity has important implications for capacity to make medical 
treatment decisions generally, and specifically in the case of anorexia. It will be shown in 
Chapter 6 that this pattern has so far been replicated in court determinations of capacity to 
refuse treatment for anorexia.  
This Chapter completes the analysis of the current state of the law that began in Chapter 2. It 
has been shown that beneficence plays a significant role alongside autonomy in the law of 
capacity. It has been shown that actual legal decision making may display an even larger role 
for beneficence than the law as written prescribes, to the point of inappropriate encroachment 
on protections of autonomy present in the law. This detailed characterisation of the law as it 
exists, and the problems that are present, will be an important basis to Chapter 5, which will 
attempt to explain how the law should work. 
                                                          
46 Boyle, above n 24. 
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Chapter 5: The Proper Role for Beneficence: Function, 
Status and Outcome 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has so far described and characterised existing law and legal decision making 
regarding capacity; this Chapter shifts to a positive, normative argument about how the law 
of capacity should work. In doing so, it will create the basis for the final Chapter, in which 
the overarching research question is answered: what process of reasoning should courts use to 
decide whether someone has capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia?  
Chapter 2 looked at the role of capacity in the legal system. It showed that despite a strong 
rhetorical focus on autonomy, there was more application of beneficence in the law of 
capacity than is sometimes thought. Although often described as a ‘functional’ test, as 
opposed to ‘status’ (using the presence of a mental impairment), or ‘outcome’, (using the 
nature of the actual decision made), in fact the cases demonstrate that there is an ongoing role 
for both outcome and status in combination with function. Chapter 2 also discussed the 
argument that legal decisions on capacity actually place even more emphasis on beneficence 
than appears to be required by the written law.  
Chapter 3 comprised a study of capacity decisions in Queensland between 2000 and 2015. 
Chapter 4 analysed those decisions, and demonstrated that for decisions made in a protective 
jurisdiction in Queensland, there was an apparent role for beneficence above that prescribed 
by law. Important problems in the legal decision making associated with this role were 
identified.  
There are two different forms the critical response to the findings of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
could take. Firstly, there is a prominent view that capacity is an illegitimate, paternalistic 
regime. The Committee of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities argues 
against substitute decision making, and says that compliance with the convention requires 
that it be abolished.1 The test of capacity, it is argued, is a means of denying the rights of 
persons with disabilities. To those holding this view, the findings in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
would simply add weight to their argument. 
                                                          
1 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment no 1: Article 12: 
Equal Recognition before the Law, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 May 2014). 
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But there is a second critical response to the findings of Chapters 2, 3 and 4, which has 
greater importance for this thesis. Even for those who accept that there is a proper role for a 
test of capacity in the legal system, there is a view that the test needs to shed its ‘paternalist’ 
aspects, and become ‘value neutral’. Value neutrality, it is believed, can be achieved through 
a test of capacity which is genuinely ‘functional’, that is, one in which outcome and status are 
irrelevant to capacity.2 This view largely rests on the liberal principle of autonomy, arguing 
that this principle needs to be given more than just the lip service seen in prominent judicial 
statements on capacity.3 On this view, the beneficence-focussed aspects of the law, discussed 
in Chapter 2, are a cause for concern. The findings of Chapters 3 and 4 would give further 
cause for criticism, adding weight to the view that courts do not ‘practice what they preach’ 
with regards to autonomy. Moreover, they confirm that the law requires specific adjustment 
so that outcome and status do become irrelevant to capacity.  
This Chapter will directly address this second critical response. It will be argued that if 
capacity is to remain part of the legal system, removing beneficence (and thus making it a 
purely functional test) is implausible and undesirable. It will be argued that, although there 
are problems in decision-making associated with a focus on beneficence in the capacity 
assessment, beneficence is nevertheless a legitimate value that the law of capacity advances. 
For the law to operate successfully, beneficence and autonomy need to be appropriately 
balanced against each other, which is a significant challenge. Chapter 4 identified problems 
that can arise when this is not done properly. For example, it can lead to the person whose 
capacity is being assessed playing a very limited role in the proceedings in which his or her 
decision-making rights are determined. This Chapter will show that an appropriate balance is 
achieved through a test that combines function, status and outcome in a sophisticated way. 
Although the current law does, as shown in Chapter 2, comprise a combination of these three, 
this Chapter will make specific recommendations on the precise role of both outcome and 
status, to reflect the nuance and vigilance this balance requires; nuance and vigilance that 
legal decision making does not consistently reflect. Risks in this approach will be identified, 
and ways in which those dangers can be addressed will be discussed. Overall, what will 
hopefully emerge is a picture of capacity that is coherent and defensible, but also richer and 
more responsive, capable of carrying the heavy weight given to it in our legal system. 
                                                          
2 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism 
(Cambridge, 2010) 101. 
3 Derek Morgan and Kenneth Veitch, ‘Being Ms B: B, Autonomy and the Nature of Legal Regulation’ (2004) 
26 Sydney Law Review 107, 108.  
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The arguments mounted here will be unconvincing to those who want to remove capacity 
altogether.4 However, given that for the foreseeable future, it appears that at least all Western 
countries will continue to have some form of substitute decision making,5 determined by a 
test of capacity, these arguments have a high level of ongoing importance. The debate over 
the overall legitimacy of substitute decision making and capacity will continue to take place 
in other fora.  
In this Chapter, it will first be argued that capacity cannot be value neutral; and that by nature 
of its role in the legal system, it is inherently normative. Values must be considered when 
determining who has capacity, and the main value that does and ought to play a role other 
than autonomy is beneficence. This role and its implications for capacity will then be 
explained through an explication of the proper role for ‘status’ and ‘outcome’ in capacity 
assessments.  
II VALUES IN CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
A  Autonomy: Necessary but Insufficient Justification for Capacity 
As set out in Chapter 2, autonomy is a central underlying justification for the role capacity 
plays in our legal system.6 The functional elements of capacity are often seen as necessary for 
autonomy, and in their absence, substitute decision making may be justified by an appeal to 
autonomy.7 For example, it may be argued that forced treatment for mental illness, if 
effective, may mean someone is able to leave their restrictive environment, live 
independently, and have a happy and successful life outside the confines of the psychiatric 
ward, therefore facilitating their autonomy.8 
                                                          
4 Supporters of this view include Eilionóir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Legislating personhood: 
Realising the right to support in exercising legal capacity’ (2014) 10(1) International Journal of Law in Context 
81; Peter Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health 
Law’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 752. 
5 John Dawson, ‘A Realistic Approach to Assessing Mental Health Laws' Compliance with the UNCRPD’ 
(2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 70. 
6 See e.g. John Christman and Joel Anderson, ‘Introduction’ in John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds), 
Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2005); E Haavi Morreim, 
‘Competence: At the Intersection of Law, Medicine, and Philosophy’ in Mary Ann Gardell Cutter & Earl E 
Shelp (eds) Competency: A Study of Informal Competency Determinations in Primary Care (Kluwer, 1991). 
7 Wayne Martin et al, Achieving CRPD Compliance: Is the Mental Capacity Act of England and Wales 
Compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities? If not, what next? An Essex 
Autonomy Project Position Paper, Report Submitted to the UK Ministry of Justice, 22 September 2014; Manne 
Sjöstrand and Gert Helgesson, ‘Coercive Treatment and Autonomy in Psychiatry’ (2008) 22(2) Bioethics 113; 
Arthur Caplan, ‘Denying Autonomy in Order to Create It: The Paradox of Forcing Treatment upon Addicts’ 
(2008) 103(12) Addiction 1919. 
8 M Gupta, Treatment Refusal in the Involuntarily Hospitalized Psychiatric Population: Canadian Policy and 
Practice’ (2001) 20 Medicine and Law 245; Jennifer Fischer, ‘Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse 
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As described in Chapter 2, autonomy is a central good connected to the ideology of 
liberalism, and in the area of mental health law, arguments for autonomy combine with those 
for recognition of human rights for people with disabilities.9 The substantial moral and 
rhetorical weight this combination creates helps explain why courts in treatment refusal 
cases, in the words of Kennedy, seem to ‘nail their colours to the mast of autonomy’,10 for 
example, in this statement: 
[t]he patient's right of choice exists whether the reasons for making that choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent.11 
This and other similar statements from appellate England and Wales cases12 seem to place 
autonomy at the centre of capacity law. It was shown in Chapter 2 that despite this 
appearance, the current law of capacity does allow for a greater involvement of beneficence 
than is often thought; an involvement that many think needs to be removed. However, a 
proper consideration of the nature of autonomy and the role capacity plays in the legal system 
shows that as a matter of coherence and logic, the overall justification for capacity law cannot 
be autonomy alone.   
Arguments for the current role of capacity in the legal system that rest on autonomy require 
an understanding of autonomy that is substantive, in that it requires a person to have certain 
attributes. There is considerable debate over what attributes might legitimately be included in 
an account of autonomy,13 but they are often taken to include things like goal directed 
behaviour, and some level of rationality.14 Most would agree that someone experiencing a 
serious psychotic mental illness, or severe dementia, is not autonomous.15 But that does not 
mean that autonomy is always self-evident, and substantive accounts of autonomy are the 
subject of much debate.16 What attributes ought to be required? What is the threshold 
between autonomous and not autonomous within those attributes? Most importantly, who 
answers those questions? When considering substitute decision making, as Kennedy and 
                                                          
Treatment for Involuntary Hospitalized Persons with a Mental Illness’ (2005) 29 Hastings International & 
Comparative Law Review 153. 
9 Part IV A. 
10 Ian Kennedy, ‘Commentary’ (1997) 5 Medical Law Review 321. 
11 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 653. 
12 See Chapter 2, Part III C.  
13 Catriona Mackenzie and Wendy Rogers ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability and Capacity: A Philosophical Appraisal 
of the Mental Capacity Act’ 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 37. 
14 See Christman and Anderson, above n 6. 
15 Lubomira Radoilska ‘Introduction: Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder’ in 
Lubomira Radoilska (ed) Autonomy and Mental Disorder (Oxford University Press 2012) x. 
16 See John Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable 
Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?’ (2007) 15 Health Care Analysis 235 
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Grubb state, autonomy is ‘in effect, a status granted by others’.17 Anderson expands on the 
point: 
Like being able to drive a car, being autonomous is a socially attributed, claimed, and 
contested status. Normative debates about criteria for autonomy (and what autonomy entitles 
one to) are best understood, not as debates about what autonomy, at core, really is, but rather 
as debates about the relative merits of various possible packages of thresholds, entitlements, 
regulations, values, and institutions.18 
Those attributes that have most widespread support, like goal directed behaviour and 
rationality, are also contested on the grounds of being ‘ableist’.19 What this shows is that 
autonomy is not a fixed attribute with a list of agreed elements; the nature of autonomy is 
contested and contingent.20 This is not a problem for the good of autonomy in itself, and does 
not mean that autonomy is irrelevant to capacity law. The problem is in using autonomy as a 
sole justification for a legal regime that involves substitute decision making. Carney et al 
capture the necessary paradox when discussing Australian guardianship law:  
At the heart of the jurisdiction is a contradiction. The ideology of freedom is linked to a set of 
legal tools to restrict freedom through the appointment of substitutes. Guardianship law uses a 
modern rhetoric of personal rights promoting autonomy, fostering independence, and 
assisting citizens to participate in social life. And yet the main task of guardianship forums is 
to strip citizens of rights, entrust proxies with the exercise of legal decision-making, and 
sometimes authorise incarceration through physical or chemical means.21 
Carney et al do not disagree with substitute decision making per se, but have identified an 
important dissonance, and it is a dissonance that exists in capacity law generally. Most 
capacity legislation has shed the overt paternalism of the parens patriae jurisdiction from 
which it emanates, but the function of the law is precisely the same. It distinguishes between 
people who are free to make their own decisions, and those for whom substitute decision 
making will be authorised for their best interests. If a person is assessed as non-autonomous, 
                                                          
17 Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Principles of Medical Law (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2000) 617. 
18 Joel Anderson, ‘Regimes of Autonomy’ (2014) 17 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 355, 355. 
19 According to the ableist critique, people not displaying traits such as rationality, are ascribed a lower social 
worth. See e.g. Fiona AK Campbell, ‘Inciting Legal Fictions: Disability's Date with Ontology and the Ableist 
Body of the Law’ (2001) 10 Griffith Law Review 42. 
20 Fabian Freyenhagen, Tom O'Shea, ‘Hidden Substance: Mental Disorder as a Challenge to Normatively 
Neutral Accounts of Autonomy’ (2013) 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 53; Brent M Kious, 
‘Autonomy and Values: Why the Conventional Theory of Autonomy is Not Value-Neutral’ 22 Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, & Psychology 1. 
21 Terry Carney, and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment: Tribunals and Popular Justice 
(Federation Press, 1997) 47. 
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by someone else, using criteria determined by someone else, then how can the process of 
removing their decision-making rights and giving them to a third party be solely directed at 
that person’s autonomy? It might be that a person could be treated against their will, have 
their health restored, and report feeling that their autonomy has been restored.22 But as 
Donnelly points out, whether someone’s autonomy will in fact be protected or restored by 
taking away their decision-making capacity for a particular decision is uncertain, and at the 
time of operation can only be speculative.23 Moreover, as Donnelly also notes, ‘some patients 
may prefer the limitations of their illness, even if it means detention, to the forced imposition 
of treatment’.24 Paradoxically, despite the argument that concern for autonomy might justify 
substitute decision making, having one’s autonomy interfered with is for some the most 
salient feature of substitute decision making.25 For this reason, protecting autonomy is a 
primary motivation of opponents of the current regime. The Committee of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities bases its call for ending the use of ‘mental capacity as 
a means of removing legal capacity’ on:  
the general principles of the Convention [..] namely respect for inherent dignity, [and] 
individual autonomy — including the freedom to make one’s own choices26 (emphasis 
added).  
Autonomy is central to the issue of capacity. However, the fact that it can be used to argue 
these diametrically opposed positions indicates problems with using autonomy as the sole 
justification for capacity law.   
 
                                                          
22 This is sometimes termed ‘thank you theory’. See Alan Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in 
Transition (US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1975).  
23 Mary Donnelly, ‘From Autonomy to Dignity: Treatment for Mental Disorders and the Focus for Patient 
Rights’ (2008) 26 Law in Context 37. See other critique of ‘thank you theory’ in Charles Marriot Culver and 
Bernard Gert, Philosophy in Medicine (OUP, 1982) 161. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Eilionóir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or 
Fantasy?’ (2014) 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law 124, 126-7. 
26 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment no 1: Article 12: 
Equal Recognition before the Law, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 May 2014) [1.4]. Other prominent criticisms of 
the current regime base their argument on the good of autonomy, see e.g. Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, A 
New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, Report to Law Commission of 
Ontario, (October 2010). 
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B  Capacity, Normativity and Value Neutrality 
The contested and contingent nature of autonomy has further implications for capacity law. 
One of the ways in which a focus on autonomy has influenced thinking about capacity law is 
through the concept of ‘value neutrality’.27 Donnelly writes: 
Respect for the liberal principle of autonomy requires that external factors, including the 
outcome of the decision reached and the degree of risk assumed, are irrelevant to the 
determination of capacity. ... [R]espect for autonomy is premised on allowing each individual 
to determine for herself what is good. Therefore, whether or not a person’s decision complies 
with other people’s perception of ‘the good’ is irrelevant to whether the person has capacity28 
(emphasis added). 
Value neutrality means the only values that have importance in capacity assessments are 
those of the person whose capacity is assessed. Importantly, as Donnelly states, it requires not 
only that decisions on capacity are not based on outcome or status, it requires that those 
factors be irrelevant to capacity. Therefore, given the role of status and outcome in the 
current law of capacity shown in Chapter 2, genuine value neutrality has not been achieved.29 
Nevertheless, as indicated by Donnelly’s comments, it remains a mainstream goal of 
reformers in the area. 
Various writers have questioned the desirability of a genuinely value-neutral test of 
capacity.30 However, more than being undesirable, complete value neutrality in capacity 
assessment is conceptually incoherent. This is revealed by a consideration of what a 
determination about a person’s capacity to make a particular decision involves.   
In legal and medical discourse, it is common to read of person X having capacity, or lacking 
capacity. This language gives the impression that capacity is an attribute of a person. If this 
characterisation were accurate, one can imagine that purely objective tests could be designed 
to assess capacity. But the determination of legal capacity is, in part, a moral and political 
judgement, and thus it is not a feature of a person that can be determined by medical 
assessment, or any purely objective assessment. Many commentators, including the United 
States’ National Bioethics Advisory Commission, have made this simple but crucial 
                                                          
27 Jules Holroyd, ‘Clarifying Capacity: Value and Reasons’ in Lubomira Radoilska (ed) Autonomy and Mental 
Disorder (Oxford University Press 2012) 145. 
28 Donnelly, above n 2, 101, quoting Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.4]. 
29 Chapter 2, Part IV.  
30 See contributions to the International Journal of Law in Context, (2013) 9(1), which all address this issue. 
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observation.31 Nevertheless, given the proposal that capacity assessment ought to be value-
neutral is a mainstream position, the truth of this argument requires elaboration.  
At this point, the distinction between ‘mental capacity’ and ‘legal capacity’ should be 
recalled. Mental capacity refers to mental abilities of a person. Mental abilities, like 
understanding, remembering, and reasoning, occur on spectrums, in that people have more or 
less of these abilities; it is not a matter of the presence or absence of these abilities.32 Legal 
capacity refers to a legal determination about a person, and is sometimes described as 
competence. Legal capacity is informed by mental capacity, but unlike mental capacity it is a 
yes or no decision; one either has legal capacity or one does not.33 The latter is the focus of 
this thesis, but confusingly both are commonly described simply as ‘capacity’. In this thesis, 
‘capacity’ is used to denote legal capacity, as opposed to ‘mental capacity’. Standardised tests 
have been developed that are used in the assessment of legal capacity, which might be taken 
to suggest that it is a measurable phenomenon. However, the makers of the most widely used 
of these—the MacCAT-T—have been at pains to point out that their test is designed to 
evaluate mental capacity, and while this information is useful in determining legal capacity, it 
is not definitive. Grisso and Applebaum state: 
A measure of a legally relevant ability may characterise how well a person performs, but it 
cannot determine whether that level of performance is enough to warrant a finding of 
                                                          
31 US National Bioethics Advisory Commission, ‘Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders that May 
Affect Decisionmaking Capacity’ (2002) 13(1) International Journal of Bioethics 109; See also Thomas Grisso, 
Evaluating Competencies: Forensic Assessments and Instruments (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2nd ed, 2006) 
15; Marshall B Kapp and Douglas Mossman, ‘Measuring Decisional Capacity: Cautions on the Construction of 
a Capacimeter’ (1996) 2(1) Psychology Public Policy and Law 73; LH Roth, A Meisel,  and CW Lidz, ‘Tests of 
Competency to Consent to Treatment’ (1977) 134(3) American Journal of Psychiatry 279, 283; Louis C 
Charland, ‘Mental Competence and Value: The Problem of Normativity in the Assessment of Decision-Making 
Capacity’ 8(2) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 135; Natalie F Banner, ‘Unreasonable Reasons: Normative 
Judgements in the Assessment of Mental Capacity’ (2012) 18 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 1038;  
Holroyd, above n 27; Bruce J Winick, ‘Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction between Assent 
and Objection’ (1991) 28 Houston Law Review 15; Scott YH Kim, Evaluation of Capacity to Consent to 
Treatment and Research (Oxford University Press, 2009) 31; Loretta Kopelman, ‘On the Evaluative Nature of 
Competency and Capacity Judgments’ (1990) 13 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 309; Charles M 
Culver and Bernard Gert, ‘The Inadequacy of Incompetence’ (1990) 68 Milbank Quarterly 619; Carl Elliott, 
‘Caring about Risks: Are Severely Depressed Patients Competent to Consent to Research?’ (1997) 54 Archives 
of General Psychiatry 113; Elyn R Saks and Stephen Behnke, ‘Competency to Decide on Treatment and 
Research: MacArthur and Beyond’ (1999) 10 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 103, 111; Alan Buchanan, 
‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment’ (2004) 97 Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 415; Kristy Keywood, ‘Rethinking the Anorexic Body: How English Law and Psychiatry ‘Think’’ 
(2003) 26(6) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 599, 607; Charles Foster, ‘Autonomy in the Medico-
legal Courtroom: a Principle Fit for Purpose?’ (2013) 22(1) Medical Law Review 48. 
32 Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society, in Lubomira Radoilska (ed) Autonomy and Mental Disorder 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) 7.  
33 Kelly Purser, Capacity Assessment and the Law: Problems and Solutions (Springer Verlag, 2017) 4. 
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incompetence. [..] Conclusions about legal competence are assisted by empirical 
observations, but they are ultimately moral in nature [..]’34 (emphasis added). 
Beauchamp and Childress explain this normative aspect of capacity. They describe three 
necessary parts of any test of capacity: firstly, choosing the relevant functional abilities (e.g. 
understanding information, using or weighing information), then deciding what level of that 
ability is needed to satisfy the test, then determining whether the person in question in fact 
meets those requirements. They point out that while the third aspect is empirical, and can be 
done without any imposition of external values, the first two aspects are inherently 
normative.35  
This normativity is most apparent in the second step: deciding what level of ability is needed 
to satisfy the test. Mental capacity is on a spectrum,36 and the vast majority of the population 
will fall somewhere between no ability and maximum possible ability. This is reflected in the 
fact that the MacCAT-T produces a range of scores reflecting differing levels of mental 
capacity.37 Determining legal capacity necessarily involves making a decision about where 
on the spectrum someone needs to be. To illustrate from the data set, in LJM,38 QCAT had to 
determine whether LJM had the capacity to understand the nature and effect of an enduring 
power of attorney that she made appointing her sister. The tribunal talked to LJM to make 
this determination, and found: 
LJM was not able to discuss or explain the events surrounding the giving of the enduring power 
of attorney and expressed only a rudimentary understanding of its purpose, that is, to have her 
sister look after her money and look after her.39 
Therefore, LJM did understand something about the enduring power of attorney, so for the 
Tribunal it was a matter of how much she understood, and, implicitly, whether or not this was 
sufficient. The decision needed to be binary, but the facts on which it was based were not. In 
that case, the Tribunal found that she did not have sufficient understanding, and set the 
instrument aside.  
                                                          
34 Thomas Grisso and Paul S Appelbaum, ‘Values and Limits of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study’ 
(1996) 2(1) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 167, 169. 
35 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics, (OUP, 5th ed, 2001) 115. 
36 Harold I Kaplan and Benjamin J Saddock, Synopsis of Psychiatry (2003, 9th ed, Lippincott Williams & 
Wilkins) 242. 
37 E.g. testing the category of ‘understanding’ under the MaCCAT produces a score out of 26: Thomas Grisso, 
Paul S Appelbaum, and Carolyn Hill-Fotouhi, ‘The MacCAT-T: A Clinical Tool to Assess Patients’ Capacities 
to Make Treatment Decisions (1997) 48 Psychiatric Services 1415. 
38 [2014] QCAT 252. 
39 LJM [2014] QCAT 252 [14]. 
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How is the sufficiency of mental capacity to make a decision determined? This is a 
complicated question, and this Chapter will set out some specific ways that this occurs. But 
the important point here is that setting this level of sufficiency cannot be done on the basis of 
objective facts alone, because there is no ‘natural’ or objective level of sufficient mental 
capacity for a particular decision.40 Thus, the boundary between legal capacity and legal 
incapacity is partly a moral or political question.41 As Craigie points out, this means: 
 different societies, or the one society at different times, will draw this line in different places 
on the basis of divergent evaluative commitments.42 
Although this conclusion is often not acknowledged in the literature, it should not be 
surprising.43 By establishing a test of legal capacity, the state is involving itself in people’s 
decisions in a normatively active way. This does not mean that lessening the role for external 
values is not a worthy direction for capacity law, it simply means that completely removing 
those values is not possible.44  
 
C  A Necessary Role for Beneficence 
If the underlying goal of capacity law cannot be autonomy alone, and if complete value 
neutrality is incoherent, what other values or goals ought to be operative? What, along with 
autonomy, can inform the decision on where to set the bar of sufficient ability for legal 
capacity? The most obvious candidate is beneficence.45 As Craigie states: 
[..] decisions about where to set the mental threshold for the right to make one's own 
decisions must balance the value of liberty and recognition against the protection of well-
being [..]46  
                                                          
40 This precise point is made by Jillian Craigie, ‘Against a Singular Understanding of Legal Capacity: Criminal 
Responsibility and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2015) 40 International Journal 
of Law and Psychiatry 6, 10. 
41 A Buchanan, ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment’ (2004) 97 Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 415, 415-420. 
42 Craigie, above n 40, 11. 
43 See discussion of this in Morgan and Veitch, above n 3. 
44 For further explanation of why value neutrality is a false goal for capacity, see Natalie Banner, ‘Can 
Procedural and Substantive Elements of Decision-making be Reconciled in Assessments of Mental Capacity?’ 
(2013) 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 71. 
45 See Chapter 2. 
46 Craigie, above n 40, 10. 
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Although controversial, that determining capacity should involve balancing autonomy with 
beneficence is not a new or narrowly held position. In fact, in US discourse, this has been a 
mainstream argument. United States President’s Commission stated:  
[A] conclusion about a patient’s decisionmaking capacity necessarily reflects a balancing of 
two important, sometimes competing objectives: to enhance the patient’s well-being and to 
respect the person as a self-determining individual.47 
Note that this specifically refers to determining capacity, not the general law of mental 
disability. The makers of the MacCAT-T tool for assessing capacity, Grisso and Appelbaum, 
openly acknowledge that determining capacity requires a balance between autonomy and 
beneficence: 
Conclusions about legal competence are assisted by empirical observations, but they are 
ultimately moral in nature: they require judgments about patients’ interests based on 
applications of the values of autonomy and beneficence48 (emphasis added). 
However, the idea that determining capacity involves a balance between autonomy and 
beneficence does not appear to have found acceptance in mainstream policy discourse in the 
United Kingdom49 and Australia,50 despite the role for beneficence identified in Chapter 2.  
It is not surprising that there is a reluctance to accept a legitimate role for beneficence in 
capacity assessment. The negative features of the personal/financial capacity jurisdiction 
described in Chapter 4, like the excessive reliance on medical evidence, are all connected to a 
focus on beneficence. Moreover, capacity is under significant pressure from rights advocates, 
prominently from the Committee of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and supporting literature, and the admission that capacity involves an application of 
beneficence lends weight to the arguments against using it all. Perhaps this is why it is 
difficult to find cases and legislation that make overt references to the non-value-neutral 
nature of the law, and why autonomy often seems, in the rhetoric of capacity law, to be the 
only relevant good.51 Perhaps this is why the current law of capacity is often described as 
                                                          
47 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research, Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent 
in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship (1982) vol 1, 57.   
48 Grisso and Appelbaum, above n 34, 169. 
49 See Law Commission, ‘Mental Incapacity’ (Law Comm No 231) (1995). 
50 For example, in the Australian Law Reform Commission’s report on disability law, autonomy alone is 
discussed as a goal; beneficence is only mentioned once in the report, in the context of ‘best interests’ substitute 
decision making: Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth 
Laws, Report No 124 (2014) passim, 49. 
51 The first three principles listed in s 1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) address capacity assessment, and 
all are statements supporting autonomy (the last two principles deal with decisions made for people found to 
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using the functional approach, not the status or outcome approach,52 including by the most 
senior judges,53 despite a clear role for status in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW), and as 
was shown in Chapter 2, a less blatant but still undeniable role for outcome in the case law.   
Whatever the explanation, it is clear that although many might accept that beneficence does 
play a role in capacity, there is considerable doubt over whether it should. The remainder of 
this Chapter will discuss how beneficence does and should operate alongside autonomy in the 
law of capacity through the use of outcome (Part III) and status (Part IV) in capacity 
determinations. It will explain the underlying justification for their use, consider the dangers 
involved in their use, and explain how these dangers can be mitigated. In doing so, it will 
develop recommendations as to the specifics of how outcome and status should be used.  
 
III  THE ROLE FOR OUTCOMES IN ASSESSING CAPACITY 
The purpose of this Part is to explain and justify the indirect use of outcomes in assessing 
capacity. The argument is that capacity assessment ought to still be based on a functional 
assessment, but that outcomes cannot be described as irrelevant to that assessment. Firstly, 
they may indicate problems in decision making; secondly, they influence the level of mental 
capacity required. Both of these roles carry the risk of beneficence overwhelming autonomy 
in capacity assessments, a risk that must be managed.  
A Outcomes and the Functional Analysis 
Chapter 2 showed that despite some statements to the contrary,54 the settled law, as indicated 
by leading appellate court judgments on capacity, does not rule out a role for outcomes in the 
capacity assessment. In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment),55 Donaldson LJ states: 
                                                          
lack capacity). The principles in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) (ss 5, 6) are similarly 
directed at autonomy and individual rights. 
52 See E.g. Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 50, 73: 
In recommending [the functional] approach that was subsequently incorporated in the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (EW), the Law Commission of England and Wales deliberately rejected status-based 
assessments: Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.5]–[3.6]. In that inquiry, 
the Law Commission received a ‘ringing endorsement’ of the functional approach: [3.6]. As the Law 
Commission of England and Wales concluded in a review of ‘mental incapacity’ in 1995, status-based 
assessments should be rejected as being ‘quite out of tune with the policy aim of enabling and 
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Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.3]. 
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That his choice is contrary to what is to be expected of the vast majority of adults is only 
relevant if there are other reasons for doubting his capacity to decide. The nature of his choice 
or the terms in which it is expressed may then tip the balance.56 
In Re MB,57 the Court of Appeal states: 
[P]anic, indecisiveness and irrationality in themselves do not as such amount to 
incompetence, but they may be symptoms or evidence of incompetence58 (emphasis added). 
Such statements can be seen as clashing with the goal of value neutrality in capacity 
assessment. However, these statements simply reflect that the functional assessment of 
capacity must necessarily contain a role for outcomes. This is revealed by full consideration 
of what a functional assessment involves. It will be recalled that the test of capacity in the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW)59 requires that someone both be able to understand 
information relevant to a decision, and then ‘use or weigh’ that information in order to reach 
a decision. Understanding information is a criterion about which it might be possible to test 
without a substantive or normative element of the evaluation. However, a number of writers 
have shown that assessing someone’s ability to ‘use or weigh’ information is one of the 
elements of the capacity that is inherently normative task.60 As Thornton puts it, ‘[t]he 
information has normatively to constrain the outcome’.61 Why else would we be assessing 
this attribute if any process of reasoning would be sufficient? The normativity in the test does 
not prescribe an outcome, or even a range of outcomes, in order to be found to have capacity. 
Rather, in Banner’s words, it constrains ‘the kinds of decision processes that could 
reasonably follow from the information given’.62 Establishing what ‘kinds of decision 
processes’ would be normatively acceptable cannot be done a priori; it is only with empirical 
consideration of actual decision making.63  
The result of this is that particular decisions, although not constitutive of incapacity, may 
raise questions about capacity. Banner’s example explains the point: 
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[S]ay I were to tell a person standing at a set of traffic lights that a lorry was hurtling along 
the road ignoring red lights, and I have every reason to believe he understands my utterances. 
He then proceeds to step directly into the lorry’s oncoming path. Without being able to delve 
into his reasoning, I would judge that this person had failed to use or weigh the information I 
had given him, because he did not respond to that information in the way that he ought to 
(taken with the assumption that he had an interest in preserving his own life). [..] 
The person’s failure to use or weigh information is, in this case, indicated by the fact that his 
action was the wrong thing to do in those circumstances, as it would likely lead to his death or 
serious injury.64  
This does not mean that the person stepping in front of the truck does not have capacity. They 
might have good reason to do so. It just means that if someone has been told that information 
and understands it, and then goes to step in front of a truck, it is more likely that something 
has gone wrong with the use the information than if the person stayed on the kerb. This 
decision, therefore, is an alerting one, the type that can legitimately prompt further 
investigation. Therefore, it is a mistake to say that outcomes are wholly irrelevant to the 
determination of capacity; they are a legitimate trigger for a closer investigation.65 They are 
also inextricably part of the decision making process itself. 
An example of outcomes arguably playing this indirect role was seen in the case of Aziz v 
Prestige Property Services66 from the data set, in which Lyons J had to determine whether 
Mr Aziz had capacity to reach a financial settlement. Mr Aziz was suffering from a 
psychiatric disorder, probably as a result of the accident for which compensation was being 
paid. Amongst other detailed consideration of the issue of capacity, her Honour stated: 
Given his wish to essentially give the money away to a soccer team, I consider that there was 
clearly no appreciation by him that the settlement amounts were to compensate him for his 
economic loss and that this fund would be what he would need to live on in the coming years. 
There was no appreciation by him that the money he received would be substantially 
diminished once the repayments and expenses were paid and that what was left was income 
support for him which would have to be carefully managed.67 
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This helped her Honour conclude that Mr Aziz did not understand the effect of the decision. 
This does not mean that people are disbarred from giving their money away. But a plan to 
give away the entirety of a compensation payment, despite being told its purpose, is an 
alerting decision, and one which requires an inquiry into the decision making process used. In 
the context of Mr Aziz experiencing a serious psychiatric disorder, combined with an 
apparent lack of understanding of facts relevant to the decision, Lyons J’s conclusion is a 
reasonable one.   
Having ‘bad’ decisions as an alerting factor, one that prompts close inquiry into the 
functional decision making, is an example of a role for beneficence in the test of capacity. If 
beneficence played no role, all outcomes would be entirely equal. Under the analysis in Part 
II, the role for beneficence is legitimate. However, this role carries danger. Allowing 
outcomes to play a role in the manner described here raises the prospect of the functional 
capacity test being effectively bypassed. Where someone is seen to be making a very bad 
decision, like giving all of an injury compensation settlement to a soccer team, or relevantly 
to this thesis, refusing life-saving treatment, it would be easy to simply infer a lack of 
functional capacity on the basis of this negative outcome, without proper consideration of the 
actual decision making used. There is evidence that judges are aware of this danger. In Heart 
of England Foundation Trust v JB,68 Jackson J stated:  
The temptation to base a judgement of a person's capacity upon whether they seem to have 
made a good or bad decision, and in particular upon whether they have accepted or rejected 
medical advice, is absolutely to be avoided. That would be to put the cart before the horse or, 
expressed another way, to allow the tail of welfare to wag the dog of capacity. Any tendency 
in this direction risks infringing the rights of that group of persons who, though vulnerable, 
are capable of making their own decisions. Many who suffer from mental illness are well able 
to make decisions about their medical treatment, and it is important not to make unjustified 
assumptions to the contrary.69 
This danger is also specifically addressed by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, when it states 
that ‘[a] person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an 
unwise decision’.70 This section is sometimes interpreted as requiring outcomes to be 
irrelevant to capacity.71 As noted in Chapter 2,72 the logic of the provision does not permit 
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that interpretation;73 however, it does require that outcomes not be determinative. Chapter 4 
showed that there were examples in the data set of outcomes being used as direct evidence of 
capacity; including refusal of medical treatment.74 According to those mounting the legal 
realist argument aired in Chapter 2, many other judicial decisions fall into this detrimental 
pattern.  
In order for this problem to be avoided, the functional test must remain the central 
mechanism by which capacity is determined. Although outcomes do have a background role 
to play, decision makers must to the greatest extent possible put their characterisation of the 
outcome aside when undertaking the functional assessment. This is a challenge, but can be 
done by focusing the inquiry on the individual and his or her decision-making. Banner has 
talked about the contextual factors involved in any decision, such as: 
[T]he patient's own perceptions and evaluations of his condition, attitudes towards his health, 
aspirations or expectations of the future, belief in the efficacy of treatment, trust in the 
medical professionals treating him, relationships with caregivers…75 
Without understanding these factors from the decision maker’s perspective, the determination 
of capacity is far more likely to be led by the characterisation of the outcome. This means that 
capacity should only be decided after proper discussion and engagement with the decision 
maker, exploring his or her values, attitudes and relationships. The Court of Protection 
(England and Wales) case of Kings College Hospital Trust v C,76 in which a woman who had 
attempted suicide was found to have the capacity to refuse life-saving dialysis, provides an 
example of this. Doctors presenting evidence to the court argued that she had a personality 
disorder,77 and lacked capacity under the functional test.78 C’s decision to refuse treatment 
and therefore die was one that many would have seen as foolish, given her age and health. 
Although C was not present for the trial, the Court took and carefully considered evidence 
from C’s children. It heard from one daughter that: 
My mother's values, and the choices that she made have always been based on looks (hers and 
other people's), money, and living (at all costs) what she called her ‘sparkly’ lifestyle …79 
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The Court also heard from that daughter that C had stated that she wanted to ‘go out with a 
bang’, and did not want to grow old.80 The Court heard from another daughter that C’s ‘entire 
identity has been built around being a self-described “vivacious and sociable person who 
lives life to the full and enjoys having fun”’.81 This information was central to the Court’s 
determination that C had the capacity to refuse this life-saving treatment. It found that C had 
made her decision ‘on the basis of placing in the balance many factors relevant to the 
decision’,82 including this attitude to life. The Court said that her decision may be considered 
by some to be ‘unreasonable, illogical or even immoral within the context of the sanctity 
accorded to life by society in general’.83 Nevertheless, considered in the context of C’s 
particular values and attitude, the Court was able to identify an ability to meet the functional 
test of capacity.   
This case demonstrates Banner’s point that capacity can only be understood in the context of 
the decision-maker’s subjective experience of the world. Given that Courts will most often be 
considering capacity in the context of a decision characterised by someone in authority as 
poor or unwise, it is particularly incumbent on Courts to engage closely with the decision 
maker, in order to elucidate these contextual factors. Otherwise, the inevitable role of 
outcomes described in this Part may simply overwhelm the functional assessment, leading to 
the situation warned of by those making the realist argument in Chapter 2, in which people 
with mental illnesses who refuse life-saving treatment will be automatically designated as 
incapacitous.  
In Chapter 4, in personal/financial capacity cases from the data set, is was shown that overall 
decision making tended towards finding incapacity. It was also shown that outcomes were 
often used as direct evidence of capacity, and that evidence directly from the adult was not 
generally given the importance it deserved. This shows that overlooking the subjective 
reasons given by the decision makers is connected with an inappropriately wide role for 
beneficence in capacity assessment. It was noted in Chapter 4 that there were some cases in 
which there was careful engagement with the adult, but that this happened only in a minority 
of cases. It was suggested there that greater use of evidence directly from the adult would 
improve legal decision making in that jurisdiction.84 The conclusions reached here support 
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that finding, and show that it is even more important to do this in cases of decisions 
characterised as poor or unwise by those in authority. Following this advice will help avoid 
one of the problems identified in Chapter 4, in which decisions rested heavily on medical 
evidence, to the exclusion of other probative sources. This conclusion also has particular 
relevance to the case of anorexia, in which the decision of a malnourished person to refuse 
food will be routinely characterised as unwise by third parties, and, as will be seen in Chapter 
6, capacity in those cases has tended to be determined on the basis of medical evidence alone.  
 
B Risk Relative Capacity 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that risk relative capacity has been accepted into the case law of 
England and Wales and Australia; recall Lord Donaldson’s statement:  
What matters is that the doctors should consider whether at the time [the patient] had a 
capacity which was commensurate with the gravity of the decision which he purported to 
make. The more serious a decision, the greater the capacity required.85 
It was shown in Part II B of this chapter that legal capacity cannot be value neutral because it 
involves deciding where on a spectrum of mental capacity one must be, in the context of 
there being no natural cut off between sufficient and insufficient mental capacity. According 
to Lord Donaldson’s formulation, an assessor should raise the level of required mental 
capacity when the risks involved in the decision are higher. As described in Chapter 2, the 
presence of risk relative capacity in the law is an overt instance of beneficence playing a role 
in the determination of capacity. In this way, it contrasts with the indirect, and therefore less 
obvious, role of outcomes in determining capacity described here in Part III A. Although the 
legitimacy of risk relative capacity has not been questioned in the case law, it is controversial. 
In Knauer’s words, it may allow capacity to be a ‘self-fulfilling doctrine: those who exercise 
approved choices have capacity, whereas those who exercise socially undesirable choices 
lack capacity’.86 Saks describes risk relative capacity as ‘a distant cousin to declaring people 
who make good choices competent and people who make bad choices incompetent’.87 This 
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concern mirrors that set out in Part III A regarding the indirect role of outcome in capacity 
determinations.  
The justification for risk relative capacity is simply that it allows for a better balancing of 
autonomy and beneficence.88 Therefore, it presupposes a role for both these values. The 
controversy is understandable given the widely held views that capacity should be value 
neutral, and that autonomy is the only underlying justification for capacity assessment. In 
Part II, it was argued that value neutrality was not a plausible goal of capacity assessment, 
and that its justification must rest on a balancing of autonomy and beneficence, not autonomy 
alone. If one does not accept those arguments, the arguments set out here in favour of risk 
relative capacity may not be convincing. If one believes that capacity should be value neutral, 
risk relative capacity is an obvious impediment to that goal. In the same way, if one believes 
that the capacity assessment should be purely functional, and the outcome of the decision 
should be irrelevant, risk relative capacity will necessarily be unsatisfactory.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to consider specific arguments related to risk relative capacity, 
because it is a clear example of beneficence in capacity law. This Part will consider criticisms 
commonly made about risk relative capacity. It will then respond to those criticisms, and 
mount two substantive arguments in favour of the principle.  
1 ‘Asymmetry’ of Risk Relative Capacity is Deceptive 
An important consequence of risk relative capacity relate is that someone might be found to 
have capacity to accept treatment but not to refuse it, because accepting treatment is seen as 
less risky than refusing it. This is described as ‘asymmetry’. One criticism made of 
asymmetry is that it creates the sense of a choice when in reality none exists. Wilks (who 
ultimately accepts asymmetry as legitimate) uses the analogy of a show election in a 
totalitarian regime where there is only one name on the ballot.89 Devereux et al state that 
capacity for a decision must be symmetrical, otherwise a patient is left with ‘no more than the 
right to agree with the medical practitioner.’90  
Given the history of subjugation of people with mental disabilities within the medical system, 
such concerns are important. And it is true that, as Lawlor argues ‘[i]f I say that you can 
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choose x or not-x, but then also say that you cannot choose not-x, you clearly do not have a 
choice’.91 The central problem with this appears to be the deception involved. However, for 
Lawlor, this does not mean that asymmetry of capacity is impermissible; it turns on whether 
someone’s ‘level of competence’ has already been established or not. In practice, decision 
making capacity is only assessed after a decision has been made,92 and therefore, there need 
not be deception. As Lawlor points out: 
We can even let the patient know, explicitly, that if they consent, we will give them the 
treatment, but if they refuse, we might have to consider their competence in more detail, and 
do more to establish their level of competence, and to consider whether their level of 
competence is sufficient to allow them to refuse treatment.93 
Here, Lawlor is assuming that capacity would not be even assessed if treatment is assented to. 
Although controversial, this is an accurate representation of what often happens.94 But the 
point would stand whether it was not assessed at all, or if it was assessed and held to a lower 
level.  If risk relative capacity is applied, it might be the case that some people who refused 
treatment would be found to lack capacity, and had they accepted, the result would have been 
different. However, this would only be known in retrospect. As long as an application of risk 
relative capacity does just mean that the riskier decision to refuse treatment will be assessed 
against a higher level of capacity, that is, that refusal is not determinative of capacity, risk 
relative capacity ought not to be deceptive.  
2 ‘Asymmetry’ of Risk Relative Capacity is Incoherent 
The more significant objection is that asymmetry of capacity for a particular decision is 
incoherent; that it does not make sense to say that someone has capacity to accept something 
but not to refuse that same thing. Bielby,95 Wicclair, 96 and Culver and Gert97 have all in their 
own words made precisely the following point advanced by John Harris: 
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To give an informed consent you need to understand the nature of the course of action to 
which you are consenting, which, in medical contexts, will include its probable and possible 
consequences and side effects and the nature of any alternative measures which might be 
taken and the consequences of doing nothing. 
So, to understand a proposed treatment well enough to consent to it is to understand the 
consequences of a refusal. And if the consequences of a refusal are understood well enough to 
consent to the alternative then the refusal must also be competent.98  
For Harris, this means that decisional asymmetry is ‘palpable nonsense’.99 Bartlett100 makes 
the same argument, supported by the definition of ‘decision making’ from the Oxford 
Dictionary of Psychology: 
The act or process of choosing a preferred option or course of action from a set of 
alternatives. It precedes and underpins almost all deliberate or voluntary behaviour. 
Therefore, for Bartlett, decisional asymmetry fundamentally misunderstands the nature of 
decision making itself. He argues that by definition, if one is not capable of weighing the 
benefits and burdens of a ‘no’ response, one is also not capable of doing so for a ‘yes’ 
response.101  
Defenders of risk relative capacity have attempted to respond to this criticism by focussing on 
what constitutes the same or different decisions. Charland argues that the decision to refuse 
treatment and the decision to accept treatment are ‘two different particular decisions’, with 
different conditions: different expected consequences, different risks and different benefits.102 
Brock and Wilks have also made the same argument.103 Thus, for them, there is no 
incoherence in decisional asymmetry. However, these arguments have not settled the matter, 
and they have not received widespread support in the literature.104 The acceptance of risk 
relative capacity in case law may suggest that asymmetry would not be considered incoherent 
in that forum; as noted in Chapter 2, asymmetry with regards capacity for medical decisions 
appears to be accepted in obiter dicta by the NSW Supreme Court in Application of a Local 
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Health District; Re a Patient Fay.105 On the other hand, no court has specifically turned its 
attention to the alleged incoherence of decisional asymmetry. In any case, the legitimacy of 
risk relative capacity does not stand or fall on the better semantic interpretation of ‘decision’ 
or ‘decision-making’. Logical arguments can be made either way.  
Resolving this issue requires consideration of the nature of capacity itself. Doing so reveals a 
fundamental problem with those arguments against decisional asymmetry based on alleged 
incoherence. Hidden in all of the arguments against decisional asymmetry is an 
understanding of capacity as an objectively observable cognitive fact about a person.  Both 
Harris and Bartlett are concerned with the level of cognitive function required to make a 
particular decision. They both believe that there will be a level of capacity, or ability, 
observable in a person in relation to a decision, which will either be sufficient to decide yes 
or no, or insufficient to decide yes or no. What is not acknowledged in these arguments is the 
inherent normativity in deciding what level of mental capacity is sufficient. In this way, they 
appear to confuse mental capacity and legal capacity. As described in Part II B, legal capacity 
is informed by observable cognitive facts about the individual (mental capacity), but is 
ultimately a political or ethical judgment, in which normative considerations necessarily play 
a role. There is no natural cut off between sufficient and insufficient mental capacity. Thus, 
the boundary between the two is necessarily determined, in part, by political and ethical 
commitments. Having different thresholds for different decisions, based in part on their risk, 
or any other political or ethical commitment, is no more or less logical than having thresholds 
at all.  
This view of capacity that underpins Bartlett and Harris’ argument is widespread, and often 
associated with the insistence that capacity is a question of function, to the exclusion of status 
and outcome. This same misunderstanding about the nature of capacity features in a major 
dispute about risk relative capacity more generally, which has relevance to the debate over 
the alleged incoherence of decisional symmetry.  
The statements from the courts on risk relative capacity106 have been the subject of scrutiny. 
On their face, they state that a higher level of capacity will be required to make a risky 
decision; therefore, as noted in Chapter 2, on their face they are inconsistent with the notion 
of capacity being normatively neutral. Sometimes riskier decisions will be more cognitively 
demanding, but this will not always be the case. The decision to refuse a lifesaving blood 
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transfusion, for example, might be conceptually straightforward, but very risky. However, a 
number of writers have sought to put a different interpretation on these statements, despite 
their clear meaning. Stewart and Biegler hold that Lord Donaldson MR’s statement is 
‘confusing’, because ‘if a person has the capacity to make a decision, they have that capacity. 
It is a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ proposition’;107 echoing the views of Harris and Bartlett above. Therefore, 
according to Stewart and Biegler: 
[T]he better way to understand Lord Donaldson is interpret this statement as requiring greater 
scrutiny of capacity in cases where the decision is about life-threatening conditions, before 
the patient is accepted as competent or not.108 
Similarly, Wicclair109 and Cale110 reject decisional asymmetry as incoherent, but according to 
Wicclair, both agree: 
[I]t is warranted to require more evidence that a patient has the requisite (task-specific) 
cognitive capacities when a decision is expected to result in substantial harm to the patient 
than when a decision is not expected to have that result111 (emphasis in original). 
Ryan et al also believe that ‘we should be more careful in our assessment of capacity when 
the stakes are high’.112 Their argument is that more weighty and complicated decisions: 
may require that an individual have more cognitive power to meet the (same) thresholds of 
understanding and using and weighing, but it is hard to see how the thresholds themselves 
could change113 (citations removed.) 
This understanding of the necessity of fixed thresholds matches arguments of Harris and 
Bartlett.114   
Requiring greater scrutiny of capacity in cases of high risk is intuitively appealing. It coheres 
with Munby J’s statement (later approved of in the Court of Appeal) that [i]n case of doubt, 
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that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life’,115 a principle that has 
been used to determine best interests,116 validity and applicability of an advance directive,117 
as well as capacity.118 As Donnelly shows, there is ‘epistemic uncertainty’ inherent in 
capacity assessments, because we can never know for sure what is going on in someone 
else’s head.119 Therefore, there will often be doubt in capacity cases. In the context of 
uncertainty, we ought to be more certain that a person understands what they are deciding 
when their decision poses a significant risk to themselves, especially when that person is 
suffering from a mental illness or intellectual disability, for the same reason that we might 
want more certainty as to the applicability of an advance directive, if following the directive 
would end the person’s life. 
The difficulty lies in arguing it is acceptable to have differing levels of scrutiny of capacity 
depending on risk, but unacceptable to have a different level of capacity depending on risk. 
Consider the requirement to seek ‘more evidence’ of or give ‘more scrutiny’ to capacity in 
cases of risky decisions: what would one look for that would not also, at the same time, be 
evidence of a higher level of capacity? As Wilks argues, if he sets an easier exam, he is 
simultaneously lowering the standard needed, and assessing students’ abilities less 
carefully.120 Equally, in the area of medical treatment decisions, a more detailed 
understanding of the treatment offered and the consequences of accepting and refusing the 
treatment, would be simultaneously more evidence of capacity, and indicative of a higher 
level of capacity, as would any of the components of typical capacity assessments.  
Moreover, consider the practical effect of requiring more scrutiny for riskier decisions. This 
closer scrutiny will presumably ‘catch’ some incapacitous people who would have slipped 
through the net without it, otherwise what would its purpose be? Given that refusing medical 
treatment might be seen as a risky decision, this greater scrutiny could lead to decisional 
asymmetry in precisely the same way as a requirement of a higher level of capacity. 
The inconsistency of the position that more scrutiny of capacity is acceptable but a higher 
level is not can be linked with the mistaken belief that capacity should be normatively 
neutral.121 It is a way of supporting formal normative neutrality, while still letting the 
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powerful, unspoken intuition that beneficence does have some role to play in capacity 
assessment in through the back door. The intuitive appeal of greater scrutiny for risky 
decisions is that which supports risk relative capacity itself. We want to allow people to 
decide for themselves, but when a person is making a self-destructive decision, and we think 
they might be affected by a mental impairment, we do not want to unquestioningly and 
automatically accede to this wish. In other words, we are attempting to balance autonomy and 
beneficence.  
The argument in this Part does not mean that all things considered, decisional asymmetry is 
acceptable, it simply means that it is not incoherent. 
3 Arguments in Favour of Risk Relative Capacity  
(a) Allows Important and Unimportant Decisions to Be Distinguished in a 
Sensible Manner 
Consider the consequences of removing risk relative capacity from capacity assessments. 
This would mean that the ‘sufficient’ level of mental capacity would be the same for all 
decisions, the only adjustments would be for complexity of decision. There are some 
everyday decisions that people make which have very low risk, and may not be considered 
difficult decisions, but if considered fully, are very complex. For example, consider the 
decision of whether to take a paracetamol tablet for a headache. While not a particularly 
difficult question, whether or not to have a headache tablet could be a complex one, 
depending on the circumstances. In fact, in terms of complexity, it might be equivalent to the 
decision as to whether to participate in an experimental treatment with unknown side effects. 
But most would consider treating these two as requiring equal understanding as absurd, and 
the underlying reason for this is that taking a headache tablet is a less risky decision. Risk 
relative capacity allows these decisions to be distinguished in a sensible manner.  
Consider the case of LJM,122 discussed above in Part II B, in which the adult was described 
as having a ‘rudimentary’ understanding of an enduring power of attorney, and was able to 
say ‘to have her sister look after her money and look after her’.123 Recall that the Tribunal 
found that she did not have capacity to make that decision. Clearly, she did understand the 
nature and effect of her actions to some extent, as this characterisation of the general nature 
of an enduring power of attorney is accurate. But handing control of one’s finances to another 
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person is a weighty, risky decision, and it is appropriate to require a high level of 
understanding in order to say that a person has legal capacity to make it. However, this 
‘rudimentary’ level of understanding might have been sufficient to make a less risky decision, 
like opening a bank account.  
(b) Risk Relative Capacity Can Be Used as a Tool for Patient Empowerment 
A second substantive argument in favour of risk relative capacity involves a richer and more 
accurate conception of risk. Understood more fully, risk relative capacity can actually be a 
tool to limit the influence of doctors in decision making. Discussion on decisional asymmetry 
in the literature seems to assume that when applying risk relative capacity, refusing medical 
treatment will automatically be seen as a riskier decision. Therefore, this principle in the 
determination of capacity could just be seen as a straightforward application of medical 
paternalism. But this should not be the case. From the beginning, those advancing risk 
relativity argued that the relevant risk was not simply a factor of how medically important the 
procedure being decided on was considered to be, even if doctors might be tempted to see it 
that way. Buchanan and Brock, early and major proponents of risk relative capacity, argued 
that the level of competence should vary not just by a narrow measure of risk, but according 
to the ‘net balance of expected benefits and risks of the patient's choice in comparison with 
other alternatives’.124 Therefore, there is more than one variable. Moreover, it is not 
unidirectional; it does not just involve raising the required level of capacity for riskier 
decisions, it also involves lowering it for less risky ones. In this way, there are many potential 
factors that could actually go towards a finding of capacity for people who have refused 
medical treatment.  
Firstly, the risk of not having medical treatment depends very much on the evidence of the 
effectiveness of treatment, and it has been pointed out many times that commonly provided 
treatments do not always have a strong evidence base for their effectiveness compared to 
doing nothing.125 This data can be adduced and considered when determining capacity to 
refuse that treatment. Moreover, the risks in a medical treatment decision will rarely be in one 
direction. For C (who had a gangrenous foot), his proposed treatment involved not just a risk, 
but a certainty that he would lose his foot.126 Many treatments, especially those for 
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psychiatric disorders, involve serious side-effects. Treatments also vary according to 
invasiveness. Proper consideration of these factors may have the effect of lowering the level 
of understanding of a decision needed to refuse the treatment.  
This proper consideration requires not just weighing the negative effects of treatment in the 
abstract, but, in the case of a treatment refusal, in the specific context of its being coerced, as 
this is the actual potential ‘risk’ of a finding of incapacity for medical treatment decisions. It 
must be remembered that risk is both objective and subjective, and the violation that coerced 
treatment represents can be particularly damaging to certain people. Equally, being able to 
decide for oneself is almost always of benefit to a person, some even more so than others. 
Therefore, a proper use of risk relative capacity requires discussion with the adult, to 
determine what is risky for them. Evidence of risk can be provided by treating doctors, but it 
is essential that this is not the only source of that evidence. Evidence from the adult must also 
be considered.  
It will be seen that these factors are highly relevant in the case of anorexia, as there are 
doubts over the long term efficacy of forced treatment, and the invasiveness of the treatment 
is very high.127  
None of the cases that affirm risk relative capacity have discussed the richer concept of risk 
discussed here; seemingly the only consideration in the minds of judges in those cases has 
been seriousness of the risk of death associated with refusing life-saving treatments.128 
Therefore, judges have not overtly considered the other variables, in particular, the risks 
associated with providing unwanted medical treatment, in their determination of capacity. 
However, those risks are frequently considered after it has been decided that the adult lacks 
capacity, in the context of a substitute decision made under section 4 of the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (EW) in the patient’s ‘best interests’.129 Bringing these considerations into the step 
of determining capacity ought to have the effect of raising the number of people who will be 
found to have capacity to refuse treatment.  
Although accepted in case law, risk relative capacity has not been incorporated into any 
capacity legislation, and there is a question as to the appropriateness of doing this, even for 
those who accept its legitimacy. People see a danger that it will simply formally entrench the 
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status quo, wherein doctors’ opinions on the ‘right’ outcome are inevitably given effect to.130 
However, as this Part has shown, this should not be the outcome of a proper application of 
risk relative capacity. If risk relative capacity were to be legislated, it would have to be made 
clear that risk is not unidirectional, and is not a factor which necessarily increased when 
treatment was refused. It would have to be made clear that a proper determination of risk 
requires discussion with the adult in order to ascertain the subjective elements of risk. Finally, 
it must also be clear that this complex weighing up only adjusts the level of mental capacity 
required to be considered to have legal capacity, it does not determine legal capacity.  
If this is done properly, requiring doctors to actually consider and demonstrate the risks of 
refusing treatment might even be an impetus for a more meaningful consideration of the 
actual evidence in favour of treatment, and the option of no treatment. 
 
C Use of Outcomes: Conclusion  
Case law and legislation state that bad outcomes do not determine capacity, but they have not 
stated that bad outcomes are irrelevant to capacity. The conclusion of this Chapter is that this 
is a desirable position. It is submitted that the illiberalism of its being more likely for certain 
decisions to be associated with a finding of incapacity is an inevitable consequence of having 
a test which assesses decision making. In order to argue against this, one has to argue against 
the existence of the test of capacity itself.  
Accepting a role for outcomes in capacity assessment requires acknowledging the real danger 
that the capacity can be simply a legal instrument by which medical opinions are enforced at 
the expense of the autonomy of people with disabilities. How this danger is managed in 
practice is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, clearly it must involve training for the 
parties involved in capacity assessment. Ultimately, it is hoped that the nuance that outcomes 
are relevant to capacity, but not determinative of capacity, is one to which trained 
professionals can give effect. Secondly, it must involve close, careful and ongoing 
engagement with the decision maker him or herself, to make sure that assessors are fully 
incorporating his or her subjectivity into the functional assessment.  
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    STATUS  
A Mental Illness as Part of Capacity Assessment 
The test of capacity as set out in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) has a ‘diagnostic 
threshold’; the functional definition is contingent on there being a mental impairment, which 
in most cases will be a named mental illness, or intellectual disability. This means that there 
is a role for ‘status’ in capacity law; not as determinative, but as an element of incapacity. As 
noted above, despite this clear role for status it is common for the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(EW) test of capacity to be described as simply functional.131 The diagnostic threshold is not 
present in all Australian jurisdictions, however even in states where it is completely absent, 
courts/tribunals look for a mental impairment as a ‘cause’ of deficits in mental capacity 
before finding legal incapacity.132 
The main justification for the diagnostic threshold is that it is an additional delimiter of the 
boundary of when it is appropriate for the state assume a role in decision making for a person. 
One of the most salient responses to calls to remove the diagnostic threshold is that doing so 
would compromise hard won rights in other areas.133 If the diagnostic threshold was removed 
from the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW), capacity could be lost for a person making a 
decision when they could not adequately perform one of the decision-making abilities set out 
in section 3(1). This would widen the scope of the Act to virtually every member of the 
population, who at some time or other would have a deficiency in understanding or use 
information for a particular decision.134 
The association between ‘impairment’ and incapacity was affirmed in England and Wales 
Court of Appeal case of York City Council v C,135 which held that there must be a causal 
relationship between the impairment/disturbance in functioning and the inability to make a 
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decision, rejecting the trial judge’s use of the less direct language of ‘referable to’ or 
‘significantly relates to’. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) Code of Practice gives the 
following examples of impairments: 
• conditions associated with some forms of mental illness; 
• dementia;  
• significant learning disabilities;  
• the long-term effects of brain damage;  
• physical or medical conditions that cause confusion, drowsiness or loss of 
consciousness;  
• delirium;  
• concussion following a head injury; and  
• the symptoms of alcohol or drug use.136 
It has already been pointed out in Chapter 2 that mental illness is not normatively neutral.137 
As the makers of the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual write, designations of certain patterns 
and behaviours as mental illnesses are made ‘primarily designed to assist clinicians in 
conducting clinical assessment, case formulation and treatment planning’.138 Therefore, by 
having it as an element of the capacity assessment, an element of beneficence is introduced 
into the test. As described in Part III on outcomes, the substance of the debate over the role of 
status in capacity assessment therefore overlaps with the question of whether there is a proper 
role for beneficence in the capacity assessment. However, again, it is important to address the 
specific arguments made for and against the use of status, especially because the element of 
medical diagnosis in capacity determination is considered particularly troubling. For many 
disability advocates, it is a straightforward granting of power to doctors at the direct expense 
of the autonomy of people with disabilities. This criticism is weighty, and has many 
elements. 
1  Is Mental Illness Real? 
An initial issue that must be dealt with briefly is the issue of whether mental illnesses have 
basic conceptual legitimacy. Especially since Foucault’s critique of Western society’s 
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construction of ‘madness’, there has been much high-level philosophical discussion about 
whether the designations of mental illness have an actual ‘referent’, 139 and how these 
designations take their place in power relations between the state and the individual.140 There 
is also continuing debate over the reality of mental illnesses at a more concrete level, which is 
often tied to arguments over the appropriateness of its position in the legal system. Matthews 
questions the legitimacy of status in capacity assessment on the basis that it is not possible to 
neatly distinguish between those who have an illness and those who do not.141 Similarly, 
Mellsop and Diesfeld142 argue that ‘psychiatric classificatory systems’ are inappropriate in 
this legal setting due to the arbitrariness and uncertainty of diagnoses. They point out that the 
way some mental illnesses are classified by a ‘menu approach’143 means that two people 
could be classified as having the same mental illness, without sharing any symptoms; or that 
one person could fit into several categories of mental illness. Another feature of psychiatric 
classification that is taken to undermine its legitimacy is that the boundaries, as determined 
by the writers of the classification manuals, are shifting. In every new version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistics Manual, there will be new diagnoses, other diagnoses merged 
together, and others removed entirely. These features, it is argued, makes diagnosis an 
inappropriate feature on which to base a determination of a person’s legal rights.144 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to engage deeply in the debate about the ontological reality 
of mental illness itself. However, it should be noted that strong counterarguments to those 
presented above do exist. The most important one is that the fact that diagnoses are 
contingent and imprecise does not mean that they are not useful or meaningful in the 
treatment and understanding of people who suffer mental distress. As Parker points out, the 
authors of the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual openly acknowledge that their classifications 
reflect the current consensus on an evolving field of knowledge.145 Certainly, the contingency 
of diagnoses means that the psychiatric classifications will evolve, and might be substantially 
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different again in 50 years’ time. However, there are many studies which show the efficacy of 
treatments for particular mental illnesses. Moreover, there is a very large amount of medical 
research that has been devoted to the causes, effects and treatments for specific mental 
illnesses. Indeed, there are entire journals devoted to certain categories of mental illness.146 
The decision as to whether certain patterns of thoughts and behaviours (e.g. substance 
addictions) should be classified as a mental disorder or not is the subject of intense ongoing 
debate,147 as is the deeper question of the proper basis for making this determination. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it will be assumed that mental illness has sufficient reality to 
support specific laws directed at helping people experiencing it.   
2 Mental Illness and Normatively Neutrality 
Another source of criticism of the diagnostic threshold is the idea that because mental 
illnesses are not normatively neutral, they are inappropriate to be considered within the 
capacity test. Accounts of how the effects of mental illness might be represented in capacity 
tests in a normatively neutral way have been given, but Freyenhagen and O’Shea148 
demonstrate that those tests in reality fail to capture many aspects of known mental illnesses. 
As has been acknowledged in Chapter 2, mental illness is an unavoidably normative 
designation. To some extent, it is contingent on societal values, and of understandings of 
‘normality’. This point is underlined by the previous inclusion of homosexuality as a mental 
illness in the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual.149 It has already been argued that normative 
neutrality is not an appropriate goal for capacity, and if that argument is accepted, this 
criticism is prima facie misplaced. Nevertheless, it must be considered on its own terms. 
This criticism may have affected the way the definition of capacity has developed in the law. 
As discussed in Part II, normativity in the test for capacity sits uneasily with the dominant, 
autonomy-focussed liberal discourse. Charland believes that one way the law has tried to 
‘define away’ the normative nature of legal capacity is to describe capacity purely on 
cognitive grounds.150 In recent years, there has been much consideration of this alleged 
cognitive focus of the capacity test. Many have expressed concerns about how the narrow 
focus on understanding, retaining and using information does not capture the autonomy-
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undermining effects of mental illness;151 for example, the impact of these illnesses on beliefs, 
values and emotions.152  
The functional definition of capacity more straightforwardly captures cognitive impairments, 
like those associated with dementia or acquired brain injury. However, the diagnostic 
threshold requires difficulties in decision making to be caused by an impairment. Mental 
illnesses are accepted as impairments that meet the diagnostic threshold, and many mental 
illnesses are primarily understood as affecting a person’s beliefs, values and emotions.153 
Therefore, it appears that the law of capacity must contemplate this broader concept of 
impairment.  The ‘original’ impairment in Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment),154 from which 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) definition comes, was not an intellectual disability, but 
schizophrenia. In that case, Thorpe J seemed to be concerned about C’s beliefs, and their 
impact on his decision-making process.155 Further, as Richardson notes, assessment of the 
case law shows that courts have not in fact been restrained in their application of the test of 
capacity to only consider cognitive impairments.156 The ‘use or weigh’ criterion has 
consistently been used to consider those autonomy-undermining ‘effects’ of mental 
illnesses.157  
Therefore, concerns that the test of capacity does not capture certain normative effects of 
mental illness appear to be unfounded. On the other hand, the argument against the use of 
mental illness as a basis for incapacity because of its normativity is grounded in an accurate 
understanding of the law of capacity.  
The strongest argument against this concern focusses on the overall justification for capacity 
law. It was argued in Part II that capacity is a necessarily normatively active test. As was 
demonstrated in that Part, even identifying incapacity on the basis of cognitive impairment 
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requires some normativity in deciding the cut off between sufficient and insufficient mental 
capacity.158 Therefore, removing normativity from capacity assessments means removing the 
test of capacity itself from the legal system, and although some do argue for this,159 an 
ongoing role for capacity is accepted by the mainstream.160  
As has been explained above,161 resting the regime of capacity law solely on the good of 
autonomy is problematic. Nevertheless, it remains the case that there is a connection between 
the goal of value neutrality in capacity law, and the liberal endorsement of autonomy as the 
proper guiding principle in capacity assessments. While designation of mental illnesses is 
normative, it seems clear that some people suffering some illnesses do have significant 
interference with their autonomy.162 Even though autonomy is contingent and disputed, most 
would agree that, in the words of Baroness Hale, ‘mental disorder may rob a person of free 
will’.163 Many have written compellingly on the specific issue of how mental illnesses can 
undermine autonomy.164 Craigie discusses issues of ‘diachronic consistency’ associated with 
mental illness, and argues convincingly that this attribute is relevant to questions of autonomy 
and capacity.165  Mental illnesses can be ‘ego-dystonic’, in that the sufferer experiences the 
illness as something separate from themselves, which causes them to think and feel other than 
they would have without it.166 For example, this is the case for some people with anorexia.167 
In these circumstances, concern for autonomy is the central (although not sole) justification 
for substitute decision making.  
The extent to which capacity is coextensive with autonomy is a matter for debate, and may 
vary on a case by case basis. Not all illnesses are experienced as ego-dystonic, some are ego-
syntonic, in which what others identify as an illness is considered by the person experiencing 
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it as part of his or her self.168 Moreover, as pointed out above,169 the justification for deciding 
that someone’s autonomy is in peril, and authorising substitute decision making in response, 
must itself rest on a balance between beneficence and autonomy.  
Nevertheless, what this shows is that even when pursuing the liberal goal of autonomy, 
situations will arise where concern for autonomy will create the ethical impetus for 
overriding a person’s decisions. Given that concern for autonomy underlies the goal of value 
neutrality, arguments against the diagnostic threshold that rest on the goal of value neutrality 
must at some point run into a significant inconsistency.  
3 Incapacity by Diagnosis 
One of the weightiest criticisms of using mental illness in the determination of capacity is 
that it leads to people being found to lack capacity simply on the basis of their diagnosis. The 
focus of this Chapter is on mental illness, but it was pointed out above that the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (EW) Code of Practice admits a number of different ‘impairments’, 
including the ‘long-term effects of brain damage’.170 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires 
capacity assessors to decide whether someone’s lack of ability to understand, retain and use 
information was caused by an impairment. But the problems in cognition that would 
constitute the ‘effects of brain damage’ would overlap with the inability to ‘use or weigh’ 
information according to the functional definition of capacity. Finding that the incapacity was 
‘caused by’ the impairment begs the question. This issue was apparent in some of the cases 
from the study set. For example: For example, in CJP,171 the tribunal ‘accepts the evidence’ 
from the medical reports that ‘CJP has a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease which has resulted 
in a major cognitive impairment.’172 Alzheimer’s disease is diagnosed, in part, by the 
existence of a cognitive impairment,173 so to say the latter has resulted from the former is not 
logically coherent. Given the lack of a diagnostic threshold in the Queensland legislation, this 
reasoning was not necessary, but under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 definition decision 
makers are required to apply this circularity of logic. 
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The same problem exists for mental illness when the attitude to treatment that motivates a 
treatment refusal is considered to be a symptom of the illness. Finding that the illness caused 
the refusal, again, is circular. Conceiving capacity in this way seems to condemn people 
diagnosed with particular illnesses to be by definition lacking capacity to refuse treatment for 
their conditions.174 Anorexia is often singled out as demonstrative of the problem, and this 
will be discussed in detail in the next Chapter; however, it is an issue for other mental 
illnesses as well, such as depression,175 and illnesses like schizophrenia, for which delusions 
are among the diagnostic criteria.176 If particular problems with decision making are seen as 
constitutive of a mental illness, then being diagnosed with that illness seems to condemn the 
sufferer to incapacity for particular types of decisions before any functional assessment of 
their decision making has been performed. 
The logical circularity of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) capacity definition is arguably 
a weakness of the test that ought to be addressed. But this issue of logic is not just confined to 
the law, it covers our entire discourse relating to mental illness. It is common, even in the 
medical discussion of mental illness, to talk about an illness’ ‘effects’, when what is being 
described is diagnostic criteria, for example schizophrenia ‘causing’ a sufferer to hear voices 
in their head. It may be that our language regarding mental illness will evolve. Perhaps, in the 
future, law makers will consider a more defensible construction like ‘associated with’, which 
on the surface will deal with the logic issue. However, even if this change were made, it is 
difficult to see how practice would be any different; if an assessor were looking for problems 
in decision-making, and an illness was partly defined by problems in decision making, then 
the issue of creating incapacity by definition would still exist.  
One response to this larger problem is to say that any capacity assessment that does equate a 
particular mental illness with incapacity would be incorrect from a legal perspective.177 The 
diagnostic threshold is just one threshold; incapacity must be identified by a consideration of 
the person’s mental capacity assessed on a functional basis. The central part of the test of 
capacity is the functional assessment, and this cannot be bypassed.178 Case law has affirmed 
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that diagnosis does not determine capacity, and deciding the functional capacity is an 
independent step from the question of whether the impairment ‘caused’ the incapacity.179  
However, a court may say it is not basing the capacity assessment on a diagnosis, but when 
the legislation requires it to find that any deficit in function is because of an impairment, and 
that impairment is itself understood to interfere with certain decision making, then such 
assurances might not be convincing. It has already been pointed out that courts have had no 
trouble getting around the alleged problem of the capacity definition being directed at 
cognition, and not at the ‘effects’ of mental illness.180  
One way decision makers avoid the very real danger that arises of incapacity by diagnosis is 
to focus on the growing study of decision making in the contexts of specific mental 
impairments. This is an evolving field with many different sites of research, but over the last 
decade, Gareth Owen and colleagues in particular have looked at patterns of decision making 
in the contexts of different mental impairments.181 For example, in a study of patients 
suffering depression of different intensities, Owen et al investigated the role of temporal 
awareness in decision making.182 Previous studies had shown that people suffering 
depression suffer difficulties in this area; Fuchs argued that those suffering severe depression 
can experience ‘a complete desynchronization or uncoupling from intersubjective time’.183 
Owen et al’s study looked more closely at this issue. They identify four temporal components 
of decision making, arguing that at least the first three are essential for decision making 
capacity: 
1. In the context of deliberation, I encounter the future as ‘open,’ as ‘yet-to-be-
determined’ or ‘yet-to-be-realised.’ [..] 
2. I experience my present task of deliberation and choice as shaping the future: What I 
decide now has the potential to determine which among those possible futures is 
realised. [..] 
3. Among the various different possible futures that may (or may not) be realised, I 
recognise significant normative differences: Some are better/worse than others, along 
various dimensions of normative difference. [..] 
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4. When it is deliberatively necessary to do so I can imagine different future scenarios in 
some degree of detail. [..] 
In this study, Owen et al give examples of severely depressed patients whose statements in 
interviews reveal an absence of these abilities for specific decisions. While patients 
demonstrated these abilities in relation to smaller, more immediate questions, like whether or 
not to continue participating in the research, in relation to longer term issues, like whether to 
continue or commence treatment, or where they would be in a year’s time, these abilities 
were lacking. In other studies, Owen has similarly investigated the specific relationships 
between disorder and decision-making capacity in Acquired Brain Injury,184 Bipolar 
Affective Disorder185 and schizophrenia.186 Expert medical evidence is routinely sought when 
courts determine capacity; from cases in the data set in Chapter 2, over the three jurisdictions, 
98 per cent of cases used medical evidence in some form.187 The type of medical information 
being explored by Owen et al seems particularly pertinent. Importantly, what it elicits is not, 
for instance, that depression causes certain problems in decision making, but that depression 
is associated with these patterns in decision making. The research reveals the patterns, but 
also the variation within the affected population. Owen et al also show how some patients, 
also suffering from depression, did not experience a lack of those temporal abilities. 
Moreover, as noted, the researchers found that while they may have been missing for some 
decisions in some patients, the same patients retained those abilities in relation to other 
decisions.  Therefore, used properly, this information simply alerts an assessor to the specific 
risk factors associated with a condition that ought to be considered when deciding capacity, 
but crucially, it does not create an equivalence between the condition and incapacity.  
The second way that the problem of incapacity by diagnosis can be avoided is ensuring that 
assessments of capacity are done of the individual, not of the category of people. The 
suggestion presented above in response to the dangers of having an element of ‘outcome’ in 
capacity assessment—making sure that the subjective views and experience of the individual 
decision maker are determined and included in the capacity assessment188—is also relevant 
here. This requires talking to the person who is making the decision, and investigating the 
specific decision making patterns they exhibit. Determinations of capacity must be made only 
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in reference to these patterns specific to the adult, not to the broader patterns of decision 
making visible across the population experiencing the disorder. 
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the problem of equating mental illness with 
incapacity like this is not one to be taken lightly. Even relatively recently, it was presumed 
that the presence of a serious mental illness meant that the sufferer lacked capacity to consent 
to treatment,189 and this automatic association will be difficult to overcome. Moreover, the 
more closely the illness is associated with particular problems in decision making, the more 
difficult it will be to avoid equating that illness with incapacity.190 It will be seen in Chapter 6 
that this is a particular challenge for anorexia.  
4 Discrimination 
As noted above, the Committee of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
argues that compliance with the convention requires the current test of legal capacity and the 
associated regime of substitute decision making to be abolished.191 Its primary reason for this 
is that the role of capacity in the law is discriminatory:  
[Legal capacity] acquires a special significance for persons with disabilities when they have 
to make fundamental decisions regarding their health, education and work. The denial of legal 
capacity to persons with disabilities has, in many cases, led to their being deprived of many 
fundamental rights, including the right to vote, the right to marry and found a family, 
reproductive rights, parental rights, the right to give consent for intimate relationships and 
medical treatment, and the right to liberty.192 
Therefore: 
[A] person’s status as a person with a disability or the existence of an impairment (including a 
physical or sensory impairment) must never be grounds for denying legal capacity or any of 
the rights provided for in article 12. All practices that in purpose or effect violate article 12 
must be abolished in order to ensure that full legal capacity is restored to persons with 
disabilities on an equal basis with others.193 
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The Committee’s views on the requirements of the Convention are controversial, but they do 
have support in the literature,194 and as the official arbiter of the Convention its 
pronouncements are important. For those supporting this position, capacity law cannot be 
remedied simply by removing the diagnostic threshold, because this would simply replace 
direct discrimination with indirect discrimination.195 Such a position is consistent; it is 
difficult to see how a purely functional test of capacity would avoid its being more likely for 
someone with a mental disability to ‘fail’ than someone without a mental disability. 
This argument regarding discrimination has had obvious impact, even amongst those who do 
see a legitimate ongoing role for capacity in the law. The Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, when reviewing Queensland’s guardianship laws, received a number of 
submissions arguing for a functional definition of capacity, but with a role for status in the 
form of a ‘diagnostic threshold’, as per the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW).196 In deciding to 
keep ‘status’ out of the Queensland law, despite the diagnostic threshold being the 
predominant model, the Commission said:  
A status approach to defining capacity is incompatible with the principle of maximising the 
adult’s autonomy in decision-making. It would also violate the adult’s right to freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds of disability.197 
While disagreeing with the Committee of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities on the need to abandon capacity laws altogether, the Essex Autonomy Project 
argues that the Convention requires the removal of the diagnostic threshold due to its 
disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities.198  
The discrimination critique is often made by highlighting the fact that people with certain 
religious beliefs have unusual decisions based on their religious views ‘respected’ whereas 
people with mental illnesses do not. John Coggon199 reflects a common scepticism with 
how mental illness is separated out: 
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Existing law tells us that a logical decision based on a deeply held religious belief against 
receiving blood transfusions will be upheld. A similar decision based on an individual 
belief that blood is evil will be ignored. A refusal of food based on a patient’s suffering 
anorexia nervosa, or some other psychiatric condition, can be ignored, though if such a 
refusal is founded on other values it may be respected. And going through decided cases, 
this sort of list would go on. In undertaking such an exercise, it is not obvious that a sound, 
guiding rationale could describe, or help predict, where the line between capacity and 
incapacity will be drawn200 (citations removed, emphasis added.) 
Kirk and Bersoff argue that the only justification for differentiating between the two is that: 
[O]ur society tolerates interference with the liberty of persons with mental illness whereas it 
does not tolerate interference with religious beliefs, even when the religious beliefs are 
entirely without objective support201 (emphasis in original). 
To many, differentiating between the effects of an illness and unusual beliefs is 
discriminatory, and therefore evidence of the inappropriateness of the diagnostic threshold.  
The discrimination issue essentially turns on whether the operation of capacity law is 
beneficial or not. The central underlying premise of the argument from discrimination is that 
a finding of incapacity, and the possibility of forced medical treatment, is adverse. This is 
very understandable; viewed in isolation, losing one’s legal capacity to do something can 
straightforwardly be characterised as negative. However, as has been shown in this Chapter, 
beneficence has an underlying role in capacity law. The ‘intent’ of beneficence is better 
outcomes for the subject. Although there is understandable scepticism on this, if better 
outcomes were in fact achieved, then the discrimination issue may not apply. This is because 
differential treatment for people with disabilities that is positive, for example, additional 
funds provided to cover medical costs, is not properly characterised discriminatory.202 
Here we enter a highly normative, political debate. For some, the denial of legal agency 
involved in a finding of incapacity is by definition negative, and cannot be overcome by 
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counterbalancing goods.203 However, an argument against a purely negative characterisation 
of capacity law comes from evidence presented to a Select Committee of the House of Lords, 
which performed post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW).204 Several 
submissions to the Committee described how local authorities had stopped providing services 
to vulnerable people who had refused social care, ostensibly using the presumption of 
capacity (without assessing their capacity), but for the actual purpose of saving money. This 
had negative consequences for those people, and according to Kirsty Keywood, had led to 
some deaths in terrible circumstances.205 There is a realistic chance that these people would 
have been found to lack capacity had it been assessed. Such a finding could have led to 
substitute decisions that would have kept them alive. On this there will unavoidably be 
disagreement, but it is the researcher’s view that this result would have been normatively 
better. Of course, even if one agrees with this view, it only demonstrates that a normatively 
better outcome is possible, it does not demonstrate that it will always be the case.206 
Nevertheless, it is an important counterpoint to the discrimination argument. 
There is another argument against the discrimination criticism based on the interaction with 
other human rights law. In Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust,207 the Supreme 
Court (UK) found that a psychiatric facility had breached Melanie Rabone’s right to life 
under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to prevent her from 
leaving the facility for the weekend. Rabone was a voluntary patient, and her capacity had not 
been assessed. She suffered from depression, and had attempted suicide in the past. She asked 
to leave, and not being an involuntary patient, the facility assented. She committed suicide 
the next day. The Supreme Court found that the facility had breached Rabone’s right to life 
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because even though she was a voluntary patient, she was vulnerable, and the facility could 
have, if it had decided to, invoked mental health legislation in order to involuntarily detain 
her on the basis that she was a danger to herself. Capacity law was not relevant in the 
judgment. However, the fact that the facility was found to have breached her right to life by 
not involuntarily detaining her has significant implications for arguments regarding capacity 
law.208 The mental health law that the Supreme Court found the facility ought to have used is, 
like capacity law, based on ‘status’, in that only a person with a ‘mental disorder’209 may be 
detained. Such laws are seen by proponents of the criticism discussed in this Part as 
discriminatory, in the same way and for the same reasons that apply to capacity law. The 
precisely same theoretical and practical issue pertains whether the option considered by the 
facility was detention under the Mental Health Act 1983, or a finding of incapacity under the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, followed by a best interests substitute decision. If, as has been 
argued,210 mental health law is reformed so that it is based on capacity rather than risk, the 
legal issue will also be precisely the same. In any case, unless Rabone v Pennine Care NHS 
Foundation Trust is overturned, medical facilities may face situations in which they have to 
choose between performing what critics of the diagnostic threshold describe as 
discrimination, or what the Supreme Court believes to be a breach of a person’s most 
fundamental human right. It is difficult to coherently maintain that protecting a person’s right 
to life is genuinely discriminatory.  
 
B Use of Status: Conclusion and Recommendation 
This Part has identified a significant danger in the use of the diagnostic threshold in capacity 
assessments: that people with certain mental illnesses will be seen as by definition incapable 
of making certain decisions, including refusing treatment for their illness. However, this Part 
also identified a significant danger in abandoning the diagnostic threshold. As mentioned 
above, arguing for the retention of a test of capacity, but the removal of the diagnostic 
threshold, means that anyone found to lack a decision-making ability could have their 
capacity for that decision removed.211 This could apply to any person, for any decision, at any 
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time.212 On the other hand, in order to remove direct and indirect discrimination from 
capacity law (if one considers capacity law discriminatory), it would be necessary to not just 
remove the diagnostic threshold, but to abandon capacity law itself. Of course, many argue 
that this is the correct course of action. However, there would at very least need to be 
significantly more consultation and debate before such a dramatic step should be taken. 
In this regard it is important to note that in Queensland, actual judicial decision making has 
carried on with the diagnostic threshold, despite its de jure absence. As shown in Chapter 3, 
95 per cent of guardianship and administration decisions specifically name a diagnosis in 
their decision,213 and often discuss the effects of that impairment on decision making. For 
example, in NMR,214 the tribunal accepted a report from a GP stating the adult had an 
intellectual impairment and schizophrenia, and that ‘[t]hese conditions have affected NMR’s 
cognitive functioning limiting his ability to just making simple decisions’.215 Interestingly, as 
well as dropping the diagnostic threshold, the Queensland legislation is also distinct in that it 
includes a requirement to be able to decide ‘freely and voluntarily’. This was intended to 
capture the role of undue influence,216 present in other jurisdictions, but not as an element of 
capacity.217 In Aziz v Prestige Property Services, the case from the study set that spends most 
time on the issue of capacity, Lyons J when considering the ‘freely and voluntarily’ issue, 
considers the effects of Aziz’s psychiatric impairment and states: 
[D]ue to the level of the plaintiff’s psychological distress at the time of the mediation and in 
the period up to 9 February 2006, he could not freely and voluntarily make decisions about 
his claim218 
Thus, the Supreme Court has used what was supposed to be a protection against outside 
personal influence to cover the ‘influence’ of mental impairment, and in so doing 
reintroduces the diagnostic threshold in a different form. There is no prohibition on this 
approach on the face of the law, although it does seem to avoid the intention of the 
legislation. The root of this dissonance is the powerful intuition that despite the criticisms 
discussed here, the diagnostic threshold is a vital step, both in properly identifying when 
autonomy is under threat, and in delineating the boundaries of when substitute decision 
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making is appropriate. Although it involves clear dangers, the diagnostic threshold is a 
necessary feature of capacity law. 
 CONCLUSION: STATUS, FUNCTION AND OUTCOME 
Balancing autonomy and beneficence in an appropriate manner is a significant, ongoing 
challenge for the law of capacity. In addition to ‘function’, it requires an ongoing role for 
‘status’ and ‘outcome’, roles that carry the danger of beneficence having a larger role in 
capacity assessments than is appropriate. In order to successfully manage the relationship 
between these different roles, the following conclusions are made:  
1. When assessing capacity in the context of a decision characterised as ‘poor/unwise’, 
courts should give full and careful attention to the views, attitudes held and reasons 
given by the decision maker. Ideally, courts should talk directly with the adult in this 
regard, but if this is not possible, they should at least seek evidence of these factors, 
and use them to help make the assessment of functional capacity; 
2. While retaining the diagnostic threshold, courts should avoid letting the presence of 
mental illness be determinative of capacity. In doing so, they should ensure that the 
focus remains on the individual and his or her decision making; 
3. Courts should apply a rich understanding of risk when applying risk relative capacity. 
This means considering the risks and benefits of the decision compared to alternatives 
when determining the level of sufficiency of mental capacity; giving full and careful 
consideration to the subjective views of the decision maker in this determination, and 
in this regard making sure to fully weigh up the dis-benefit of having one’s capacity 
removed. However, courts should not let this complex calculation be determinative of 
capacity. 
Capacity law need not change for these recommendations to be given effect; each flows from 
a proper, coherent consideration of current legislation or case law. However, none of these is 
to be found specifically spelt out in any law or official guidance. Therefore, it is argued that 
these steps should be formally set out, whether in legislation, case law, or a code of practice 
associated with capacity legislation.  
All of the conclusions of this Chapter have been developed at a general level, and are 
applicable to any determination of capacity for medical treatment decisions. In the following 
Chapter, the way that these conclusions affect the specific situation of anorexia will be 
considered. 
165 
 
Chapter 6: How Should the Law Determine Capacity to 
Refuse Treatment for Anorexia? 
 
   INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explain how legal capacity to refuse treatment in the case of 
anorexia should be determined. The goal is to provide an answer to this question that 
convincingly deals with the specific issues presented by anorexia.  
Chapter 1 described the current medical understanding of anorexia. It showed that it is a 
particularly problematic mental illness, for a number of reasons. The effects of starvation on 
the body are pervasive, and of all recognised mental illnesses, it has the highest death rate. 
While there have been some advances in understanding the vulnerabilities to anorexia, like 
many mental illnesses, the underlying causes are not well understood, and there is no 
agreement on what is the most effective treatment. There is a subset of people with anorexia 
whose experience of the illness is acute, treatment resistant and long lasting; recently this 
collection of characteristics has been described as ‘severe and enduring anorexia’.  
It was argued in the Introduction that it would be undesirable to require the law to change to 
deal with anorexia.1 This Chapter will not make any recommendations that are inconsistent 
with the explication of capacity law developed in Chapter 5. The solutions presented here 
acknowledge that anorexia is a particularly difficult case, but it is not so fundamentally 
distinct that a different test is necessary. Therefore, the conclusions of this chapter, while 
directed at the issue of anorexia, will have wider application. 
This Chapter will first explain the general challenges anorexia presents to capacity law. It 
will then critically assess legal decision making in this area, and identify specific problems 
that reveals. Then, considering those challenges, and incorporating the conclusions developed 
in Chapter 5, the primary question of this thesis will be addressed.  
 
   CHALLENGES ANOREXIA PRESENTS TO CAPACITY LAW 
Anorexia presents a serious practical and theoretical challenge for those assessing the 
capacity of a person with that diagnosis who is refusing treatment. It has been described as 
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the ‘hard case’ of capacity law, for good reason. This is revealed by considering how the 
conclusions made in Chapter 5 apply to anorexia. These conclusions were: 
1. When assessing capacity in the context of a decision characterised as ‘poor/unwise’, 
courts should give full and careful attention to the views, attitudes held and reasons 
given by the decision maker. Ideally, courts should talk directly with the adult in this 
regard, but if this is not possible, they should at least seek evidence of these factors, 
and use them to help make the assessment of functional capacity; 
2. While retaining the diagnostic threshold, courts should avoid letting the presence of 
mental illness be determinative of capacity. In doing so, ensure that the focus remains 
on the individual and his or her decision making; 
3. Courts should apply a rich understanding of risk when applying risk relative capacity. 
This means considering the risks and benefits of the decision compared to alternatives 
when determining the level of sufficiency of mental capacity; giving full and careful 
consideration to the subjective views of the decision maker in this determination, and 
in this regard making sure to fully weigh up the dis-benefit of having one’s capacity 
removed. However, courts should not let this complex calculation be determinative of 
capacity. 
Regarding conclusion 1, cases involving anorexia may involve a person who is purposefully 
restricting his or her nutritional intake to the point where health and life are risked, and who 
is refusing treatment aimed at avoiding these serious risks. It is not difficult to see how the 
decision to refuse this treatment will be typically characterised as highly unwise by 
authorities involved. Therefore, the challenge of performing a genuine functional capacity 
determination is heightened in these cases.  
This problem can be mitigated by ensuring that the enquiry into the person’s functional 
capacity makes careful use of the individual’s context, his or her beliefs, attitudes, and 
perspective on the situation.2 However, there appear to be difficulties in applying this 
solution to anorexia. If one considers the anorexic person’s subjective views, one could 
understand the person as having the goal or desire to be very thin as more important than 
anything else. Accepting that goal, any decision that had the effect of avoiding weight gain 
might be seen to be rational, and demonstrative of an ability to understand, use and weigh 
information in order to reach a decision. This could be compared with Kings College 
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Hospital Trust v C,3 in which C had refused life-saving dialysis. The Court, accepting C’s 
subjective views that a life that did not ‘sparkle’ was one not worth living—although this 
may be a questionable view to wider society—saw that her decision making was rational, and 
indicative of capacity.4 However, such a conclusion in the case of anorexia would seem to 
overlook the fact that the pathology of anorexia consists in those subjective views about food 
and weight, as expressed in the third of the diagnostic symptoms of anorexia from the DSM5: 
• Disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight or shape is experienced, undue 
influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or persistent lack of recognition of 
the seriousness of the current low body weight.5 
Therefore, the approach taken in Kings College Hospital Trust v C could lead to people with 
anorexia never being found to lack capacity, even though anorexia is commonly believed to 
impact on sufferers’ autonomy.6  
On the other hand, the diagnostic threshold accepted in conclusion 2 seems to risk the 
opposite problem. It was argued in Chapter 5 that although it was acceptable to have a 
diagnostic threshold for incapacity, using the threshold poses the danger that people would be 
found to lack capacity on the basis of their diagnosis.7 It was noted that this danger was more 
acute the more closely the illness was associated with problems in decision making.8 Two of 
the three diagnostic symptoms of anorexia9 can be directly related to problems in decision 
making, so this issue is potentially particularly problematic in the case of anorexia.  
Therefore, the law appears to face risks of both over- or under-estimating incapacity in the 
case of anorexia. Both of these concerns have been expressed separately in the literature. 
Hope and Tan published a series of articles on the issue of capacity for anorexia, in which 
they argue that because the test of capacity focusses on cognition, it is not equipped to detect 
the ‘effects’ of anorexia on decision making.10 Their argument is that an anorexic patient may 
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seem rational, understand their situation, and be able explain the refusal in terms that seems 
to show capacity. However, to conclude that the adult had capacity based on these features 
would be to reckon without the person’s ‘pathological values’, values associated with the 
illness that are detrimental to autonomy, but are not detected by normal capacity tests.11 
Craigie and Foster have also stated that people with anorexia will often meet the criteria of 
the current test for capacity, but question whether that outcome is appropriate.12 
On the other hand, some hold the concern that people with anorexia will always be found to 
lack capacity because it will be determined by their diagnosis. This concern was most 
memorably put by the parents of E, one of the subjects of severe anorexia found to lack 
capacity by the Court of Protection: 
It seems strange to us that the only people who don't seem to have the right to die when there 
is no further appropriate treatment available are those with an eating disorder. This is based 
on the assumption that they can never have capacity around any issues connected to food. 
There is a logic to this, but not from the perspective of the sufferer who is not extended the 
same rights as any other person13 (emphasis added). 
That two contradictory concerns can be held as to how the test of capacity applies to anorexia 
demonstrates the difficulties this illness presents.  
Conclusion 3 argues for a sophisticated application of ‘risk relative capacity’ that uses a 
thorough understanding of the risks involved in medical decision making. It was argued in 
Chapter 5 that risk in this context should be understood as the risk of the decision as against 
the other available options.14 In the case of treatment refusal, it should include a full 
appreciation of the risk involved to the person of having capacity removed and having the 
particular involuntary treatment performed. For anorexia, the risks in both directions are 
heightened. On the one hand, anorexia is a dangerous illness; malnutrition can be disabling or 
fatal, so refusing treatment to alleviate this is prima facie risky.15 On the other hand, as was 
noted in Chapter 1, one of the salient features of anorexia for people who have experienced it 
                                                          
Center Report 19; Tony Hope et al, ‘Agency, Ambivalence and Authenticity: The Many Ways in which 
Anorexia Nervosa Can Affect Autonomy’ (2013) 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 20. 
11 Jacinta Tan et al, ‘Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking Processes and 
Values’ (2006) 13(4) Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 267. 
12 Jillian Craigie, ‘Competence, Practical Rationality and What a Patient Values’ (2011) 25(6) Bioethics 326, 
327; Charles Foster, ‘Autonomy in the Medico-legal Courtroom: a Principle Fit for Purpose?’ (2013) 22(1) 
Medical Law Review 48, 61. 
13 Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 [52]. 
14 Chapter 5, Part III B. 
15 See Chapter 1, Part II B.  
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is the feeling of control it confers.16 It was also noted that childhood abuse is a risk factor in 
developing the illness, and forced treatment may be a traumatic trigger for people with those 
experiences.17 Force feeding has been described by the World Medical Association as 
‘inhuman and degrading treatment’.18 Also, as with other mental illnesses, forced treatment 
can decrease the chances of successful engagement in psychotherapy.19 In this context, 
finding the person incapacitous and forcing treatment on them should also be considered 
risky. Therefore, the application of risk relative capacity for anorexia requires a particularly 
difficult balancing process.  
In summary, it can be seen that the Conclusions reached in Chapter 5 do not immediately 
solve the difficulties in determining capacity in the case of anorexia. More consideration is 
required. 
  
  LEGAL DECISIONS ON CAPACITY AND ANOREXIA IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
A Overview 
Until relatively recently, there were no reported cases in England, Wales and Australia in 
which capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia was considered under capacity law. A number 
of earlier decisions mentioned capacity, however they were made under either mental health 
law, or under the parens patriae jurisdiction relating to minors. The impression given by 
those cases was that had capacity been determinative, the subject would have been found to 
have lacked it.20 There are still no reported Australian cases that make this determination, 
however since 2012, there have been five such cases in the Court of Protection (England and 
Wales).21 All five cases involved a person who had been treated for anorexia for a number of 
years without success, and who wanted the treatment to cease. Although not always identified 
as such, each subject of those cases would probably meet the criteria for ‘severe and enduring 
                                                          
16 Chapter 1, Part II D. 
17 Ibid. 
18 World Medical Association, WMA Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers (2017) 
<https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-malta-on-hunger-strikers/>. 
19 Chapter 1, Part II D. 
20 With the possible exception of Riverside Mental Health NHS Trust v Fox 1 FLR 614, see Introduction, fn 24. 
See also Kristy Keywood, ‘Rethinking the Anorexic Body: How English Law and Psychiatry ‘Think’’ (2003) 
26(6) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 599. 
21 Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) [2012] EWCOP 1639, The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWCOP 
2741, A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35; Re W (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2016] 
EWCOP 13, Cheshire & Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust v Z [2016] EWCOP 56. 
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anorexia’. Each of the five were found by the court to lack capacity to make the decision to 
refuse treatment for the anorexia.  
It was shown in Chapter 5 that concerns the test of capacity did not capture the ‘effects’ of 
mental illness generally have been unfounded.22 That all of the Court of Protection cases 
finds the adult to lack capacity indicates that this concern is also unfounded for anorexia. 
Indeed, as this Part will show, the reasoning followed in these cases means that a person with 
anorexia will never be found to have the capacity to refuse its treatment.  
 
B Courts Find Anorexia Causes Deficit in Decision Making Ability 
The precise reasoning on the question of capacity in the five Court of Protection cases differs, 
but in each case the general reasoning is very similar. The adult was not present in any of the 
cases, understandably as each was very sick. In Re W (Medical Treatment: Anorexia), 
Jackson J did speak to W via video-link,23 but did not appear to consider the impression 
gained by this in his determination of capacity. Each case used evidence from the same 
psychiatrist, Dr Tyrone Glover, a specialist in eating disorders, and his evidence played a 
prominent role in the determination of capacity,24 which was usually stated in a single 
paragraph. In each case, anorexia, or a diagnostic symptom of anorexia, was presented as the 
cause of the patient’s incapacity to make the decision to refuse treatment for anorexia. At this 
level, the reasoning used resembles that of by Lord Donaldson in the parens patriae 
jurisdiction, who in Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) stated: 
[i]t is a feature of anorexia nervosa that it is capable of destroying the ability to make an 
informed choice. It creates a compulsion to refuse treatment or only to accept treatment which 
is likely to be ineffective. This attitude is part and parcel of the disease and the more 
advanced the illness, the more compelling it may become.25 
                                                          
22 Chapter 5, Part IV A 1.  
23 Re W (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13 [4]. 
24 Cave and Tan discuss the problems with one expert being used in many cases in Emma Cave and Jacinta Tan, 
‘Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa in the Court of Protection in England and Wales’ (2017) 23 
International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 1. 
25 Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758, 769 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
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Jackson J in Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia),26 stated that this case did not provide 
‘direct assistance’,27 as it was decided under a different jurisdiction. Nevertheless, his 
Honour’s reasoning in that case is comparable: 
..E's obsessive fear of weight gain makes her incapable of weighing the advantages and 
disadvantages of eating in any meaningful way. For E, the compulsion to prevent calories 
entering her system has become the card that trumps all others. The need not to gain weight 
overpowers all other thoughts.28  
Both extracts mention a ‘compulsion’ to refuse treatment; the cause was stated in Re W (A 
Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) to be anorexia, in Re E (Medical Treatment 
Anorexia) it was a ‘fear of weight gain’, one of the diagnostic symptoms of anorexia. This 
compulsion, it was held, meant that the subjects lacked capacity to make decisions about 
food. 
In Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia), Dr Glover told the court that ‘anyone with severe 
anorexia’ would lack capacity to make decisions about treatment.29 Jackson J did not find it 
necessary to reach a conclusion on this general point, but does not disagree with it.  
In the other Court of Protection cases, there was a more direct link made between anorexia 
and incapacity, reflecting the views of Dr Glover. In A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X,30 the 
court heard evidence from Dr Glover that: 
[X’s] ability to weigh the decision in the balance is significantly disturbed by her fear of 
weight gain. This disturbance is sufficient to render [Ms X] incapacitous with respect to these 
decisions.31 
This evidence is stated without interrogation, and forms part of the finding that X lacked 
capacity. In The NHS Trust v L and Others,32 the connection between the illness and the 
incapacity was even more direct. King J stated: ‘[t]he illness, [Dr Glover] explained, causes a 
deficit in capacity specific to issues relating to food and weight gain’33 and on this basis her 
Honour was ‘entirely satisfied’ L lacked capacity.34 Similarly, in Re W (Medical Treatment: 
                                                          
26 [2012] EWHC 163. 
27 Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) [2012] EWCOP 1639 [119]. 
28 Ibid [49]. 
29 Ibid [51]. 
30 [2014] EWCOP 35. 
31 Ibid [28]. Note that there is another psychiatrist who gives evidence used in this case. That is discussed below 
at IV A 1 (a). 
32 [2012] EWCOP 2741. 
33 Ibid [54]. 
34 Ibid [56]. 
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Anorexia),35 the total consideration of capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia is stated in 
this sentence: 
I accept the advice of Dr X and Dr Glover that W, by reason of her severe anorexia, lacks the 
capacity to make decisions about the care and treatment of the condition [..]36 
In Cheshire & Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust v Z the judge simply states that he 
found the adult lacked capacity, and that the matter was ‘not contentious’.37  
In keeping with the direct connection between anorexia and capacity for decisions about 
food, three cases specify other types of decision for which the adult retains capacity. W is 
found to have capacity to make other decisions, like those about physical health.38 X was 
found to retain capacity to make decisions about drinking alcohol, despite being diagnosed 
with alcohol dependence syndrome.39 L is found to have capacity to make other health 
decisions, including whether to take antibiotics for pneumonia (as the antibiotics are not 
calorific), pain relief and treatment for bed sores.40  
 
C Support for this Reasoning 
There is nothing on the face of these judgments that is unusual or surprising; and the view 
they present of the relationship between anorexia and capacity has wider support. Baroness 
Hale uses ‘the kind of compulsion which drives a person with anorexia to refuse food’41 as an 
example of something that would ‘rob [a person] of the ability to make an autonomous 
choice’.42 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice, when discussing the ability to 
‘use or weigh’ information, states that:  
a person with the eating disorder anorexia nervosa may understand information about the 
consequences of not eating. But their compulsion not to eat might be too strong for them to 
ignore.43 
                                                          
35 [2016] EWCOP 13. 
36 Ibid [26]. 
37 Cheshire & Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust v Z [2016] EWCOP 56 [5]. 
38 Re W (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13 [26]. 
39 A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35 [30]. 
40 The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWCOP 2741 [54]. 
41 R v Cooper [2009] UKHL 42 [25]. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Department of Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (TSO, 2007) 48. 
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The UK Law Commission uses anorexia as an example of a ‘compulsive condition’ that 
could cause people to be unable to use information, despite being able to understand it.44  
The notion of anorexia being associated with a compulsion, and therefore a cause of 
incapacity is more than a legal construct, it reflects a widely held view in medicine also. As 
noted, these decisions essentially repeat the views of psychiatrists who present evidence on 
capacity.45 Two of the three diagnostic symptoms from the DSM5 have direct relevance for 
decision making.46 Further, the view of anorexia being a ‘compulsion’ to engage in particular 
behaviours has support from the reported experience of anorexia sufferers.47 
However, despite support for this reasoning, it is problematic when used to determine a 
person’s legal capacity to make a decision.   
 
D Problems with this Reasoning 
1 Circularity of Reasoning Means Functional Assessment Is Bypassed 
To understand this problem, it is useful to recall the logical issue with the diagnostic 
threshold. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW) requires that there 
must be an impairment of the mind identified—the ‘diagnostic threshold’—and that this 
impairment must be the cause of deficit in decision making.48 It was shown in Chapter 5 that 
for an impairment like acquired brain injury, the criteria for the impairment and the criteria 
for incapacity overlap significantly, and therefore the statement that one causes the other is 
circular, and incoherent.49 Describing mental illness as a cause of the patterns of thoughts and 
behaviours that comprise that illness suffers the same logical problem. It will be recalled that 
the diagnostic symptoms of anorexia are: 
• Restriction of energy intake relative to requirements, leading to a significantly low body 
weight in the context of age, sex, and developmental trajectory, and physical health …; 
                                                          
44 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.17]. 
45 See also Geppert, a psychiatrist and professor who argues that ‘decisional capacity impairment in [anorexia] is 
an intrinsic part of the pathology of the disorder’ (emphasis added): Cynthia MA Geppert ‘Futility in Chronic 
Anorexia Nervosa: A Concept Whose Time Has Not Yet Come’ (2015) 15(7) American Journal of Bioethics 34 
46 American Psychiatric Association, above n 5. 
47 E.g. in H. (Re), 2005 CanLII 57849, the anorexic patient describes the anorexia as a ‘tyrant in her head against 
which she could not fight’: 7.  
48 Part II.  
49 Chapter 5, Part IV A 3. 
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• Intense fear or gaining weight or of becoming fat, or persistent behaviour that interferes 
with weight gain, even though at a significantly low weight; 
• Disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight or shape is experienced, undue 
influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or persistent lack of recognition of 
the seriousness of the current low body weight.50 
The second and third of those symptoms have implications for decision making; they will 
manifest in decisions that avoid gaining weight. Therefore, to say that anorexia is the causal 
agent of a person’s decision to avoid gaining weight is both incoherent and without content.51 
It might be possible to associate certain decision making with anorexia. One could 
distinguish the actions of a person diagnosed with anorexia from that of a person on hunger 
strike by saying that one set of behaviours was associated with a mental illness and the other 
was not, but to treat anorexia as a cause of its own diagnostic symptoms is circular. And yet, 
as shown above, this is precisely the reasoning followed in the major England and Wales 
capacity cases involving anorexia.  
The reasoning apparent in Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) and Re W (A Minor)(Medical 
Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) is more detailed, because these cases purport to identify a 
compulsion that either causes or comprises (the judgments are not entirely clear) incapacity. 
As noted, the impetus to identify a compulsion here is understandable. Some who have 
experienced anorexia describe a compulsion, and if it exists, it would be legitimate to 
consider it a barrier to decision making capacity.52 However, the subjects in these cases (and 
the other Court of Protection cases) did not state that they were compelled to act as they did, 
so this compulsion was not directly evidenced, and could only be assumed. Moreover, it is 
not possible to separate the putative compulsion from the diagnostic criteria of anorexia 
itself; they amount to the same thing: a pattern of thoughts and behaviours involving a high 
value put on thinness and avoidance of food. In the same way, the diagnostic criteria of 
anorexia are not separable from decision making that avoids gaining weight; decisions that 
avoid weight comprise the diagnostic criteria of anorexia. Therefore, the reasoning followed 
in these cases is entirely circular, and this negatively affects the decisions.  
Identifying anorexia as the causal agent of someone’s decision making about food—whether 
or not a compulsion is said to be involved—is conceptually impossible. Therefore, the only 
                                                          
50 American Psychiatric Association, above n 5, 338-9. 
51 Simona Giordano, Understanding Eating Disorders: Conceptual and Ethical Issues in the Treatment of 
Anorexia and Bulimia Nervosa (2005, Clarendon Press) 70. 
52 See H. (Re), 2005 CanLII 57849. 
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way the courts can claim to be performing this identification is by inference, identifying an 
effect, and inferring the cause. In cases of treatment refusal for anorexia, the ‘effect’ has 
already been provided by the refusal itself. Therefore, the decision to refuse treatment for 
anorexia is simultaneously evidence of the cause (anorexia) and of the effect (incapacity).53 
The problem is admitted in Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia):54 
I acknowledge that a person with severe anorexia may be in a Catch 22 situation regarding 
capacity: namely, that by deciding not to eat, she proves that she lacks capacity to decide at 
all.55 
Therefore, these cases capacity will be determined by ‘status’: the person is diagnosed with 
anorexia, and ‘outcome’: the person refuses treatment.  
By merging the tasks of identifying the anorexia and identifying the incapacity, the functional 
assessment of capacity, supposedly the central feature of the test of capacity, is completely 
bypassed. 
2 Relevant Information Is Ignored 
The result of this is that the specific reasons the person diagnosed with anorexia gives for 
refusing treatment becomes irrelevant. In the Court of Protection cases, capacity is dealt with 
in a short passage, usually only containing reference to evidence from the psychiatrists. This 
is despite indicia of understanding held by these adults recorded in other parts of the 
judgment. For example, in Re W (Medical Treatment: Anorexia),56 W provided the judge 
with two documents about her position, which the judge described as ‘remarkable for their 
clarity and analytical nature’.57 The judge, having spoken to W through video-link, noted that 
W was able to give an ‘insightful response’ to questions about her anorexia,58 and was able to 
talk about her treatment options, saying that her current unit was problematic because ‘she 
feels that she has failed and that nobody believes that she can succeed’.59 In An NHS 
                                                          
53 Pierre Beumont and Terry Carney, ‘Conceptual Issues in Theorising Anorexia Nervosa: Mere Matters of 
Semantics? (2003) 26(6) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 585, 591. 
54 [2012] EWCOP 1639. 
55 Ibid [53]. The Superior Court of Ontario makes a similar admission (without noting the ‘catch-22’) in L. C. v. 
Pinhas, 2002 CanLII 2843. Reviewing a number of Capacity and Consent Board (Ontario) cases on capacity in 
the case of anorexia, the court notes without criticism: 
The very fact that the patient declined to follow the recommendations for treatment was considered a 
manifestation of the inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or 
lack of decision and contributed to the finding of a lack of capacity. [37]. 
56 [2016] EWCOP 13. 
57 Ibid [29]. 
58 Ibid [31]. 
59 Ibid [30]. 
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Foundation Trust v Ms X,60 X wrote a letter to the judge stating that the ‘pressure of mental 
health staff and services’ associated with her treatment over the last 14 years was making 
things worse, rather than helping.61 In Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia), in comments 
related by the Official Solicitor's representative, E stated that her life was a ‘torment’, and 
that all the treatment she has received involved ‘a lot of pain with very little benefit’.62 E 
knew that without treatment she would die, but wanted to ‘live for the remainder of her life as 
she chooses’.63 
All of these comments exhibit a seemingly accurate understanding of the situations the 
decision makers were in, and understandable reasons for refusing further treatment. They do 
not prove that these people had capacity, but given the test of capacity is directed at a 
person’s understanding of information relevant to the decision at hand, and ability to use and 
weigh that information, they are directly relevant to the determination of capacity. The fact 
that relevant comments like these are ignored when deciding capacity is the inevitable 
consequence of the approach taken by the courts. Anorexia, or the compulsion it creates, is 
seen as the cause of the treatment refusal. Therefore, even impressive reasons made in 
support of the refusal can simply be treated as more persuasive emanations from the illness.64 
The person’s specific reasoning will not change the determination in any way, and as a result 
it is irrelevant.  
It is true that deceit, whether conscious or not, is a known feature of anorexia.65 Therefore, 
reasons given for avoiding weight gain may in some cases be a post-hoc justification for a 
decision taken due to the compulsion. Thus, it may not be good practice for a doctor to take 
the reasons given by a person diagnosed with anorexia for their avoidance of food entirely at 
face value. However, to ignore stated reasons for a treatment refusal when making a 
determination on whether a person has a legal right to make that refusal is entirely different.  
                                                          
60 [2014] EWCOP 35. 
61 Ibid [51]. 
62 Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia), [2012] EWCOP 1639 [76]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 In Foster’s words, the Courts are effectively treating the refusal as being made ‘by the parasite’: Charles 
Foster, ‘Autonomy in the Medico-legal Courtroom: a Principle Fit for Purpose?’ (2013) 22(1) Medical Law 
Review 48, 61. 
65 Mark L Norris et al, ‘Ana and the Internet: A Review of Pro‐anorexia Websites. (2006) 39(6) International 
Journal of Eating Disorders 443, 446. 
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3 No Balance between Autonomy and Beneficence 
The overarching conclusion of Chapter 5 was that a proper assessment balancing between 
autonomy and beneficence in capacity assessment requires close and careful engagement 
with the decision maker, to understand the decision from his or her perspective. This is 
particularly important in the case of a person refusing treatment for anorexia. But these cases 
on anorexia do the precise opposite, relegating subjective views to irrelevance. This alone 
suggests that this approach is deficient. A number of others have pointed to the way decision 
making in anorexia cases has involved inappropriate subjugation of the subjects’ autonomy. 
Cave and Tan argue that this approaches a presumption of incapacity, in opposition to the 
presumption of capacity in the law.66 As Wang points out, avoiding the functional part of the 
capacity assessment appears to offend the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (EW), which presents 
capacity as primarily a functional test.67 In doing so, this represents a large backwards step 
for capacity law; the functional assessment, after all, was supposedly the means by which the 
law of capacity was to stop being a tool for medical paternalism, and instead be protective of 
autonomy.68 The approach shown here means that one of one’s most vital rights, the right to 
decide what others do to your body, is in effect removed by a psychiatrist putting you into a 
category, a category that is socially constructed, contested and contingent; without any clear 
recourse to legally challenge this determination.  
The problems with this approach to cases of capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia do not 
pertain solely to autonomy. Whiteman believes it may be discriminatory against people with 
anorexia.69 Wang and Whiteman both argue that incapacity by diagnosis offends the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 70 
As well as anorexia, any mental illness, for example, depression, in which a disturbance in 
decision making is one of the diagnostic symptoms of the illness, is similarly at risk of 
incapacity by diagnosis if this reasoning is followed. This pattern of decision making is a 
therefore a significant problem for the legal system.  
                                                          
66 Emma Cave and Jacinta Tan, ‘Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa in the Court of Protection in England 
and Wales’ (2017) 23 International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 1, 16. 
67 Noting the arguments from Chapter 5 that it should not be considered solely a functional test.  
68 Chapter 2, Part IV B. 
69 Joanna Whiteman, ‘Limiting Autonomy? Mental capacity to refuse treatment in the UK. The Equal Rights 
Review’ (2012) 9 The Equal Rights Review 149, 151. 
70 Daniel Wei L Wang, ‘Mental Capacity Act, Anorexia Nervosa and the Choice Between Life-Prolonging 
Treatment and Palliative Care: A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X’ (2015) 78(5) Modern Law Review 871; 
Whiteman, ibid 152. 
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   HOW SHOULD CAPACITY IN THE CASE OF ANOREXIA BE DETERMINED? 
A Ensure Functional Capacity Assessment Is Performed 
If a proper balance between autonomy and beneficence is to be achieved in anorexia cases, 
the most immediate imperative is to ensure these decisions are decided by a functional test. 
Despite the logical problems associated with the diagnostic threshold in the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (EW), the Act is clear that diagnosis does not determine capacity, and that whatever 
the ‘status’ of the individual, the functional test still applies.71 Therefore, although the 
diagnostic threshold means that an impairment does have to be formally identified and 
associated with the deficit in decision making ability, this is only one element of 
determination.  
The above analysis shows that this cannot simply amount to determining whether or not the 
decision to refuse treatment was caused by the illness, or symptoms of the illness, without 
being circular, and without leading to incapacity by diagnosis. Abandoning this type of 
reasoning is therefore essential.  
A concern might be raised that abandoning the causal reasoning criticised here might lead to 
a different problem. Anorexia primarily manifests in goals and values, rather than problems 
with cognition to which the functional test of capacity is directed. Insisting on a functional 
assessment that avoided consideration of causation, therefore, might lead to an 
underestimation of incapacity in the case of anorexia.72 It was for this reason that Hope and 
Tan suggested the concept of ‘pathological values’73 be included in the test of capacity. 
However, there is good reason to think that such a move is not necessary. Grisso and 
Appelbaum argue in their response to Hope and Tan that the differences in thinking 
associated with anorexia will tend to find expression in some kind of distortion of reality, 
which in turn will be identified in a normal functional capacity assessment.74 Taking a wider 
view of the case law, it is possible to find support for this position. There are a number of 
cases on capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia from Ontario, Canada and one from New 
Zealand75 that include examples of specific problems in decision making that are legitimately 
linked to a functional capacity assessment. In Ontario, capacity to make medical treatment 
                                                          
71 S 3. 
72 Part II above.  
73 Tan et al (2006), above n 10.  
74 Thomas Grisso and Paul S Appelbaum, ‘Appreciating Anorexia: Decisional Capacity and the Role of Values’ 
(2006) 13(4) Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 293. 
75 Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538. 
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decisions is decided by the Capacity and Consent Board, under a comparable definition of 
capacity to that in England and Wales and Australia.76 The cases mentioned in this Part 
involve hospital patients who were diagnosed with anorexia, and were refusing treatment for 
the anorexia.77 The New Zealand case Re CMC78 was heard under guardianship legislation, 
and also involved a hospital patient diagnosed with anorexia, who was refusing treatment. It 
was also decided under legislation equivalent to England and Wales and Australia.79  
Three common problems in decision making that have been identified and used in the 
determination of capacity in these reported cases will be described.  
1 Reasons Anorexia May Be ‘Detected’ on a Functional Assessment.  
(a) False Beliefs about Quality of Available Food 
In some cases a person refusing to eat had done so for the stated reason that their diet at the 
hospital was inadequate.80 These beliefs about the nature of the food provided in the hospital 
were found by the court or tribunal to be factually incorrect, and thus evidence of a lack of 
understanding of information pertaining to the decision. In Re RM,81 the patient stated that 
the hospital food was ‘unnatural’ compared to the ‘holistic’ and ‘natural’ food she ate at 
home.82 This was held by the Capacity and Consent Board of Ontario to constitute 
‘delusional thinking around food’,83 caused by anorexia which, along with other 
manifestations of the disorder, prevented RM from being able to understand and appreciate 
information relevant to the treatment decision.84  
In the New Zealand guardianship case of Re CMC,85 evidence was presented that CMC had 
been provided with ‘an abundance of food and variety of food’86 at the hospital, but still 
argued that she was given an inadequate diet. His Honour stated that in fact ‘she wished to be 
                                                          
76 Health Care Consent Act, SO 1996 c 2 s 4. 
77 In Ontario, Canada, children are also dealt with by the same law as adults, merging ‘Gillick competency’ and 
capacity; R Geist, D Katzman, and J Colangelo, ‘The Consent to Treatment Act and an Adolescent with 
Anorexia Nervosa’ (1996) 16 Health Law in Canada 110. Case law from this jurisdiction, including cases 
relating to minors, is therefore directly relevant to the issue of capacity in that jurisdiction. Some cases 
mentioned here involved patients who were under 18.  
78 [1995] NZFLR 538.  
79 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (NZ) s 5. 
80 RM (Re), 2012 CanLII 7685, JQ (Re), 2011 CanLII 84618 and Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538. 
81 2012 CanLII 7685. 
82 Ibid [8]. 
83 Ibid [11]. 
84 Ibid.  
85 [1995] NZFLR 538. This was decided under a functional definition of capacity: Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights Act 1988 (NZ) s 5. 
86 Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538, 542. 
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so selective that she effectively prevented herself from being able to have a full and balanced 
diet’ and that ‘[t]his was a normal feature of the illness itself’,87 and not ‘deliberate’ but 
‘compulsive’. 
If a belief that is relevant to the decision being made is unequivocally untrue, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that this negatively affects capacity to make that decision. This 
informed the reasoning in Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W,88 in which W, 
who refused an emergency caesarean section on the basis that she believed she was not 
pregnant, was found to lack capacity to make this decision.  
(b) Unable to Apply Information about Nutrition to Oneself 
As noted, the psychiatric entity of anorexia is not associated with broader cognitive 
problems.89 It is likely that most people with anorexia would be able to understand the 
medical fact that people require a certain intake of food to be healthy. One pattern observed 
in anorexic patients is that they will at some level understand the information given to them 
about weight and nutrition, but not fully believe that it applies to them. Hope and Tan quote 
the following statements by subjects in their study that evidence this feature of anorexia: 
Participant B:  Your bones can be weak, your heart slows down, you can be infertile, stuff 
like that. 
Interviewer:  Has the risk of death been mentioned?  
Participant B: Yeah. 
Interviewer:  Do you believe these things you’ve been told?  
Participant B:  No. 
Interviewer:  About the risk of death, do you think it could happen?  
Participant B:  Not to me. 
Interviewer:  That’s the opinion of doctors, and I wonder why you don’t think it can 
happen to you.  
Participant B:  Because you have to be really thin to die, and I’m fat, so it won’t happen to 
me.90  
--- 
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Interviewer:  Why do you think you don’t believe these things could happen to you?  
Participant H:  Because although logic tells me I’m underweight, but I don’t feel it. When 
I’m just going around doing whatever in the day, then I don’t feel that I’ve 
got a problem. But I know I am underweight because I stand on the scales.  
Interviewer:  So it sounds like logic tells you you’re underweight. But the way you feel is 
that you’re normal weight?  
Participant H:  Yeah, I just feel that I’m – I don’t feel ill, if you know what I mean. I just feel 
– I guess I’ve got used to the feeling. But my hands are often cold and so – 
but I’m used to it so to me it’s normal.91 
This problem in decision making was identified and formed part of the reasoning in A NHS 
Foundation Trust v Ms X.92 There, X’s clinician provided the following evidence: 
[Ms X] is able to understand the information provided and on my assessment of her cognitive 
state on the 28th August 2014 she was able to retain and feedback to me the information 
provided to her about the same evidencing both retention and understanding due to ongoing 
severe body dysmorphia, false beliefs about her weight shape and nutritional state and 
absolute fear of weight gain from her anorexia, she was and is unable to apply the information 
to herself or believe in the need for it. In addition the absolute fear of weight gain and anxiety 
induced around the same over rides any loose connection she might have to the information 
pertaining to herself. The reality and importance of the associated risks including death of her 
malnourished state are therefore not truly appraised which means she is unable to weigh up 
the information provided in the decision making process93 (emphasis in original.) 
This evidence was accepted unreservedly, and Cobb J found that X lacked capacity to make 
decisions about treatment for her anorexia. The same feature is identified in the Capacity and 
Consent Board (Ontario) case of In the Matter of R.B., a Patient at the Hospital for Sick 
Children:94 
[a]lthough R.B. superficially understood the need for food and fluid to remain medically 
stable she was unable to apply this information to her own condition. This was because of the 
anorexia.95 
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95 Ibid [34]. For other decisions using this reasoning see Board of Capacity and Consent (Ontario) decision in 
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Understanding whether a general medical fact that applies to all humans also applies to that 
individual is a relevant piece of information regarding the decision. Failure to understand this 
may legitimately lead a capacity assessor to conclude that the adult does not sufficiently 
understand information relevant to the decision.96  
(c) Dissonance between Goals and Decisions.  
Another aspect of decision making in anorexia that may influence a legitimate functional 
assessment of capacity is the inconsistency between a person’s stated goals and their 
individual decisions. This does not demonstrate a lack of capacity, however it is an alerting 
inconsistency, and one which might legitimately be put to the decision maker. Grisso and 
Appelbaum note the following inconsistency in Hope and Tan’s subject’s discussion, in 
which Patient I at one point says: ‘I wasn't really bothered about dying, as long as I died 
thin’, but later says: ‘I do think that being thinner for me will make me happy.’ 97 
This reasoning can be seen in In The Matter of L.W.,98 where the Capacity and Consent 
Board of Ontario found: ‘Although L.W. states she does not want to die, she is unable to take 
steps to prevent herself from dying.’99 Similarly, in L. C. v. Pinhas:100 
L.C. wants to move on with her life. The fact is, however, that, over the past almost four 
years, she has consistently conducted herself in a manner that takes herself further and further 
from her goal of recovery101 
This dissonance is seen by the Board as caused by the anorexia, and assists the board to 
conclude that the patient in those cases lacks capacity to make decisions about food. Re CMC 
also includes this reasoning: 
Whilst she stated that she wished to survive and wished to have a future quality relationship 
with her children – indeed, wished to attain an optimum weight for her own wellbeing, she 
could not see what was necessary in order for this to be achieved.102 
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Inconsistencies like this, as Grisso and Appelbaum argue, are not constitutive of incapacity, 
but with further inquiry might be seen as evidence of a lack of ability to use or weigh 
information pertaining to the decision.103 
 
B Engage with Decision Maker’s Subjective Reasons; Do Not Rely 
Solely on Medical Evidence 
The overvalued ideas and body dysmorphia associated with anorexia may mean that a 
genuine functional assessment will uncover legitimate, functional bases for finding a lack of 
capacity. But this, in turn, means that the risk remains that in practice, people with anorexia 
will invariably be found to lack capacity to refuse its treatment. It is likely that a closer 
engagement with functional capacity in the Court of Protection cases could have uncovered 
some legitimate evidential support for a finding of incapacity like those outlined above in 
Part IV A 1. If it were the case that being found to have capacity to refuse treatment for 
anorexia was a practical impossibility, then the problems associated with its being a 
theoretical impossibility still apply. In this context, it is worth noting that none of the reported 
cases of which the researcher is aware, even in the wider contexts of Canada and New 
Zealand, made this finding. Therefore, insisting on a functional approach may not be 
sufficient.  
One of the important findings of Chapter 4 was that an overemphasis on beneficence in legal 
decision making on capacity can be associated with an over-reliance on medical opinions on 
capacity, at the expense of proper engagement with the adult. This problem is arguably 
evidenced in many decisions in the case of anorexia, like the five Court of Protection 
(England and Wales) decisions, in which the issue of capacity is resolved by the courts 
seemingly on the psychiatrists’ evidence alone, frequently just on one psychiatrist. By leaving 
the adult out of the legal proceedings when determining capacity, he or she does not have the 
opportunity to respond to the evidence upon which his or her rights will be decided. If a court 
infers a deficit in capacity from features of a patient’s decision making, for example, on what 
it regards as a distortion of reality, those features, and that inference, should be put to the 
adult so that he or she has the chance to respond. The court can say: ‘You say X, but the 
reality is Y. This tends to indicate you lack capacity to make this decision. Would you like to 
say something about that?’. Responses to this may not reveal anything to displace the initial 
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views of the court. But this cannot be known in advance, and as a matter of natural justice the 
subject must at least have a chance to answer this question. Doing this also can prevent 
capacity from being determined on the medical evidence alone.  
As well as responding to inferences drawn from medical evidence, this direct engagement 
with the adult should also include asking the adult for his or her reasons why they are 
refusing treatment. This was one of the conclusions of Chapter 5, and as discussed above, it is 
notably absent from anorexia capacity cases.104 This process of engagement may reveal 
reasons for refusal of treatment that go to demonstrating capacity.  
Wang, and Cave and Tan, have convincingly argued that the Court of Protection (England 
and Wales) conception of ‘the decision’ for which capacity in the case of anorexia has been 
assessed is too narrow. As Wang argues in relation to the decision in An NHS Foundation 
Trust v Ms X,105 X’s refusal should not be simply seen as one pertaining to nutrition. It was 
also about a ‘painful, invasive and dangerous treatment that carries many mental and physical 
risks’ and may be associated with memories of childhood abuse.106 With this broader view of 
the decision in mind, there are many reasons one may give for avoiding treatment for 
anorexia that cannot be dismissed as caused by a compulsion associated with the illness. Any 
type of forced treatment is unpleasant, but forced treatment for anorexia is especially so for 
two reasons. Firstly, nasogastric feeding is particularly uncomfortable and invasive.107 
Secondly, the subjective experience of many people with anorexia is that interference with 
personal control and autonomy is particularly troubling.108 If these aspects of the decision are 
considered, it is very possible that people experiencing anorexia will be able to provide 
reasons more likely to be seen as demonstrative of capacity. 
Engaging directly with the decision maker in this way may be very difficult. People at the 
severe end of the illness may be very medically unwell, and too weak to attend a hearing, 
complicating the court’s ability to directly question the adult. It also may be difficult for the 
person whose capacity is questioned to be directly confronted with what the court sees as 
their distortions of reality. Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, without direct and open 
engagement with the adult on the issue of capacity, decisions on capacity in the case of 
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anorexia will be necessarily determined by psychiatrist’s opinions made before the trial 
begins, and the risk that incapacity by diagnosis will be the practical reality for anorexic 
patients refusing treatment will transpire.  
 
C Autonomy and Beneficence Are Both Relevant 
The suggestions made in this Part on the process by which the law should decide capacity to 
refuse treatment for anorexia, have the goal of ensuring that beneficence and autonomy are 
balanced together, not that one or the other operate alone. To illustrate, consider the three 
problems in decision making were identified in Part IV A 1 that may be present in a person 
diagnosed with anorexia, and are relevant to a functional determination of capacity: 
unequivocally false beliefs about food, failure to understand that medical facts apply the 
decision maker, and dissonance between goals and decisions. By using these characteristics 
as a basis for a determination of capacity, rather than the circular reasoning involving 
anorexia as a causal factor, the autonomy of people experiencing anorexia is promoted, 
because it means they will not have their legal capacity removed simply due to their 
diagnosis. However, it does not mean that beneficent considerations are removed. 
Normativity underpins all three characteristics of decision making, in that each problem is 
related to a form of rationality. Total commitment to autonomy would mean that the 
rationality of decision making would not be a factor in assessing capacity.  
Engaging with a decision-maker’s subjective reasons for their decisions also balances 
autonomy and beneficence. Hearing the subjective views of a decision maker in the 
determination of capacity, as opposed to simply hearing from medical experts, clearly 
provides a measure of support for that person’s autonomy. It means that people diagnosed 
with mental illness, even when they hold highly unusual views, may still be found to lack 
capacity. And yet, beneficence still underpins this process, because the interrogation is being 
done with a view to deciding whether to remove a person’s decision making autonomy, and 
have substitute decisions made on their behalf, in their best interests. Moreover, in practice, 
this question will only be under consideration due to the fact that the person diagnosed with 
anorexia has made the alerting decision to refuse food, despite being malnourished. 
Therefore, a beneficent consideration has prompted the determination of capacity in the first 
place.  
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D Capacity and Severe and Enduring Anorexia, a Special Case?  
One of the issues that has been considered in regards to capacity and anorexia is whether 
there ought to be different consideration given to ‘severe and enduring anorexia’. Draper,109 
Giordiano110 and Gans and Gunn111 all argued that while generally people with anorexia will 
not have capacity to refuse treatment, someone who has been treated unsuccessfully for years 
ought to be found to have capacity to refuse further treatment. Different specific criteria 
regarding the illness are given by the writers, but all of their descriptions would cover what is 
now described as severe and enduring anorexia.  
It is possible to see similarities in these arguments and much of the critical response to Re E 
(Medical Treatment Anorexia),112 criticism which notably did not appear in relation to the 
other four Court of Protection anorexia cases, in which capacity was similarly found to be 
absent, but the Court ruled that further forced treatment was not in the patient’s best interests. 
A reasonable inference that can be drawn from the difference in opprobrium given to Re E 
(Medical Treatment Anorexia) compared to the other Court of Protection cases is that the 
central problem was not the finding of a lack of capacity, but the ‘best interest’ decision that 
followed it. As such, although these criticisms are ostensibly directed at the Court’s lack of 
proper consideration of E’s autonomy,113 the underlying ethical impetus for this criticism is 
arguably a particular understanding of beneficence. This impetus is revealed in Hewson’s 
critique, in which she criticises the judge for treating E ‘like a child’, but also argues that for 
E ‘the deliberate infliction of prolonged suffering, with such a bleak prognosis, must be 
disproportionate. Put simply: it really isn’t worth it.’114 
Similarly, those who have specifically argued for differential treatment of capacity in the case 
of severe and enduring anorexia appear to be influenced by beneficent considerations. Draper 
does not believe her argument rests on best interests, nevertheless she does note that 
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subjecting someone to force feeding ‘on more than a few occasions’ will not be in their best 
interests. Moreover, her consideration of the issue itself is in part prompted by her question of 
what if: 
the quality of her life was so poor that the therapy was no longer of benefit to her, or that it 
was on balance more of a burden than a benefit?115 
Gans and Gunn similarly seem to rest their conclusions on autonomy, but one of the 
questions they ask that prompt their thesis is: 
Is there a point, when someone is in the end stages, that practitioners abandon the hope that 
the patient will be restored to competence?116  
Many of the criteria Gans and Gunn ultimately propose for finding someone able to refuse 
treatment are beneficent considerations, for example: ‘an objective assessment by treaters and 
family members that Mrs. Black's quality of life was poor’.117 Giordiano, on the other hand, 
openly bases her call for respecting treatment refusal in the case of severe and enduring 
anorexia on beneficence: 
After many years and many therapeutic attempts, and after many reiterated competent 
requests for suspension of therapy, I believe we should probably consider the patient’s 
request, not necessarily because the person is now more competent than before, but, more 
probably, out of pity118 (emphasis in original.) 
One of the central findings of this thesis is that beneficence plays a greater role in capacity 
law than is often believed, but that this role is coherent and necessary. In the previous Part, 
the use of beneficence through outcome and status was defended in the case of anorexia.119 
Nevertheless, it has also been shown that this role for beneficence carries with it a very real 
and high risk of unjustified paternalism and subjugation of patient rights. Therefore, calls for 
a differential treatment for severe and enduring anorexia based purely on beneficent 
considerations, whether openly acknowledged or not, should be treated with caution.  
However, by applying the conclusions reached in Chapter 5 and this Chapter, the views of 
these writers can be given effect, without any beneficent considerations other than what has 
already been set out in this thesis. It has been argued that the person diagnosed with 
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anorexia’s specific reasons for treatment refusal must be listened to. Recall that in Re W 
(Medical Treatment: Anorexia),120 An NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X,121 and Re E (Medical 
Treatment Anorexia),122 the patients all expressed the reason that the treatment they were 
receiving was futile, an understanding that was accurate, and ought to have been considered 
in the determination of capacity. Futility of treatment is something that is only apparent after 
it has been tried and failed; so by definition it will be more apparent in the case of severe and 
enduring anorexia. Therefore, consistent application of the approach to capacity advocated in 
this thesis might make it more likely for someone with severe and anorexia to be found to 
have capacity than someone for whom every available treatment had not already been tried 
and failed.  
The second reason why someone with severe and enduring anorexia might be more likely to 
be found to have capacity without any change in approach is through application of risk 
relative capacity. As noted in Chapter 5, this is an openly beneficent aspect of the law of 
capacity. It requires taking the risk of all aspects of the decision into consideration, including 
the comparative risks of a decision versus the available alternatives. It was noted above that 
the risks in both directions for anorexia were heightened, so at a general level a proper 
application of risk relative capacity will influence determinations of capacity in the case in a 
consistent way. However, this may be different for severe and enduring anorexia. In many 
such cases, the ‘risk’ of refusing treatment will be non-existent. This is evidenced by those 
four Court of Protection cases where it was found that continued forced treatment of the 
illness actually posed a greater threat than allowing the patient to follow her wishes and 
refuse the treatment.123 The ‘best interests’ substitute decision, therefore, was the same as the 
adult’s own decision. Allowing her to make the legally effective decision to refuse treatment 
herself, rather than taking that capacity away, then making the same decision, carried no risk. 
It was argued that the calculation of risk should not be determinative of capacity, and 
maintaining the distinction between risk and capacity was vitally important. Nevertheless, a 
proper use of risk relative capacity ought to require a low level of understanding of the 
decision for people in the position of L, X, W and Z. Therefore, consistent application of risk 
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relative capacity may have the outcome argued for by Draper et al,124 without the 
disadvantage of imposing ad hoc beneficent considerations for severe and enduring anorexia.  
 
 FULL FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT IN THE CASE OF SERIOUS MENTAL 
ILLNESS: AN EXAMPLE 
Properly applying the functional approach to capacity as advocated in this Chapter requires 
courts to make a very difficult balance, weighing very different considerations together. An 
anorexic patient may exhibit some distortions of reality that may be related to deficits in 
functional decision making capacity. They may exhibit serious internal inconsistency 
between their life goals and individual decisions. On the other hand, they may provide 
compelling reasons why treatment is particularly troubling for them. They may make 
accurate statements about the futility of the treatment. Bringing these different factors 
together in its calculation is a very challenging task, and it is one for which specific guidance 
cannot be given. Capacity is to be determined on the facts of each case. Which set of 
considerations will be found to carry more weight cannot be stated in advance. But by 
providing the patient with anorexia a voice in the capacity decision, and by considering the 
decision being assessed in its full context, the decision making will be improved.  
A recent Court of Protection case provides an example of how proper engagement with the 
decision maker can allow him or her to have a voice in the decision, and avoid the question of 
capacity being determined in advance by the opinions of psychiatrists, or by their diagnosis. 
Re SB (A Patient: Capacity to Consent to Termination)125 involved a woman who had a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, which had been managed with medication. SB became 
pregnant, and was initially happy to be pregnant, and stopped taking her bipolar medication, 
seemingly so as to avoid problems with the pregnancy. Unfortunately, symptoms of bipolar 
disorder then re-emerged, and SB was then detained for treatment under mental health law. 
SB then changed her mind about the baby and informed the health authority that she wanted a 
termination. Her capacity to make this decision was then assessed by the Court.  
The medical opinion presented to the court comprised the views of two psychiatrists, both of 
whom believed that without doubt, SB lacked capacity to make this decision. Both 
psychiatrists determined that SB’s decision to have the termination was based on ‘paranoid 
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beliefs’ about her husband and family, beliefs which were caused by her bipolar disorder. 
Evidence given in the trial, supported by oral evidence from SB, was that she did not believe 
her husband or family were supportive of her, nor would be supportive of her and her baby. 
These views were strongly contradicted by the husband and family. Dr Smith found that there 
was a ‘strong temporal relationship’ between the patient stopping medication, developing 
these ‘paranoid’ views about her husband and family, and deciding to have a termination of 
her pregnancy. SB’s husband and family agreed with this interpretation.  
However, despite this considerable evidence of incapacity, Holman J decided otherwise. His 
Honour decided to accept, for argument’s sake, that SB’s views about her husband and family 
were influenced by ‘delusion or paranoia’. Nevertheless, as His Honour noted, in her 
evidence to the Court, SB had also provided ‘a range of rational reasons for her decision’.126 
Importantly, SB told the court that having a baby as a compulsorily detained patient was 
‘crazy’; stating ‘I am extremely unhappy where I am. Imagine being unhappy and being 
pregnant?’.127 In fact, the idea of carrying the baby to term made her feel suicidal, and she 
believed that it was preferable to have a termination than to commit suicide.128 Holman J 
noted that it was possible to carry a baby to term while being compulsorily detained, having 
heard evidence that this frequently occurs. Nevertheless, His Honour found SB’s views on 
this to be understandable, and did demonstrate an understanding of the situation SB was in. 
Therefore, it was held that these reasons needed to be considered in the determination of 
capacity, and they weighed against the psychiatrist’s views of SB’s delusions.  
This case has great significance for decisions on capacity in the case of anorexia.129 In it, the 
court was faced with thoughts and beliefs associated with a mental illness that were found to 
be inaccurate, and could legitimately inform a finding of incapacity under a functional 
assessment. Against this, there were other reasons given by the adult, given a chance to speak 
and explain her decision, which indicated capacity. These subjective reasons were ultimately 
found to be more convincing than the weight of medical evidence. There is no reason why 
this balancing could not have taken place in the Court of Protection cases on anorexia. In Re 
SB (A Patient: Capacity to Consent to Termination), Holman J made the following comment: 
In most cases that come before the Court of Protection, at any rate in my experience, the 
assessment of capacity by one or more psychiatrists is regarded as determinative. But those 
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are generally cases in which the patient himself or herself is not positively and strongly 
asserting, and actually giving evidence, that he or she has the required capacity.130 
This is an accurate characterisation of the process of capacity assessment in Court of 
Protection anorexia cases. In each, capacity was decided on the evidence of the psychiatrists 
alone, without speaking to the adult themselves. However, the second part of this quote 
actually demonstrates the problematic nature of those decisions. To draw the distinction that 
SB was ‘positively and strongly asserting’ her capacity shows a lack of appreciation for the 
situation the subjects of those cases were in. As has been shown in this Chapter, these 
people’s capacity was effectively determined before they had got to court, just by the fact of 
their being diagnosed with anorexia and their refusal of the treatment. In fact, their capacity 
to refuse treatment for their illness had most likely never been considered possible, evidenced 
by the fact that they had all been in and out of compulsory treatment for the duration of their 
illness. Certainly, they were not given the chance to ‘strongly and positively assert’ their 
capacity in their cases; the judges did not think it even necessary to engage with them on the 
issue of capacity. The finding in Re SB (A Patient: Capacity to Consent to Termination) 
compellingly shows the different outcomes that were possible had this engagement occurred.  
 
  CONCLUSION 
Anorexia is the specific focus of this thesis. However, the initial assumption of this thesis—
that the law should not be adjusted to fit this particular mental illness—has not been 
displaced. The recommendations developed in Chapter 5,131 while potentially challenging to 
apply in the case of anorexia,132 should be applied in these cases. This Chapter has analysed 
problems that are evident in the reasoning of cases deciding capacity to refuse treatment for 
anorexia. Two conclusions have been reached following that analysis: 
• Courts should avoid reasoning that directly links the treatment refusal to incapacity, 
or anorexia to incapacity. Deficits in decision making ability relating to a functional 
assessment of capacity must be identified; 
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• If courts infer a deficit in capacity from features of a patient’s decision making, those 
features, and that inference, should be put to the adult so that he or she has the chance 
to respond. 
In keeping with the assumption of this thesis, these recommendations ought to apply to any 
person whose capacity is being assessed by a court or tribunal, not just those diagnosed with 
anorexia.  
Whether an application of these recommendations would have resulted in a different finding 
in any of the cases in which capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia has been decided is not 
possible to determine. Capacity is a judgment that must be made on the specific evidence 
presented. Nevertheless, by involving the subject in the legal determination of their capacity, 
and thereby broadening the evidence upon which the judgment is made, the decision making 
will improve.  
In Cheshire & Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust v Z,133 after the Court had very 
briefly ruled that Z lacked capacity to make her own decisions owing to her anorexia, thereby 
assuming the role of her substitute decision maker, Hayden J ruled that continued forced 
treatment would not be in Z’s best interests, and therefore she should be discharged home to 
her parents. His Honour found that this was ‘the only proposal which carries any vestige of 
hope and most effectively preserves Z’s dignity and autonomy.’134 One of the central themes 
of this thesis has been the relationship between capacity and autonomy. It has been shown 
that the law’s ostensible support for autonomy is less absolute than is sometimes thought. 
However, Hayden J’s statement indicates that for Z, her autonomy only came into calculation 
after she had been found to lack capacity. This is a problem. Deciding legal capacity must 
always involve a balance between autonomy and beneficence. If the conclusions of Chapters 
5 and this Chapter are accepted, a more appropriate balance between these two values will be 
achieved.  
Re SB (A Patient: Capacity to Consent to Termination) presents an example of how the 
conclusions of this Chapter could be implemented in the case of anorexia. It ought to be held 
as a positive example for courts to follow in the future. People with anorexia may still have 
an uphill battle to convince a court that they have capacity to refuse treatment. Nevertheless, 
if this approach is followed, they will at least have a voice in the decision, and a realistic 
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possibility of a finding of capacity. This will have a positive effect on the legal system, for 
anorexia, and for other mental illnesses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has shown that the response to the problems found in anorexia capacity cases 
cannot be made with anorexia solely in mind. Solutions must embrace the complexity and 
breadth of capacity to make medical treatment decisions, as well as a wide variety between 
and within recognised mental conditions. They also must bear in mind what is at stake when 
these decisions are made. In his critique of capacity law, Foster made the following comment: 
Given the consequences of being found in one camp rather than the other, and particularly 
since the idea of capacity is called upon by the judges to do the legal work that autonomy 
cannot do (or which the judges cannot be bothered to do), one would hope that capacity itself 
would be rich, nuanced, and philosophically sophisticated. It is not so.135 
The weight of the decision to remove someone’s legal capacity must always be given proper 
consideration, but the response should not be to seek simplicity in the law governing the 
determination; complexity is the price to pay for a proper explication of capacity. It is hoped 
that this thesis will help capacity law to develop the nuance and sophistication commensurate 
with its vital role in the legal system. To this end, the following conclusions have been 
reached: 
• When assessing capacity in the context of a decision characterised as ‘poor/unwise’, 
courts should give full and careful attention to the views, attitudes held and reasons 
given by the decision maker. Ideally, courts should talk directly with the adult in this 
regard, but if this is not possible, they should seek evidence of these factors, and use 
them to help make the assessment of functional capacity. Courts should avoid 
deciding capacity on the basis of medical evidence alone; 
• Courts should apply a rich understanding of risk when applying risk relative capacity. 
This means considering the risks and benefits of the decision compared to alternatives 
when determining the level of sufficiency of mental capacity; giving full and careful 
consideration to the subjective views of the decision maker in this determination, and 
in this regard making sure to fully weigh up the dis-benefit of having one’s capacity 
removed. However, courts should not let this complex calculation be determinative of 
capacity; 
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Medical Law Review 48, 58. 
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• While retaining the diagnostic threshold, courts should avoid letting the presence of 
mental illness be determinative of capacity. In doing so, they should ensure that the 
focus remains on the individual and his or her decision making; 
• Courts should avoid reasoning that directly links the treatment refusal to incapacity, 
or anorexia (or other mental illness) to incapacity. Deficits in decision making ability 
relating to a functional assessment of capacity must be identified; 
• If courts infer a deficit in capacity from features of a patient’s decision making, those 
features, and that inference, should be put to the adult so that he or she has the chance 
to respond. 
These solutions are not straightforward, but this should not be considered detrimental; indeed, 
it is necessary. Mary Donnelly recently commented that there is ‘ongoing tension between 
protection and autonomy norms’, but that: 
[t]his should not be seen as a problem. Without the pull and push of competing norms, we 
would lack necessary conceptual tools to engage with the complex questions to which 
impaired capacity gives rise.136 
The conclusions reached here all arise from a balancing of autonomy and beneficence, and 
create a complex, but coherent picture of capacity. The additional support for autonomy 
within these inclusions will hopefully have a positive effect on those subjects of future cases 
deciding capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia in England and Wales and Australia. In 
particular, it is hoped that by directing courts to investigate and consider the decision-makers 
subjective views and reasons, their agency in the process will be improved, and it will be 
possible for a court to conclude that some do have capacity to refuse treatment.  
However, it must be remembered that this thesis was directed at what process of reasoning 
the court should follow when deciding capacity, not whether or not people should be found to 
have capacity. One critical response to the conclusions of this thesis is that it may ultimately 
not make a difference to the outcome of cases involving people in the position of E, and the 
other subjects of the Court of Protection anorexia cases. It may well be that going through the 
processes outlined here will lead to particular individuals diagnosed with anorexia being 
found to lack capacity to refuse its treatment, as were the subjects of the previous cases. 
                                                          
136 Mary Donnelly, ‘Changing Values and Growing Expectations: The Evolution of Capacity Law’ (2017) 70(1) 
Current Legal Problems 305, 307. See also Robert Wheeler, Paul Spargo, and Anneke Lucassen, ‘The Shifting 
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Without a radical overhaul of the legal system, this situation is unavoidable. In accepting an 
ongoing role for legal capacity, one must also accept that some people will experience an 
unwanted loss of capacity.  
It must also be accepted that all of the elements of beneficence in capacity law that have been 
accepted and advocated here also carry the danger of undue paternalism. Therefore, it would 
not be enough to implement the conclusions of this thesis without further scrutiny. The 
results of Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that ongoing vigilance is required if these elements of 
beneficence are not to overwhelm the legal protection of autonomy. In this regard, 
Freyenhagen and O’Shea’s advocacy for ‘democratic accountability and contestability’ in 
capacity assessment should be followed as much as possible.137 Their suggestion of involving 
those who have been subject to involuntary interventions in developing policy and practice is 
also a very important one.138  
The life circumstances of E are profoundly troubling. That a person could experience such 
mental torment that voluntary starvation is their chosen course of action must enliven our 
concern and sympathy. The conclusions of this thesis may only play a very small role in 
assisting people in E’s situation. Obviously, there is a vast amount of other work that is still 
to be done, in medicine and law, to assist people like E throughout their experience of the 
illness, not just after years of failed treatment. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the conclusions 
of this thesis, as well as improving the law of capacity, will in a small way have a positive 
effect on people like E in the future.   
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